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Abstract 
This thesis examines the work of anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, South 
Africa and Namibia. It argues that these agencies have produced disappointing 
results in terms of investigating and prosecuting high-level corruption. It suggests 
five main reasons for this failure. First, anti-corruption agencies have suffered 
from a lack of resources resulting from lack of political support and the general 
problem of economic underdevelopment. Second, there is a lack of political will' 
to prosecute high-level corruption. Third, even if there was such a will, anti- 
corruption agencies, by their very. nature, are unable to affect the underlying 
political pressures which promote corruption and, therefore, their successes need 
to be limited to individual cases. Fourth, the model on which such agencies have 
been based is inappropriate to the African setting and assumes conditions that 
cannot be replicated in the subcontinent. And finally, these factors suggest that the 
purpose of anti-corruption agencies in Africa might possibly have more to do with 
reassuring investors and aid donors in an age of globalisation. than with actually 
attacking high-level corruption, an activity that would, after all, undermine the 
fragile political elites of these countries. The dissertation first evaluates the 
destructive character of corruption in Africa and attempts to control it through 
anti-corruption reform. It then proceeds to an analysis of the problem, and the 
agencies set up to deal with it, in each of the three country cases. The dissertation 
concludes with a comparison of the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies 
in the three countries. 
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Note about currency 
I have used local currencies where expressing values in the dissertation. Although 
there were fluctuations during my research, the rough equivalent for the 
currencies of Botswana, Namibia and South Africa were as follows: 
Botswana: 
Friday, I October 1999 
WI Botswana Pula 0.13360 British Pound 
I British Pound (GBP) 7.48526 Botswana Pula (BWP) 
(ii) I Botswana Pula 0.22050 US Dollar 
I US Dollar (USD) 4.53515 Botswana Pula (BWP) 
Nainibia: 
Tuesday, 22 February 2000 
(i) I Namibia Dollar 
I British Pound (GBP) 
(ii) I Namibia Dollar 
1 US Dollar (USD) 
0.09886 British Pound 
10.11492 Namibia Dollar (NAD) 
0.15813 US Dollar 
6.32400 Namibia Dollar (NAD) 
South Afýica: 
Monday, 8 May 2000 
I South African Rand 
I British Pound (GBP) 
I South Affican Rand 
IUS Dollar (USD) 
0.09421 British Pound 
10.61481 South African Rand (ZAR) 
0.14394 US Dollar 
6.94750 South African Rand (ZAR) 
Source: Oanda Corporation, New York: http: //Nv-%vw. oanda. com/convert/classic 
Chapter one: Introduction: combating corruption in Southern Africa 
This dissertation exaTnines the work of anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, 
South Africa and Namibia. These agencies have produced disappointing results in 
tenns of investigating and prosecuting high-level corruption. My thesis suggests 
five main reasons for this failure. Firstly, it argues that they have suffered from 
lack of resources resulting from lack of political support and the general problem 
of economic underdevelopment. Secondly, it argues that there is a lack of political 
will to prosecute high-level corruption. Thirdly, it suggests that even if there was 
such a will, anti-corruption agencies, by their very nature, are unable to affect the 
underlying political pressures which promote corruption and that, therefore, their 
successes can only be limited to individual cases. Fourthly, it argues that the 
model on which such agencies have been setup is inappropriate to the African 
setting and assumes conditions that cannot be replicated in the subcontinent. And 
finally, these factors suggest that the purpose of anti-corruption agencies in Africa 
might possibly have more to do with reassuring investors and aid donors in an age 
of globalisation than with actually attacking high-level corruption, an activity that 
would, after all, undennine the fragile political elites of these countries. 
These factors are inextricably interrelated and interdependent. Take, for example, 
the question of anti-corruption agencies being under-resourced. In the first place, 
this is usually because there is lack of political support for anti-corruption 
agencies. In part this arises because there is lack of appreciation for the fact that 
an effective anti-corruption agency needs to be properly resourced. But political 
support is usually lacking, also, because anti-corruption agencies are victims of 
the pressures for personal accumulation which bedevil African politics. Moreover, 
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anti-corruption agencies lack adequate resources because of economic 
underdevelopment. Anti-corruption agencies compete for resources with other 
institutions of the state. Because of underdevelopment, the state is not able to 
provide adequate resources for any of its competing institutions, including anti- 
corruption agencies. Resources in this case refer not only to money but also 
institutional weaknesses and skills. In most developing countries, skills are in 
short supply and the institutions are generally weak. This manifests itself in weak 
support for anti-corruption activities from related institutions such as the judiciary 
and the criminal justice system. If say, the criminal justice system is bedevilled by 
problems of capacity, this will slow the process of bringing those accused before 
the courts. This may also be the case if there is a shortage of judicial officers or if 
the police service is corrupt. In this sense, establishing an anti-corruption agency 
is not adequate, there is also a ncd to build capacity for other institutions which 
support anti-corruption agencies. 
Or take the question of political will. Anti-corruption agencies have also been 
limited in their success in combating high-level corruption because of a lack of 
political will to support investigation and punish high-level corruption. The lack 
of political will for combating high-level corruption arises because anti-corruption 
activities may threaten not only the positions of politicians but also the stability of 
the political system itself. By doing so, anti-corruption agencies "interfere with 
patterns of private accumulation and political patronage and threaten the 
privileges which state office bestows on political elites and their supporters and 
associates" (Szeftel, 2000a: 428). In this sense, anti-corruption agencies create 
problems for African states because they strike at the means of regime survival, at 
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the very nature of the African state which functions on the basis of political 
patronage. In part this explains why ruling elites often oppose anti-corruption 
activities. As a result, anti-corruption agencies do not get the resources they need 
to do their job and have also lacked independence from executive control or 
oversight as well as statutory autonomy. As Rose-Acken-nan observed, "good 
ideas are useless unless someone is willing to implement them" (1999: 5). 
Although anti-corruption agencies have had some success in tackling lower-level 
corruption, there are grounds for arguing that their inability to tackle high-level 
corruption undermines not only their legitimacy but also their ability to contain 
low-level corruption as well. This is not only because they lack resources and 
autonomy from the executive but also because political patronage may protect 
lower-level officials. In this sense lower-level corruption may thus be linked to 
high-level corruption. 
Then consider the problems posed by the nature of political corruption itself. 
Anti-cOrruption agencies in Africa have achieved limited success because such 
organisations are unable to tackle the political and socio-economic forces that 
promote corruption and undermine institutional reform in Africa. That is to say, 
anti-corruption agencies are equipped to address specific cases; the underlying 
political pressures which give rise to corruption are not part of their brief. Because 
of the very nature of development, people of ambition look to government as a 
locus of resources. As a result, there is pressure on public officials because a 
public office is seen as a source of vvealth. Anti-corruption institutions in Africa 
are victims of the structural pressures on the political process for personal 
t 
accumulation. Because they are not geared to deal with the structural factors 
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which promote corruption in Africa, anti-corruption institutions have in most 
cases treated the symptoms rather than the causes of the problem (Szeftel, 1998). 
In turn, by not tackling such underlying factors that promote corruption, anti- 
corruption institutions do not address the very factors which undermine 
institutional reform. As a result, "corruption has survived and prospered" (ibid. 
238). 
Again, the interdependence of these factors is seen when we consider the model 
on which such institutional reform is based. Anti-corruption agencies in Africa 
have b een s et upona model w hich isi nappropriatc tot he African s etting a nd 
assumes conditions that cannot be replicated in the subcontinent. Such agencies 
are modelled on the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 
Hong Kong. Following the success of the ICAC in combating corruption in Hong 
Kong, the ICAC has been seen, cited and employed as a model which other 
countries should follow. The ICAC uses 'a three pronged strategy' of 
investigation and prosecution, corruption prevention and public education in, its 
fight against corruption. This strategy is implemented by three departments which 
are interdependent. These are the Operations Department, Corruption Prevention 
Department and Community Relations Department (ICAC, 
2001: http: //w,, v,, v. icac. org. hk/; Camerer, 1999; Pope and Vqgl, 2000). The ICAC 
has wide-ranging powers (Camerer, 1999: 201). However, there are checks and 
balances to monitor the activities of the ICAC (ICAC, 2001: 
http: //Nv-vv-%v. icac. org. hk/eng/power/powe-acct-l. html; Camerer, 1999). We 
examine the ICAC in detail in chapter three. 
t 
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There is no doubt that the ICAC's strategy was successful in fighting corruption 
in Hong Kong from its establishment in 1974. However, as we shall see, the 
ICAC is a model designed for a colonial system with huge material resources. 
Despite this fundamental difference, the ICAC, as we shall show in our case 
studies of Botswana, South Africa and Namibia in the subsequent chapters, is seen 
as a model in the three countries in systems which operate on the basis of 
transparency and accountability. These are not authoritarian or non-democratic 
regimes. They are democratic regimes which are obliged to employ the rule of law 
in response to democratic demands from their citizens. Moreover, as we shall 
demonstrate, t he application oft he I CAC m odel too ur c ase s tudies h as h ad to 
take, of necessity, a very modified and diluted fonn. In our case studies, we find 
three different applications of the ICAC model. The experience of Botswana, 
South Africa and Namibia will suggest that more than a good model is needed to 
combat corruption successfully. 
And finally, anti-corruption agencies have produced disappointing results in 
fighting high-level corruption because, as these factors suggest, the purpose of 
setting up anti-corruption agencies in Africa might possibly have as much to do 
with reassuring investors and aid donors in an age of globalisation as to actually 
tackling high-level corruption. Indeed, we might question whether or not anti- 
corruption agencies were ever set up to tackle high-level corruption. It would 
appear that anti-corruption agencies have sometimes been established with little 
expectation of reducing corruption at the highest level. This could be the case 
because attacking high-level corruption might undermine the fragile political 
elites of these countries, as well as the stability of the political system itself. Low 
6 
expectation also arises because of underdevelopment of resources. It seems at 
least in part that anti-corruption agencies were not created to rock the boat but to 
reassure foreign investors and donor organisations. Reassuring investors is very 
important for these countries because of the dependence of their economics on 
foreign investment. Because of a combination of all these factors, anti-corruption 
agencies in Africa have been limited in their success in fighting corruption, 
especially high-level corruption. These arguments are at the centre of the analysis 
that follows in the subsequent chapters. 
The nature of this study 
Why study African anti-corruption agencies, especially given their limited 
success? We would suggest such a study is important for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, this study is the first of its kind. There is as yet no detailed, comparative 
study of anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, South Africa and Namibia nor any 
exploring why and how these institutions have emerged, how they function and 
how and why they evolved in the way that they did. This is the case despite the 
proliferation of anti-corruption agencies in Africa. There is a need for a study 
which will evaluate the nature of these agencies in combating corruption, and how 
they promote accountability in public administrations. To the extent therefore that 
this thesis infonns on the historical trajectory of anti-corruption agencies in 
Botswana, South Africa and Namibia, it tackles an underrescarched area of our 
knowledge of anti-corruption agencies. Moreover, the utility of the thesis goes 
beyond the particular account it offers of the work of anti-corruption agencies in 
Botswana, South Africa and Namibia. One of its key objectives is to provide an 
analysis of the broader picture about the dynamics of the politics of combating 
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corruption in Africa. To understand this dynamic, it is important and useful to 
examine the institutions that have been established to combat corruption. By 
conducting an evaluation of anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, Namibia and 
South Africa, we will contribute to the ongoing debate about how corruption can 
be regulated if not controlled. 
Secondly, the study is important because the impact of corruption has been 
46catastrophic" in contemporary Affica (Riley, 2000). At the turn of the century, 
corruption has come to be associated with political instability and deep-rooted crises 
of economic development, poverty and spiralling public debt. Stephen Riley 
observed that "extensive high-level or large-scale corruption, as well as its petty or 
incidental fonns, is linked to a wider set of systemic crises which now confront a 
number of African countries" (2000: 138). Moreover, he suggested, "corruption in 
Africa is universally perceived ... as being 'catastrophic' in its impact on 
development, a major cause of economic crisis, authoritarianism, political instability 
and state collapse" (Riley, 2000 quoted in Szeftel, 2000a: 427). Thus, Riley argues 
that corruption in Affica "is often part of a syndrome of de-development or 
underdevelopment which destroys the life chances of the poor majority". He 
suggests that it has "important transnational dimensions and both short-term and 
longer-term developmental effects, both of them catastrophic" and can lead to "very 
damaging consequences for public reputations and the integrity of state institutions" 
(ibid. 138). Similarly, John Mbaku asserts that corruption in Africa has become one 
of the major obstacles to "genuine development" as it "has failed to improve political 
and economic participation in the African countries" (1998: 35). Furthermore, 
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Mbaku contends that pervasiye corruption in Aftica is "a major constraint to 
effective institutional refonns" (ibid. 27). 
In similar vein, many writers stress the destructive nature of corruption in Africa. 
Kpundeh argues that "corruption in African countries ... poses a profound threat to all 
systems of government" (1995: 62), while LeVine asserts "that in a good many 
Afhcan countries political corruption is sufficiently pervasive that the public expect 
their politicians and public servants to be generally dishonest" (1975: 110). The 
President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, called for the need to tackle "the 
cancer of corruption" (The World Bank, 2002: 
http: //Nv%vw. worldbank. org/html/prddr/trans/so96/art3. htm). The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) states that corruption is capable 
of threatening stability, development, and the values of democracy (OECD, 
2001: http: //www. oecd. org/daf/nocorrupti. on/initiatives. htm). For the World Bank, 
corruption 
hinders economic performance, increases the cost of public investment, 
lowers the quality of public infrastructure, decreases government revenue, 
and makes it burdensome and costly for citizens - particularly the poor - to 
access public services. Corruption also unden-nines the legitimacy of 
governments and erodes the fabric of society" (2000: 73). 
Thus the consensus is that Corruption has debilitating effects on democracy and 
development (Szeftel, 2000b). These views that corruption is damaging in Africa 
are also shared by Africans themselves (Szeftel, 2000a). The rising concern over 
corruption has not only raised awareness but has also created a demand for good 
governance amongst local refonners and donors. Thus, corruption has become an 
important t heme f or m any c onferences o rganised w orld-wide tot ry toc ultivate 
and promote ethics and good governance. 
9 
Thirdly, the study is important because globalisation increasingly imposes 
universal standards of honesty and corruption. Globalisation creates pressures for 
the regulation of corruption. It requires countries to adhere to international 
standards of doing business if they are to attract foreign investment and aid. 
Countries perceived as having widespread corruption may find it more difficult to 
attract investment (World Bank, 2000). With the acceleration of globalisation, 
donors have tied aid and, especially, debt relief to political 'conditionalities' 
requiring political reforrn and 'good governance'. This includes the prevention of 
corruption. As an attempt to curb the problem of corruption, "donors have 
encouraged, through aid and political pressure, a number of strategies to further 
the governance agenda" (Szeftel, 2000b: 290). Thus, without substantive 
economic and political reforms, donors are able to withhold aid until the recipient 
country has met the criteria set by donor organisations. For instance, the World 
Bank has proposed cutting lending to a government that is reluctant to tackle 
corruption (Riley, 2000). Announcing a cut in aid to Kenya, a representative of 
the Dutch Government said "what is difficult to understand, in an age when 
governance is such a dominant theme in international discussions on 
development, is lack of action taken in Kenya on reports of looting of public 
funds" (Panafrican News Agency, 9 July 1999). For the World Bank and other aid 
donors, a successful anti-corruption strategy should curtail rent-seeking practices 
by public officials, reduce monopolies of power, and at the same time, promote 
accountability in government (Riley, 2000: 145-147). Szeftel argues that the 
demand that African governments tackle corruption demonstrates the desire to 
I 
build "a world that is fit for doing business" in the post Cold War era (2000b: 
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288). Thus, there is a commitment on the side of Western governments "to 
promote market capitalism and the liberal democratic state as the only 
institutional arrangements" suitable for globalisation (ibid. 289). 
This marks a profound change of approach compared with that of the 1980s when, 
as Riley noted, "many Western govenunents and international institutions failed 
to concern themselves with the levels of corruption in Africa" (2000: 137). Riley 
identified a number of reasons for this failure. He attributed it amongst other 
things to "an element of confusion", characterised by rhetorical condemnation of 
corruption with little effort being made to ensure that recipient governments 
seriously tackled it. Emphasis was placed on other issues seen then as of more 
importance, such as the need for achieving higher economic growth. Moreover, 
the unwillingness to seriously tackle corruption in the past had to do with the Cold 
War (ibid. 140). With the end of the Cold War, donors now contend that 
corruption is and has to be 'a politically salient issue' for reformers. As a result, 
nearly all of Africa's main aid donors and trading partners put in place policies in 
the 1990s to counter the damaging effects of corruption (Riley, 2000). With the 
acceleration of post-Soviet globalisation, "donors now expect higher ethical 
standards" (ibid. 142). And in order to meet the expectations of donors, concerted 
efforts had to be made to put in place Measures that promoted good governance 
and reduced corruption (ibid. 142). As we noted earlier, much anti-corruption 
reform was directed at meeting such donor and investor demands. In the eyes of 
donor organisations such as the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), "a limited, legitimate, honest and 
transparent state ought to be at the centre of the development process" (ibid. 144). 
II 
Thus, we can say that globalisation has put democratic reforrn and anti-corruption 
refonn on the agenda for Africa. Speaking of the need to tackle corruption in 
1994, Baroness Chalker said that 
where a government wants aid to help with a transformation to democracy, 
to strengthen its institutions, to weed out corruption and incompetence - 
we will give it. But where a government turns its back on democracy, 
ignores accountability, flouts human rights and allows corruption to 
flourish, our aid will only be of a humanitarian nature to help the people in 
real need. No taxpayer in any donor country should be asked to contribute 
to t he S wiss b ank accounts ofc orrupt t hird w orld p oliticians. There are 
courageous leaders undertaking difficult economic and political 
transformation without seeking personal gain. These are the countries 
Britain should help (ODA, News Release, 6 July 1994 quoted in Szeftel, 
2000b). 
This clearly demonstrates that donors are more c oncerned with political reform 
and the need to tackle corruption than ever was the case in the past. The new 
intolerance of corruption has to do with the high costs and threat corruption poses 
to the aid agenda and donor refon-ns. Moreover, Szeftel contends that the need to 
tackle corruption "reflects the dominant neo-liberal concern to promote 'market 
fiiendly' development", and furthermore, "it reflects the economic crisis in the 
South and the fonner USSR and the need to ensure that governments in these 
regions repay their debts to their (Western) creditors" (2000b: 288). 
For Riley, the growing concern with corruption is also "in part a product of the 
events of the 'corruption eruption"' (2000: 140). This refers to major corruption 
scandals witnessed during the last ten to fifteen years in both the developed and 
developing world (Della Porta and Vannucci, 1999; Galtung and Pope, 1999; 
Riley, 2000). Galtung and Pope noted that "throughout 1992 and 1993, significant 
corruption scandals reaching the highest political echelons in countries as diverse 
12 
as Belgium, Spain, Italy, Japan, France, and Russia" (1999: 263). Although these 
scandals may have put into question "the cultural superiority of the North" (ibid. 
263), donors nevertheless continued to preach and impose conditionalities on 
Africa. In turn, this concern over corruption has created pressures leading to the 
setting up of anti-corruption agencies in Africa and elsewhere. In turn, the process 
has been welcomed by Affican reformers. Hope (2000) holds that anti-corruption 
agencies are essential and need to be maintained if corruption is to be contained in 
Affica. It is in this sense that the control of corruption has become a high priority 
in recent years. 
Fourthly, the study is important because regardless of external pressure, 
corruption frequently poses a threat to democracy and prospects for consolidating 
democracy in Africa. This threat emanates from the unaccountable and thus 
unchecked use of state power. Moreover, in the eyes of the donors "liberalization 
requires also a democratization strategy to restrain state power" (Szeftel, 1998: 
226). LeVine (1993) argues that democracy helps to check corruption. LeVine 
notes that 
while administrative corruption cannot be eliminated, it can be limited in 
[democratizing] states. The operative consensus, with which I agree, is 
that attempts at [limiting corruption] are more likely to succeed the further 
the country is along the democratization path. The more democracy, the 
more likely that mechanisms will have been put in place to monitor the 
perfon-nance of administrators and bureaucrats as well as incentives 
created to 'nourish incorruptness' and punishments mandated to 
discourage corrupt practices (1993: 271). 
In this sense, "the persistence of corruption was an indication not of democratic 
failure b ut r ather ofi ncomplete d emocratization", e manating " from t he need to 
wipe out old states and eradicate old vested interests" (Szeftel, 1998: 226). 
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Democracy can limit corruption through greater accountability and transparency 
as well as by having an organised public opinion which can punish leaders 
through corruption scandals (LeVine, 1993). Riley, equally, observed that "the 
political and managerial will to control corruption, are more likely to be seen in 
democratic societies where pressures of political competition often force 
politicians to act" (2000: 153). 
Markovits and Silverstein make a similar point. They argue that democracy is an 
effective tool against corruption because it has the capacity through checks and 
balances to expose corruption in the fonn of scandals. These checks and balances 
are in the form of the rule of law, separation of powers, a free press, political 
parties that are competitive and free and fair elections. Because public behaviour 
in a democratic order is transparent and accountable, a breach in one of these 
ingredients of liberal democracy would result in the "due process" taking its 
course (1988: 6). Thus, they observed: "it is only via the firm institutionalisation - 
almost sanctification - of due process that liberal democracies can legitimately 
curtail the randomness, secretiveness, and exclusive character inherent in the 
exercise of political power" (ibid. 6). In this sense, liberal democracy has the 
capacity to limit the abuse of state power because it has well defined "strict rules, 
procedures and public scrutiny" (ibid. 6). Similarly, Wraith and Simpkins noted 
that "in theory the self-regulating processes of democracy ought to banish bribery 
and corruption from public life" (1963: 196). 
However, the issue of exposing corruption through scandals does not work well in 
Aftica. Riley wrote that "there is a relative absence of scandal in Africa" (2000: 
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148). This is because 'the due process' is weak because institutions are weak 
(Appendix 1 shows how Markovits and Silverstein's due process functions). This 
explains why it is important for Botswana, South Africa and Namibia to prevent 
the widespread corruption from taking hold if their fragile democracies are to be 
defended and consolidated. 
Alongside the argument that democracy can limit corruption, another opposite 
argument is also made, that corruption undermines and threatens democracy 
(Della Porta and Meny, 1997; Della Porta and Vannucci, 1999). Della Porta and 
Meny noted that by striking at the very heart of democracy, "political corruption 
endangers the very functioning of democracy" (ibid. 179). Johnston contends that 
corruption does its most serious damage to the intangibles of democracy - 
to the values of trust, forbearance, and justice so essential to making our 
system work. A system with no corruption will not be perfectly 
democratic, of course, but significant corruption puts these essential 
democratic values under severe strain (1982: 177). 
By attacking the essential aspects of democracy, Heywood observed that 
"widespread political corruption helped undennine one of the support structures - 
the claim to operate on the basis of public accountability - which had underpinned 
western democracies in the post-war world" (1997: 3). Similarly, Della Porta and 
Vannucci argued that "corruption undermines a number of democracy's 
fundamental principles" (Della Porta and Vannucci, 1999: 9). And Della Porta and 
Vannucci quoted Pizzorno, who observed that 
corruption tends to act upon those conditions of political activity without 
which democracy is not democracy at all: the principle. of transparency, 
and what might be called equality of political rights, equal access to the 
state for all citizens (Pizzorno, 1992 quoted in Della Porta and Vannucci, 
1999: 9). 
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Pizzorno's argument is important because it demonstrates that anti-corruption 
agencies are important and thus it is crucial that they function well, otherwise 
democracy itself is under threat. This is one more reason why anti-corruption 
agencies need to be examined and need to work properly. 
Furthermore, anti-corruption is important because it legitimizes democracy 
(Szeftel, 2000a). As Szeftel has observed, "the control of corruption is an essential 
element in the legitimation of liberal democracy and in the promotion of global 
markets" (2000a: 427). Democracy functions on the basis of defined rules and 
regulations, fair and equal treatment before the law as well as a separation 
between public and private function. These principles are necessary to legitimize 
the use of state power because corruption is a threat. This is particularly the case 
for new states in Affica such as BotsvVana, South Africa and Namibia. It is in this 
sense that anti-corruption agencies became part of the democratic agenda. This is 
important because for democracy to survive, especially in new states, anti- 
corruption agencies need to function properly. This is why the study of anti- 
corruption agencies is important. Having considered the question of why we 
should study African anti-corruption agencies, we now need to turn to the 
question of why we study them in Botswana, South Affica and Namibia. 
Cases 
The study examines the work of anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, South 
Africa and Namibia. There are a number of reasons why these three countries 
have been chosen as case studies. First of all, the three countries are in the same 
geographical region of Africa. Secondly, they have close historical, political and 
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economic links which mean that (a) they are more easily and relatively compared 
and (b) they influence each other in ways that make their choices of anti- 
corruption strategies interesting. Thirdly, all the three countries are stable and 
ruled by dominant ruling parties with only weak opposition parties facing them. 
Pressures for change emanate more from within ruling party and government than 
from the opposition benches in parliament. In addition to being dominant party 
states, all three countries have liberal democratic constitutions based on the rule of 
law. 
Fourthly, none of the three countries face the same serious level of debt crisis 
found in much of the rest of Africa and therefore none are subject to the same 
levels of direct donor pressures for refon-n. Thus, although all must consider 
issues of foreign investment and aid, the process of reforrn comes as much from 
internal political considerations as from international pressures from donors and 
investors. Fifthly, the three countries are qualitatively different from much of 
Aftica, in the sense that anti-corruption agencies in all three were a response to 
internal political debates rather than being simply the mechanical adoption of 
donor models. And finally, the three countries are ranked as the least corrupt 
countries in Africa at the- moment according to Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index (TI CPI). In this sense, for all the three countries the 
problem is to prevent widespread corruption taking hold if democratic gains are to 
be consolidated and defended rather than to control a rampant corruption. 
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The section that follows introduces anti-corruption agencies examined in 
Botswana, South Africa and Namibia, as these agencies are the subject of the 
study. 
Anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, South Africa and Namibia 
Botswana, South Africa and Namibia have established anti-corruption agencies in 
an attempt to tackle the problem of corruption. In Botswana, the Directorate on 
Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) was established in 1994 following the 
enactment of the DCEC Act. The DCEC Act provides "for the establishment of a 
Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime; to make comprehensive 
provision for the prevention of corruption; and confer power on the Directorate to 
investigate suspected cases of corruption and economic crime and matters 
connected or incidental thereto" (Republic of Botswana, 1994: A. 92). Its anti- 
corruption strategy involves investigation and prosecution, corruption prevention 
and public education. The DCEC is a government department with wide-ranging 
powers which is answerable to the President who appoints the head of the DCEC. 
However, it lacks independent powers to prosecute possible offenders. 
In South Africa, uniquely, there are more than ten anti-corruption agencies. 
However, this thesis limits itself to the discussion of three such agencies, namely; 
The Public Protector of 1994, Investigating Directorate for Serious Economic 
Offences (JIDSEO) of 1992 and Special Investigating Unit (SIU) of 1996. First, 
because at the moment these are the main anti-corruption institutions with the 
widest powers to curtail the problem of corruption in South Africa. Second, the 
other agencies are not as important and comprehensive as these three. These 
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agencies fight corruption mainly through investigation. The Public Protector was 
established 
to investigate matters and protect the public against matters such as 
maladministration in connection with the affairs of govenu-nent, improper 
conduct by a person perfori-ning a public function, improper acts with 
respect to public mo . ney, improper or unlawful enrichment of a person 
performing a public function and an act or omission by a person 
performing a public function resulting in improper prejudice to another 
person (Republic of South Africa, 1994: PREAMBLE). 
The Public Protector is appointed by the president on a non-renewable seven year 
term, following a recommendation by the National Assembly. The Public 
Protector is answerable to the National Assembly. He or she has wide powers, but 
lacks independent powers to prosecute. 
With regard to IDSEO, the principal objective of its Act was to "provide for the 
swift and proper investigation of certain serious economic offences" (Republic of 
South Africa, 1995). IDESO is a branch of the National Prosecuting Authority. 
The President appoints the Director of IDSEO. Although IDSEO was granted full 
powers to prosecute in 1998, it continues to make recommendations to the 
Nation al Prosecuting Authority. The SIU, in turn, was set up "for the purpose of 
investigating serious malpractices or maladministration in connection with the 
administration of the State institutions, State assets and public money as well as 
any conduct which may seriously hann the interests of the public" (Republic of 
South Africa, 2000: http: //%v-%vw. heathsiu. co. za/act. htm). The President appoints 
the head of the SIU. Moreover, the SIU operates on the basis of presidential 
proclamations. That is to say, for the SHJ to investigate, the President has to give 
it the authority to do so. The SIU investigates cases from a civil perspective. 
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In Namibia, the leading anti-corruption agency which is constitutionally enshrined 
is the Office of the Ombudsman created in 1990. The Ombudsman is appointed by 
the President following a recommendation by the Judicial Service Commission 
and reports to the Speaker of the National Assembly. In Namibia, the Ombudsman 
Act of 1990 empowers the Ombudsman to investigate acts of maladministration and 
corruption, issues of human rights abuse, and issues of the environment or misuse of 
natural resources. The Ombudsman lacks independent powers to prosecute. He or 
she only make recommendations following an investigation. 
Although the Ombudsman remains the leading anti-corruption agency in Namibia, in 
2001 the National Assembly passed a Bill providing for the creation of a special 
anti-corruption agency. However, the National Council rejected this Bill by two- 
thirds majority, and noted that "the tasks of the anti-corruption agency it was 
supposed to set up could be carried out by the Ombudsman's office" (77ie Nandbian, 
13 February 2002). The National Assembly can either accept or reject the 
recommendations of the National Council. At time of writing it has yet to react. If it 
accepts the recommendation of the National Council, "the Bill will be scrapped" 
(The Nandbian, 13 February 2002). The main aim of the Bill is "to establish the 
Anti-Corruption Commission and provide for its functions; to provide for the 
prevention and punishment of corruption; and to make provision for matters 
connected therewith" (Republic of Namibia, 2001). The Bill provides for an anti- 
corruption strategy, which involves investigation, corruption prevention and public 
education. 
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In all the three countries, these agencies have produced disappointing results thus 
far in terms of investigating, exposing and punishing high-level corruption. We 
will argue that this is because of the combination of factors outlined at the 
beginning of the thesis. Before we do this, however, it is necessary to examine the 
problems of research. 
The problems of research 
This study adopts a comparative method in order to understand why anti- 
corruption agencies have been established in Africa and why they have had such 
limited success in fighting corruption. The comparative method has not been fully 
utilised in explaining the work of anti-corruption agencies in Aftica. The study 
uses a cross-country method of comparative analysis. The attempt to embed our 
exploration of anti-corruption agencies in a wider perspective influences the way 
we approach anti-corruption agencies analytically. The comparative approach has 
the utility of offering an interesting analysis of anti-corruption agencies which 
may not be answered by data from a single case study. May notes that 
comparative analysis "can allow those who are studying other countries to have a 
particular insight into their practices" (1993: 157). For Mackie and Marsh (1995), 
comparative analysis is important, first because it offers an opportunity to move 
beyond an analysis that is ethnocentric. Secondly, it leads to the develoPment of 
theory and hypotheses that can be generally applied. However, there are problems 
with comparative research. May argues that one of the key problems with 
comparative analysis is "to generalize and explain social relations across societies 
and social contexts" (1993: 159). There are also problems as to how many cases 
to study, having too many variables and a limited number of countries to examine, 
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bias, and the problem of the same phenomena but having different meanings 
(Mackie and Marsh, 1995: 180-183). 
In making a comparative analysis, we used a number of approaches. First, we 
used institutional analysis to consider the state and the way institutions operate. 
Second, we compared the nature of corruption in the three countries to understand 
how corruption is embedded and how the conduct of politics affects the nature of 
corruption. The third approach to this is the use of political economy to 
understand how corruption is embedded in each political economy of each 
country and how political economy affects corruption and resources to fight it. 
The literature on corruption is generally dominated by single case studies (Riley, 
1993; Ellis, 1996). As Ellis has observed, "the literature on corruption or on 
governance in Africa more generally tends to adopt a national perspective, 
investigating how national elites use corruption or manipulation of public policy 
to enrich themselves and maintain themselves in power" (1996: 165). The 
defining feature of this kind of research is that its analytic focus concentrates on 
either a single anti-corruption agency or elites amassing wealth in a particular 
country without paying adequate attention to contexts in which anti-corruption 
agencies function. 
Collection and sources of data 
The data for the study was collected in the three countries of Botswana, South 
Africa and Namibia, which are the focus of the study, between the period 
September 1999 and July 2000. The fieldwork commenced with the application 
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for pemiits to conduct research in the three countries. For Botswana, the research 
permit was obtained from the Office of the President. And for South Africa and 
Namibia, research permits were obtained from their High Commissions in 
Gaborone, Botswana. Data collection started in Botswana, mainly in the capital 
city, Gaborone, where the headquarters of its anti-corruption agency, the 
Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) is based, and in the 
DCEC office in Francistown, Botswana's northern city. This was followed by a 
visit to the Office of the Ombudsman in Windhoek, Namibia during February and 
March 2000. The last leg of the fieldwork was conducted in Pretoria, South Africa 
in May 2000 at the offices of the Public Protector and the Investigating 
Directorate: Serious Economic Offences (IDSEO). Although it was not possible to 
visit the Special Investigating Unit (SIU), in East London, due to financial 
constraints, interviews were held with the head of the SIU and one of his officials. 
Although the thesis proceeds from an analysis of a wide range of general 
secondary work on corruption, much of the information presented in this thesis 
was obtained mainly from primary sources, official and unofficial, written and 
unwritten. Written primary sources of information collected from the three 
countries are listed in the bibliography. 
Unwritten primary data was collected mainly through face-to-face interviews and, 
on three instances, through telephonic interviews using semi-structured interviews 
as a guide (see appendix 2,3 and 4 for the questionnaires used). In all the three 
countries, those interviewed included; (1) officials working in anti-corruption 
11 
agencies, (2) politicians, (3) senior civil servants working in govennnent, (4) 
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journalists, (5) officials working in donor agencies and non-govenunental 
organisations (NGOs), and (6) academics. In all, seventy-eight interviews were 
conducted, 35 in Botswana, 23 in South Africa and 20 in Namibia. The people 
targeted were chosen for their specialised knowledge and positions of authority. 
Questions were asked to gain perceptions of, or opinions on anti-corruption 
initiatives in the three countries in tenus of how these agencies function and the 
difficulties they face in carrying out their functions. Data collected through 
interviews was recorded by taking field notes, as those interviewed preferred not 
to be tape-recorded. The notes were recorded in a personal diary. The data cannot 
be quantified because it is anecdotal and answers were often given in a variety of 
different ways by different respondents. As a result, data collected through 
interviews was managed anecdotally. 
Problems of data collection 
Collecting data in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa presented a number of 
difficulties. One of the key problems faced was that certain officials who worked 
for these anti-corruption agencies tended to be concerned with presenting the 
performance of their agencies in the best possible light and understating the 
limitations or problems their agencies faced. They were often unwilling to accept 
that there were such problems despite the fact that official reports produced by the 
same agencies highlighted a number of difficulties faced by these agencies in their 
everyday operations. Moreover, anecdotal evidence collected through interviews 
with people not working for these agencies suggested that these agencies had 
produced disappointing results thus far. Another obstacle faced was that of 
suspicion. Because of the nature of the subject of corruption, people were often 
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unwilling to talk openly about it and they preferred not to be tape-recorded, 
despite assurances that their names would not be disclosed and their views would 
remain confidential. An equally pressing problem faced was that of inadequate 
funding. A research that entails crossing borders is expensive to undertake. 
Therefore, data collection in Namibia and South Africa had to be achieved within 
a very short period of time and fieldwork was complemented by the use of 
internet sources, which proved to be a valuable source of information. 
Organisation of the thesis 
The thesis has eight chapters. Having set out the nature, objectives and approach 
of the study in this introduction, the dissertation then proceeds to an analysis of 
the general problem of corruption in Africa, analysing the political and socio- 
economic factors which have necessitated anti-corruption reform on the continent 
in some detail and the forms this refonn effort has taken. In each case, the points 
of similarity and difference between the general process on the continent and the 
specific features of the three case studies, is explored. This is followed by specific 
and detailed examinations of the role of anti-corruption agencies in each country 
before a comparative assessment is made. 
Chapter two is about socio-political forces and economic problems that drive 
corruption in Africa and give rise to anti-corruption agencies to combat 
corruption. The focus of this chapter is on the importance of corruption as a 
problem facing contemporary Africa. The question we are exploring in this 
chapter is why has corruption become an issue of critical importance to African 
politics in the last part of the twentieth century. This is in part because corruption 
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has destructive effects on the political system and the state in Africa. The chapter 
is important to the overall thesis in the sense that it leads to an understanding as to 
why corruption has devastating effects in Affica although the scale of corruption 
in Africa is not distinctively worse than in other parts of the world. The chapter 
argues that in order to understand why corruption is damaging in Africa, we need 
to understand the politics of the state in Africa. This is because corruption in 
Africa is embedded in the politics of the state. First weak state institutions, which 
are further undermined by economic problems, promote corruption for various 
reasons. Elites scramble for public resources as the economy contracts. Weak state 
institutions make corruption easy, lack of punishment of offenders encourages 
offences, and factional competition makes looting the state more likely. Secondly, 
corruption increases the decline of economic development and undennines 
democracy and thus stability. It also entrenches authoritarianism and the arbitrary 
use of power. This has I ed for pressures to curtail corruption. The chapter also 
shows how Botswana, South Africa and Namibia are different from much of 
Africa yet they have seen it fit to introduce anti-corruption agencies in order to 
prevent widespread corruption from taking hold in their countries. Moreover they 
want to assure foreign investment. In turn this chapter shows why anti-corruption 
agencies are important and need to be effective. 
Chapter three sets out the broader context of reform more generally and in Africa. 
With the increasing concern over the problem of corruption over the past ten to 
fifteen years, there has emerged a new consensus in development circles that the 
problem of corruption and in turn, economic crisis need to be tackled through 
institutional refon-n. This chapter is concerned with the specific nature and content 
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of the institutional or governance reforms and the problems that attend them 
generally in Africa. Donor govermnents and agencies are pushing for a liberal 
democratic reforrn agenda, which entails economic liberalization and political 
democratisation in pursuit of good governance. Moreover, reform entails 
instituting anti-corruption measures and the establishment of a stable government 
that is accountable and transparent. In the eyes of the donors and Western 
governments, political and economic reforms are seen as necessary to curtail the 
devastating effects of corruption in Africa. As a result of donor and local 
pressures, African states have of late embarked on some political and economic 
reforms. This chapter will help us to understand why there is a sudden push for 
institutional reform in Africa. Despite a push for reform to curb the problem of 
corruption, this chapter demonstrates that anti-corruption reform has so far 
produced mixed results, which indicates that reform is not sufficient to curb the 
problem of corruption. The chapter also spells out the Hong Kong ICAC model in 
detail and its application to Africa. Botswana, South Africa and Namibia are not 
in the same economic crisis as elsewhere in Africa yet they have adopted the 
Hong Kong model. This is because the three countries are -vulnerable and have 
leamt from what has happened elsewhere in Africa. The fact that the three 
countries have not yet travelled down the crisis road makes the control of 
corruption more hopeful and all more important to prevent the slide into post- 
colonial crisis. Therefore there is a need for effective anti-corruption agencies in 
order to strengthen their democratic credentials in the eyes of international 
investors, donors and their own voters. 
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Chapters four, five and six analyse anti-corruption reform efforts through our case 
studies of Botswana, South Africa and Namibia respectively. Although 
Transparency International regards Botswana, Namibia and South Africa as the 
least corrupt countries relative to Africa and elsewhere, they have of late 
embarked on anti-corruption reforrns. This is important to prevent widespread 
corruption from taking hold in these countries. Therefore, chapters four, five and 
six analyse how anti-corruption agencies. function in Africa's least corrupt 
countries. Chapter four offers a detailed exploration of our case study of 
Botswana. Botswana has also experienced some demands for reform to curb 
corruption following a series of corruption scandals in the early 1990s. The 
response to the problem of corruption was to create the Directorate on Corruption 
and Economic Crime (DCEC) in 1994, a specialised anti-corruption agency. The 
chapter discusses the problem of corruption in Botswana, followed by a detailed 
exploration of the DCEC, the reasons for establishing it as well as the nature of its 
performance. The chapter will help us to understand the nature of the problem of 
corruption in Botswana as well as the nature of the mechanisms that have been put 
in place to curtail corruption. 
Chapter five offers an assessment of the nature of corruption and the institutional 
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mechanisms to fight corruption in South Africa. The chapter explores how South 
Affican politics relates to corruption before it gives an examination of anti- 
corruption institutions in South Africa. Various institutional measures have been 
introduced to tackle the problem of corruption in South Africa. However, chapter 
five limits itself mainly to an examination of the Public Protector, Investigating 
Directorate for Serious Economic Offences (IDSEO), and the Special 
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Investigating Unit (SIU), commonly known as the Heath Unit, because these three 
are the leading anti-corruption agencies in South Africa. The main focus of this 
chapter is on why these institutions were established and as well as the nature of 
their perfortnance. The chapter will help us to understand the roots of corruption 
in South Africa, the nature of anti-corruption institutions and the way they 
function in their attempts to combat corruption in South Africa. 
Chapter six discusses the nature of corruption in independent Namibia and efforts 
to combat corruption in Namibia, in particular, the Office of the Ombudsman and 
recent efforts to establish a specialised anti-corruption agency in Namibia. The 
chapter will help us to understand the problem of corruption in Namibia as well as 
the nature of the institutional mechanism to combat corruption in Namibia. 
Chapter seven brings our case studies of Botswana, South Africa and Namibia 
together with the aim of obtaining a comparative analysis of anti-corruption 
institutions in the three countries. This chapter will help us to understand the 
similarities and differences in the nature of corruption and anti-corruption 
agencies in the three countries. Chapter eight gives a summary of the main 
arguments presented in the thesis as a whole. 
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Chapter two: The problem of controlling corruption in Africa 
Chapter one set out the overall argument of the thesis. It suggested, in introducing 
the argument of the thesis, that the perception of corruption as a central problem 
facing contempory Africa had become widespread among Africans and donors 
alike. The focus of this chapter is on what, following Riley, we referred to as the 
'catastrophic' nature of corruption and on the way corruption unden-nines 
democracy in Africa. The question we need to explore here is why corruption has 
become an issue of critical importance to African politics in the last part of the 
twentieth century. The destructive effect of corruption on political systems and 
states in Africa has become a general concern of scholars and policy makers alike. 
Corruption in Africa has come to be associated with deep-rooted crises of 
economic development, political instability and spiralling public debt. Because 
corruption has devastating effects in Africa (despite the scale of corruption not 
being distinctively worse than in other parts of the world), the creation and 
success of anti-corruption agencies becomes important and urgent. 
In order to understand why corruption has such destructive effects in Africa, we 
need to understand the politics of the state in which corruption is embedded. First, 
weak state institutions, which are further undermined by economic problems, 
encourage corruption for various reasons. Elites scramble for public resources as 
the economy contracts. Weak state institutions make corruption easy as lack of 
punishment of offenders encourages offences, and factional competition makes 
looting the state more likely. Secondly, corruption encourages the decline of 
economic development and undermines political legitimacy, democracy and thus 
stability. It also entrenches authoritarianism and the arbitrary use of power. There 
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is, therefore, a destructive vicious circle in which corruPtion and institutional 
weaknesses feed off each other and the cost's of corruption becomes too great for 
poor countries to bear. This leads to pressures from donors, from within the local 
elite, and even from the masses for action to curtail corruption. This process is 
examined in this chapter in general tenns and, in the last part in terms of our case 
studies of Botswana, South Africa and Namibia. 
The context of corruption in Africa 
Although high-level corruption is a major problem in Affica, it is not greater in 
aggregate terms than in many other parts of the world (Szeflel, 2000a). However, its 
developmental consequences seem far worse. Khan argues that in some Asian 
countries such as South Korea, "widespread corruption has accompanied decades of 
very high growth" (1998: 15). Riley emphasises the safne point. He notes that, 
historically widespread corruption was not an obstacle to rapid economic growth in 
many cases of successful development (Riley, 2000). Thus, in one instance in South 
Korea an inquiry into the Hambo Steel Company which went bankrupt in early 
1997, found that at least two billion dollars disappeared from its account and 
concluded that this money most likely found its way into the pockets of business or 
political elites (Kang, 2002: 1). Compared with examples like this, the scale of high- 
level corruption in Africa is generally not that excessive apart from a few spectacular 
exceptions like the corruption of a few authoritarian rules such as Abacha or 
Mobutu. The problem, however, is that corruption in Africa has not been 
accompanied by economic growth; rather it has come to be identified with economic 
stagnation and deep-rooted crises of development, political instability and spiralling 
public dýbt. 
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Indeed, it is widely considered to be a cause of crisis. Riley contends that corruption 
in Affica "is often part of a syndrome of de-development or underdevelopment 
which destroys the life chances of the poor majority", and that its "short-term and 
longer-tenn developmental effects [are] both of them catastrophic". This he notes, 
can lead to "very damaging consequences for public reputations and the integrity of 
state institutions" (2000: 138). For Hope, "corruption in Africa has reached 
cancerous proportions" and "is destroying the future of many societies in the region" 
(2000: 17). Similarly, the United States Agency for International Development's 
(USAID) Bureau for Africa states that "in Affica ... corruption exacts a higher toll 
than in other regions of the world because the economies of African countries can 
least afford the economic consequences of corruption" (1998: 1). It is this perceived 
link between corruption and developmental crises that places anti-corruption Uforts 
at centre-stage. As Williams argues, corruption in Afhca deserves "serious attention 
not just because it appears prevalent [more than say in Europe], but because of the 
widespread perception that it has major consequences for political and economic 
development" (1987: 2). 
Reducing corruption in Affica has thus become a matter of high priority for African 
governments (Riley, 2000). As a result, anti-corruption measures have become a key 
aspect in local democratic demands and of donor 'conditionalities' (Szeftel, 2000a). 
As Szeflel has noted, these views not only overestimate the degree to which 
corruption "is a cause of crisis in Africa" rather than a symptom of underlying 
problems of underdevelopment, but they also underestimate "both the depth of its 
roots in t he very fabric oft he p ost-colonial s tate a nd i ts r esilience in the f ace of 
reforrn measures imposed from abroad" (2000a: 428). Instead, donors identify 
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corruption with weaknesses within state institutions. Donors have pushed for a neo- 
liberal agenda that entails liberalization and democratization. The pro-market 
policies perceive the state as a burden on economic development and instead calls 
for a small state that is transparent and accountable. The policy is not entirely 
internally consistent. On the one hand, the state is seen as prone to corruption and 
international pressures are aimed at reducing the role of the state so that its 
propensity to produce official corruption affects fewer parts of society and social life. 
This view is the logical underpinning of aid tied to reforms that promote democracy 
and liberalization as key weapons in combating corruption. On the other hand, the 
state is seen as requiring institutional strengthening so that it is less corruption prone 
and thus more effective. This is the view behind the idea of good governance, using 
aid to promote institutional reform. Inevitably, this has led to a focus by donors and 
local reformers alike on public accountability, which in turn has produced greater 
concern about corruption and greater emphasis on anti-corruption agencies. Thus, 
anti-corruption agencies have been set up in much of Affica to curb the problem of 
corruption. 
However, the reform measures promoted by donors have so far produced 
disappointing results. There are a number of reasons for this failure. Firstly, as 
Szeftel has noted, refon-n measures rarely challenge the relationship behveen 
corruption and "patterns of private accumulation and clientelist political 
mobilization" (2000a: 428). Thus, anti-corruption agencies have found it difficult to 
investigate and prosecute high-level corruption because to do so would "interfere 
with patterns of accumulation and political -patronage" and, as a result, "threaten the 
privilcgcSý which state office bestows on political elites and their supporters and 
associates". Secondly, for these reasons, anti-corruption measures sometimes "create 
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problems in the relationship behveen donor and debtor governments and are bitterly 
resented and resisted by ruling elites" (ibid. 428). By not challenging or even 
addressing these political and socio-economic forces, anti-corruption agencies may 
not affect factors which give rise to corruption in Africa and undermine institutional 
refonn in Africa and, as a result, these agencies may be limited in what they can 
achieve. 
As Szeftel fin-ther argues, the donors reforms may even increase corruption and so 
weaken anti-corruption reforms: "far from arresting the upward spiral of corruption, 
the economic liberalization and attendant governance reforms imposed by the donors 
have sometimes intensified it beyond anything that government can manage or 
control" (2000a: 429). He asserts that the upward spiral of corruption has led 
scholars, including Riley (2000), to perceive corruption as a cause of 'catastrophe' in 
Africa. 
However, emerging evidence suggests that corruption is a sign of a crisis rather 
than its cause. By failing to locate the roots of corruption in the fabric of politics, 
many observers conclude that corruption is the cause of Africa's problems (ibid. 
429). To understand the roots of corruption in Africa, there is a need to understand 
the way the post-colonial state functions and sustains itself in Africa in the context 
of underdevelopment. Corruption is not a malady that is unique to Africa (Harsch, 
1999; Ayittey, 2000; Szeftel, 2000a). Therefore, corruption should not be 
understood as a monocausal explanation for Africa's problems but, instead, as an 
outcome of underlying political and socio-economic structural factors (Szeftel, 
2000a). To understand how these factors contribute to making corruption so 
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destructive, we need to understand how the politics of the post-colonial state 
work. As the following section demonstrates, corruption in Africa was built into 
the very nature of the post-colonial state from the outset (Szeftel, 2000a), through 
processes of clientelism, factionalism and corruption. 
The roots of corruption in Africa 
Corruption in Africa is rooted in the politics of the post-colonial state as well as in 
the problems that confronted the post-colonial state after independence. As Szeftel 
has rightly observed, after independence the post-colonial state in Africa inherited 
underdeveloped economies that 
were characteristically skewed and vulnerable to international economic 
changes and fluctuations. This extreme dependence on the expansion and 
contraction of the global economy was complemented by the level of 
unevenness in their economic and social development. Uneven 
development took many forms, among them: the combination of declining 
peasant subsistence economies with multinational export production; 
extreme inequalities of income; the differential incorporation of different 
regions and ethnic groups into different roles in the economy and the state; 
and the exclusion of vast numbers of the indigenous population from 
ownership of property, capital, skills and market opportunities through 
institutionalized racism (1999: 10-11). 
John Mbaku makes a similar point: 
the economies that the Africans inherited from the European colonizers 
were weak, potentially unstable and not particularly viable. In addition, the 
new economies were almost totally dependent on the metropolitan markets 
for trade and development assistance. Consequently, post-independence 
society in Africa became dependent on the industrial market economies, 
primarily those of Western Europe, for economic growth and 
development. Although the African countries were politically independent, 
domestic policy makers found themselves unable to effect independent 
development policies because their economies, which had been 
'integrated' into, and made appendages of the European economics, had 
still not been successfully weaned from this one-sided dependency (1998: 
237). 
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In the context of underdevelopment, the inherited colonial institutions and the 
nature of the post-colonial state, it was felt that the only institution best suited to 
tackle such problems was the state. The post-colonial state had to play a major 
role in development because of deep inequalities left behind by the colonial state 
coupled with the increasing problem of poverty (Mokoli, 1992). According to 
Tordoff "the state ... had to assume a major entrepreneurial role" as "the private 
sector was under-developed" (1993: 3). In this sense, the state was assigned a 
central role in the economy (Young, 1991). The African state was seen "as an 
engine of socio-economic development" (Mokoli, 1992: 25). The post-colonial 
state assumed a central role because "historical experience made it unlikely that 
the market forces which had produced underdevelopment and exclusion would 
mysteriously reverse themselves once independence was attained" without the 
state playing a key role in forcing change (Szeflel, 2000a: 43 1). 
It is against this background of underdevelopment that the state was imposed "as 
the key player in economic development" (Wiseman, 1997: 276). Thus, the state 
became "central to African aspirations", and "political power was regarded as the 
mechanism by which development and individual opportunities for jobs and 
upward mobility would be achieved" (Szeftel, 1999: 11). Moreover, Szeftel adds, 
"the state was seen by many as the means to redress past discrimination and 
promote private wealU' (ibid. 11). In the light of economic underdevelopment, 
the general consensus in the 1960s and 1970s was that "the state ought to play a 
pivotal role in the post-independence period, both to promote rapid development 
and provide the basis for a unified national identity" (Healey and Robinson, 1994: 
20). As a result, Berkester notes 
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the 1960s and the 1970s were decades of unprecedented nationalism, a 
growing role for the intervention in the economy, and experimentation 
with variants of socialism and self-reliance. Comprehensive development 
planning was widespread, and the prevailing model of development 
throughout ... Africa ' was variant and statist, 
largely inward-oriented, 
import-substitution industrialisation. It was also socially redistributive, at 
least in rhetoric (1995: 174). 
According toT homas, s tates inp eripheral s ocieties don ot e xpand t heir role in 
national economies out of choice but "the structural necessities of their internal 
social situations and the historically formed links between their economies and 
those of the centre" force them to do so (1984: 53-54). Thus "peripheral 
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capitalism makes the African state far more central to its social formation than are 
the industrial states of the West" (Kasfir, 1987: 47). The centrality of the state in 
the economy dates back to the 1920s, when, following the Great Depression, JM 
Keynes argued in favour of control measures in the economy, which proved to be 
relatively stable from 1945 through the 1950s. By assuming the central role in the 
economy, the state in Africa became the fundamental source of resources. Szeftel 
wrote 
the p eculiar c onjuncture ofc olonial s tate e xclusion, n ationalist p romises 
and political independence produced almost limitless expectations of 
government to intervene in the economy, to redistribute entitlements and 
to p rovide j obs, I oans, c ontracts a nd f avours t hrough p olitical p atronage 
(2000a: 43 1). 
The independence promises resulted in an overly expanded state in terms of its 
functions. As a result, the state did not only become the largest employer, but it 
also emerged as the most powerful institution in society (Mokoli, 1992). Key 
welfare services such as education and health were provided for free. The state 
became both big in size and scale because of its political and economic priorities 
(Young, 1991). Thus, as Mokoli has observed 
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In socio-economic terms, the state emerged as the dominant force in 
African societies. It became the largest single employer of labor. It has 
access to domestic resources and investment funds from abroad. The state 
is not only an. institution of administration, - but also the most powerful 
economic force in society. Since the middle classes-traders and 
businessmen-have been relatively weak, economic success has been 
contingent on access to the resources of the state. Soon everyone realizes 
that the only road to prosperity runs through the state machine (1992: 24). 
In turn, the centrality of the post-colonial state in economic development had 
some important ramifications for politics (Mokoli, 1992). As Mokoli further 
noted 
civil servants and bureaucrats soon realized that employment in the public 
sector bestowed important privileges on them. Nationalist leaders 
understood that political influence was synonymous with economic power; 
without the backing of the state none could pursue a successful career in 
business. 
... Every ambitious person 
fights desperately to carve out a place 
for himself inside the state apparatus. With so much at stake, none can 
afford to give up influence with the state machine. The loss of influence 
over the state means the loss of everything. The ruling class in Africa can 
not maintain its power and prestige without directly running the state (ibid. 
25). 
The expectations of the state to play a central role in directing economic affairs 
coupled with independence promises "placed a huge burden on the African state" 
(Szeftel, 1999: 11). However, as Kasfir noted "the exPansion of the state 
apparatus provides the fundamental opportunity both to maintain political control 
and to achieve remarkable wealth amidst great and growing poverty" (1987: 45). 
The nature and character of the post-colonial African state needs to be understood 
in this context. 
Although the post-colonial state was assigned such a central role in the economy, 
it "was not equipped to bear this burden" (Szeftel, 2000a: 431). It lacks the 
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capacity a nd s ufficient r esources tom eet t he d emands p laced onit. T his ist he 
case because "underdevelopment and dependence on primary exports gave it an 
uncertain revenue base which constantly undermined development strategies" 
which were pursued (ibid. 431). Moreover, the institutions that were inherited at 
independence were designed or organized to serve the economic interests of the 
colonial state (Mokoli, 1992). They were organized to maintain law and order and 
ensure the exploitation of export commodities, and "not to respond to the 
democratic demands grafted onto it or to expand the content of citizenship" 
(Szeftel, 1999: 11). They were not created to serve the new demands of the post- 
colonial state such that "in the immediate post-colonial period.... the existing 
liberal democratic structures were strained by particularistic pressures, continued 
high birth rates, rapid urbanization, increased education, and expectations of rapid 
change generated by the ideological and policy pronouncements of the new 
nationalist leadership" (Callaghy, 1987: 94). Accordingly, Mbaku argues that "the 
rýlatively weak and inefficient institutions inherited from the Europeans were left 
intact and successfully used by bureaucrats, politicians and interest groups to 
enrich themselves, while imposing significant costs on society" (1998: 238). 
These demands or pressures give rise to competition for scarce state resources 
even amongst the ruling elite. According to Mokoli, this explains why the one- 
party or military state was introduced immediately after independence. He wrote 
that "a one party system eliminates rivals for influence and consolidates the hold 
of the governing party over the state" (1992: 25). Szeftel makes a similar point. 
He notes. that "the one-party state was the ultimate expression of attempts to 
regulate factional competition and conflict over the division of spoils" (2000a: 
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434). The introduction of one party or military rule meant the end of the limited 
pluralism for much of Africa. Kasfir links "the growth of authoritarianism ... to an 
economic struggle to keep rival groups from enjoying these few available 
opportunities to become rich" (1987: 45). 
The importance of the state in Africa as a source of resources as well as power has 
turned the state into 'a battleground', because success is tied to state resources. 
The state in Africa is not only a management tool, but it is also a place where the 
struggle amongst the various factions of the ruling elite and the antagonism 
between the ruling elite and the masses takes place. Scarcity of state resources 
makes it difficult for the state to meet the demands placed on it. As a result, 
competition for control of the state resources becomes fierce. In this sense, the 
state is the major centre of class antagonism and social transformation (Mokoli, 
1992). In the light of the economic struggle and ovenvhelming societal demands, 
the state that emerged a few years after independence in most parts of Africa was 
centralized, authoritarian, prebendal and based on personal rule, - patronage and 
clientelist politics (Tordoff, 1993; Allen, 1995; Szeftel, 2000a). Thus, after 
independence, 'authoritarian personal rule'Icame to be the key feature of the post- 
colonial state in Affica (Healey and Robinson, 1994). Its legitimacy was founded 
on the use of force (Robinsion, 1993; Szeftel, 2000a). The growth of 
authoritarianism is linked to the concentration of political power in and around the 
presidency (Thomas, 1984). Szeftel (2000a) locates the origins of African 
presidentialism in the transition from colonialism to independence. 
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Pressures on the state led to the centralization of power. Soon after independence, 
most African countries moved away "from a bureaucratic administration that 
emphasized good governance to one that emphasized the sovereignty of politics" 
and this Hope argues, led to "a politicized bureaucracy in those countries which 
began to engage in centralized economic decision-making and patrimonialism" 
(2000: 18). The neo-patrimonial African state is characterised by highly frail 
formal institutions, personalised rule and widespread clientelistic networks 
(Lawson, 1999). Political power is centralized in and around the presidency, with 
a weak parliament, mostly dominated by the ruling party. Civil society is weak 
and lacks autonomy. Opposition parties are fragmented, and in some countries 
have become corrupt, and as a result, they are failing to hold the executive 
accountable. For instance, Makinda notes that in Kenya, one of President Arap 
Moi's effective strategies is his ability to play around with opposition politicians. 
He has put in place institutions within which opposition politicians function. 
Sometimes he "buys them with cash", and has been able to turn opposition 
politicians against each other. As a result they do not concentrate on the mistakes 
of government, and many are corrupt like those in government (1997: 264). The 
way the post-colonial state functions is best summarized by Bratton and Van de 
Walle, who noted that 
one individual often president for life, dominates the state apparatus and 
stands above laws. Relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a 
forinal political and administrative system, and officials occupy 
bureaucratic positions less to perform public service, their ostensibly 
purpose, than to acquire personal wealth and status. Although state 
functionaries receive an official salary, they also enjoy access to various 
forms of illicit rents, prebends, and petty corruption, which constitute 
sometimes important entitlement of office. The chief executive and his 
inner circle undermine the effectiveness of the nominally modem state 
administration by using it for systematic patronage and clientelist practices 
in order to maintain political order. Moreover, parallel and unofficial 
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structures may well hold more power and authority than the formal 
administration (1997: 62). 
The new states, Hope adds "were not only bureaucratic autocracies but also 
political and economic monopolies now lacking in accountability, transparency 
and the rule of law" (2000: 18). Thus, "the post-independence governmental 
bureaucracy that emerged in most African countries contributed to institutional 
instability, the politicization of the state, and patrimonial economic management 
and incentives, whereby clientelism replaced moral and political legitimacy, and 
political and personal loyalty and obedience were rewarded more than merit" 
(ibid. 18). This is the root of corruption in Africa (Hope, 2000). In this sense, one 
party states were not just about keeping control of public goods but, they were 
also about managing competition between the rival factions. 
Clientelism became a method of mobilising political support from the start (Allen, 
1995). As Szeftel noted "support was exchanged for access to state resources and 
the citizens of the new state were integrated into electoral politics on the basis of 
the access to public resources that political competition afforded rather than on the 
basis of ideology or class interests" (2000a: 433). Because of underdevelopment, 
clientelism was not capable of meeting the demands of the competing factions and 
this in turn became a source of political instability as well as corruption. The state 
was not able to meet mass expectations because it lacked resources (Szeftel, 
2000a). This is the case because the state is based on a weak economic 
foundation. Failure to meet factional demands led to intense competition amongst 
factions for patronage. As a result, "African governments became preoccupied 
with the need to manage patronage, making them intolerant of internal debate and 
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increasingly inclined to use presidential power to control and ration the 
distribution of patronage" (ibid. 433). However, the strategy of clientelist politics 
soon became unsustainable with the contraction of African economies starting 
from the mid-1970s (ibid. 434). In turn, economic crisis intensified corruPtion. 
We are persuaded to argue and agree with Szeftel's contention that corruption is 
"rooted in the contradictions of the post-colonial state rather than in any personal 
inadequacies of African leaders or any inappropriate cultural qualities" (2000a: 
434). The problem of corruption in Africa is far deeper than an issue of poor 
leadership or poor governance. As Riley observed "the problem of corruption 
does not simply disappear with the removal of corrupt officials" (2000: 141). 
Zambia under Chiluba is a case in point. "Contrary to conventional wisdom, 
corruption, under the multiparty state, has become pervasive, uncontrollable, and 
unrestrained" (Chikulo, 2000: 161). Similarly, Cheushi wrote: "since the MMD 
accession to power in 1991, some 20 government ministers and deputy ministers 
have resigned or been sacked either after having accused their colleagues, or 
themselves being accused of corruption" (1995: 11). This shows that the change 
of leadership in Zambia did not reduce corruption, instead corruption has 
intensified to the extent that it is believed corruption is worse today in Zambia 
than it was under Kenneth Kaunda (Chikulo, 2000). 
Factors such as poor leadership may have contributed to the malaise but they were 
not the decisive factors. Reducing corruption in Africa to a question of poor 
leadershiý seems to reflect a misunderstanding of the form clientelism. and in turn 
corruption takes in Africa. To understand this, we need to understand the nature of 
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clientelism in Africa because it has destructive effects on the state. The section 
that follows shows how clientelist politics led to factions and competition for state 
resources. 
Clientelism, factions and spoils politics 
As noted earlier in this chapter, the post-colonial state in much of Africa turned 
out to be centralized, authoritarian, prebendal, and was based on personal rule, 
patronage, spoils, clientelist politics and factionalism. According to Szeftel "post- 
colonial politics was characterized by intense factional competition for patronage 
and by conflicts between factions which frequently became public and 
acrimonious", and in turn "producing governmental crises and intensifying 
communal rivalries" (1999: 14). For Jackson and Rosberg, politics in Africa was 
"often ap ersonal orf actional s truggle toc ontrol t he n ational g overnment orto 
influence it" (Jackson and Rosberg, 1992 quoted in Wiseman, 1997: 276). 
Given the importance invested in the state, politics focused on access. This was 
the case because the state holds the key for "import and export licences, access to 
foreign exchange, governments grants and loans, and reasonable treatment in 
relation to the payment (or in many cases non-payment) of duties and. taxes" 
(Wiseman, 1997: 276). Doig makes the same point. He described the state "as a 
provider and allocator of services and functions" (1999: 21), such as education, 
health, licenses and contracts (Carino, 1985). The state was also a fundamental 
source of "money decisions" as well as "benefits that are vigorously pursued by 
many groups and individuals. The demands for government's rewards frequently 
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exceeds the supply... " (Johnston, 1982: 3). This was acute in most of the 
developing world where resources are very scarce. In addition to these, "the state 
constituted the key source of employment, status and self-advancement" 
(Robinson, 1993: 86). This suggests that "to promote a successful economic 
enterprise it was necessary to hold an important position within the state or to 
acquire ap atron w ho d id" (Wiseman, 1997: 2 76). T his ist he c ase b ecause t he 
state in Africa is "run by elites, classes, factions or personal cliques" (Marenin, 
1987: 66). 
In Africa, a political or public office is an "investment" in which the occupants 
expect to harvest something in return (Allen, 1999: 377). It is a basis for economic 
advancement. Moreover, Mbaku noted that in Africa "corruption provides 
significant benefits to the incumbent regime". Thus, "it generates resources that 
the government can use to purchase regime security and also provides the 
framework through which these resources can be channelled to the regime's 
supporters and its potential competitors, especially those that have developed a 
significant level of violence potential" -(1998: 42). Similarly, Marenin noted that 
in Africa "control over the state agencies can and should be used to enrich oneself 
and in, exchange relations, reward one's followers and supplicants for favours" 
(1987: 66). A political office in Africa is highly valued because it brings with it 
considerable material wealth (Kpundeh, 1995). In this sense, "opposition 
politicians as well want to acquire those positions within the state apparatus, 
primarily to advance their own personal interests and further individual 
accumulation. Thus, the keys to transforming the petty bourgeosie into a property- 
owing class were through state power and political office" (Tangri, 1985 quoted 
45 
in Kpundeh, 1995: 2). Ayittey observed that in Africa "the ruling elites acquire 
their wealth not in the private but in the state sector, by using the instruments of 
the state to enrich themselves" (2000: -117). Lodge (1998) underscores the same 
point. He noted that 
in developing countries the state'is usually the major force within the 
modem economy and in general conditions of economic scarcity and low 
levels of social stratification political and bureaucratic power brings 
unprecedented opportunities for control over material resources; in such 
circumstances, political office becomes the main route to personal wealth 
(1998: 160). 
This e xplains " why politics issoh ard f ought ins ub-Saharan A frica" (Lawson, 
1999: 5). This is in part because political office carries with it not only power but 
great material wealth for the incumbents and their followers. In the context of 
underdevelopment, the state in Africa became the main source of resources and 
this gave rise to more demands and competition for state resources. However, the 
state is not able to meet these demands because its political economy is based on a 
weak foundation (Leys, 1994). 
The strategy of spoils and patronage was effectively used in much of Africa. For 
instance, in Kenya, ethnic politics and patron-client networks are still prevalent 
(Makinda, 1997). In Botswana, a number of agricultural schemes and policies 
were introduced which e ffcctively worked to the advantage of the ruling party. 
These in most cases coincided with elections. In much of Africa, employment in 
the bureaucracy is the main feature of spoils (Sandbrook, 1986). A Zambian 
minister said "if I don't appoint people from my own region, who else will" (New 
Africa, June 1992 quoted in Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 39). This indicates that even 
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those in positions of leadership perceive the state as a resource that can be used to 
change the positions of their supporters. 
Thus, political mobilisation in Africa was founded on a system of clientelist 
politics (Allen, 1995; Szeftel, 2000a). Szeftel argues that by using "house-to- 
house" contact, clientelism in Africa has been and continues to be an efficient 
method of mobilising communities in order to accumulate clients. Thus he adds, 
clientelism "among poor people or excluded from equal citizenship it thus 
constitutes an efficient, sometimes even an energising and empowering, method 
of political recruitment" (2000a: 435). There exists a system of clientelism that is 
based on a complex and informal interconnection of personal loyalties that 
connects communities to members of the ruling elite. As a reward for showing 
loyalty to the political elite, supporters received a variety of payoffs, including; 
favours, jobs, preferential loans and in extreme instances, bribes and embezzled 
property (Robinson, 1993). Clientelism thus became a source of corruption. Those 
who were part of the clientelist interconnections and showed loyalty to the ruling 
party and its leaders received something in return, they gained access to state 
resources. These resources could be extended to less important followers and 
voters as a way of strengthening their support, or they could be maintained and 
used as a source of wealth accumulation. The need to maintain state resources for 
personal use increased when parties in power started to depend on the use of force 
rather than popular support to remain in office. As a result, politics, politicians 
and t heir a ides as w ell as t he w hole p olitical sy stem c ame tobem ore c orrupt. 
Those who could not access the state at the national or local level exploited 
communal divisions to avoid permanent exclusion from the state (Allen, 1995). 
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As Szeftel noted "clientelism thus promotes a form of factional competition which 
encourages the plundering of the state" (2000a: 437). 
These clientelist networks seemingly had a deleterious effect on the country's 
development as well as on the state. Lawson (1999) argued that African political 
systems were crippled by the disturbing 'coexistence' of institutions and 
structures amongst others patrimonialism and patron-client system, that were 
suitable to pre-capitalist societies, as well as empty bureaucratic structures 
imposed by the colonial powers. Allen (1995) observed that although clientelism 
was effective in ensuring political support, it also destabilised the system. Szeftel 
(2000a) emphasises this observation. He noted that "given the underdevelopment 
of the economy, clientelism proved unable to meet factional demands and so 
became a source of instability as well as corruption" (2000a: 433). This he adds, 
was because "governments lacked the resources to deliver the development goods 
necessary to satisfy mass expectations" (ibid. 433). Allen (1995) asserted that 
clientelist politics in turn led to a 'crisis of clientelism'. This he noted, came into 
effect when members of the opposition as well as the masses became opposed to 
ruling party factions which tried to ensure complete control over public resources 
as well as to the govemment's failure to build popular support as clientelist 
resources are redirected from the masses to enrich ruling party activists (ibid. 
305). As an attempt to avert clientelist crisis, partial reforms were introduced, 
with the sole objective of yielding stable but authoritarian regimes.. These reforms 
retained clientelism, power was centralised in and around the presidency, the 
bureaucracy r eplaced t he r uling p arty asad istributor ofr esources a nd ins orne 
instances, the party was incorporated into bureaucratic structures. The strategy of 
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centralised-bureaucratic governments worked well until the 1980s (ibid. 305-306). 
Allen further contended that where clientelist crisis could not be tackled with the 
introduction of centralised-bureaucratic refonns, it led to 'spoils politics' whereby 
the system totally collapses (1995: 307). As Allen observed 
spoils politics occurs when the primary goal of those competing for 
political office or power is self-enrichment. Under these conditions, 
patronage politics, involving the exchange of material benefits for political 
support, occurs only when actual competition for office occurs or to 
protect the ruling group from a short-term threat (1999: 377). 
According to Allen, 'spoils politics' could easily be identified by eight features, 
and these are, 'the winner takes all', 'corr-uption/looting of the economy', 
ceconomic crises', 'lack of political mediation', 'repression and violence', 
'communalism', 'endemic instability' and 'erosion of authority' (1995: 307-9). 
Once a political system has reached the stage of spoils politics, it does not only 
experience high levels of corruption, but as Allen noted, was characterised by 
'endemic instability'. Economic decline made it very difficult for the state to 
distribute clientelist resources, which is a way to ensure popular acceptance. Thus 
the state is unable to maintain popular support. As a result the state resorted to use 
of force to suppress mass discontent. It was in this sense that clientelism in Africa 
undermined the state as well as economic development. 
However, the effects of corruption are not always easy to evaluate. In Asia, 
countries such as South Korea had been able to achieve unprecedented levels of 
development amid authoritarianism and high levels of corruption. Yet this has 
I 
failed to replicate itself in Africa. This was because in Africa, clientelism and in 
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turn corruption worked against capital accumulation. According to Szeftel, 
clientelism in Africa does this in two ways 
first, it rests on the need for patrons to distribute state resources to a wide 
communal base rather than simply to business cronies. And second, 
... there is not much of a capitalist class from which politicians can extort 
resources. Instead, the flow of resources is all one way, from the state to 
the private sector; the looting of public resources, rather than the 
accumulation of capital (2000a: 439). 
It was these two factors which put more pressure on state resources and in turn 
plunder of state resources. This was compounded by the fact that African 
economies were poor and underdeveloped. Lawson observed that "its economies 
remain not only poor, but largely pre-capitalist, with self-sufficient peasant 
communities predominating" (1999: 3). However, by the 1980s as Bratton and 
Van de Walle noted 
the diversion of public surpluses into private consumption led to a 
prolonged economic downturn, chronic government budget deficits, and 
slumping mass living standards. Even larger numbers of citizens, 
including even previously privileged public sector employees and other 
segments of Africa's nascent middle classes experienced the trickling up 
of poverty (1997: 99-100). 
The contraction of public resources created even more problems for the post- 
colonial state because clientelist networks became difficult to manage. A decline 
in clientelist resources meant that the ruling elites appropriated bigger shares of 
public resources. This limited the ability of the ruling elites to maintain popular 
support. As Bratton and Van de Walle observed 
economic crisis undercut the material foundations of neopatrimonial rule: 
With fewer resources to distribute, political elites faced a growing problem 
of how to maintain control of clientelist networks .... the contraction of 
resources at their disposal led those in power to appropriate ever larger 
shares. This narrowed their capacity to co-opt elites and maintain a 
measure of popular acceptance (ibid. 100). 
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Chris Allen makes a similar point. He argued that economic contraction and debt 
crisis compromised the ability of the "centralised-bureaucratic" state to 
concurrently provide for ruling elite demands, salaries for the public sector, and to 
dispense clientelist resources to local networks and to the masses (Allen, 1995: 
312). Asa result, the state faced "a crisis of political legitimacy" in the I 980s 
(Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 98). There was loss of faith in the African state 
"as the prime mover of development". Rather, the state was seen as the main 
obstacle to economic development (Healey and Robinson, 1994: 20). Healey and 
Robinson noted that the consensus that emerged in the 1980s was that the state 
was no longer capable of fulfilling its functions of promoting political integration, 
social transformation and economic development. Bratton and Van de Walle 
wrote 
by the 1980s, authoritarian rulers in Africa's patrimonial regimes typically 
faced a crisis of political legitimacy. This crisis was manifest in a loss of 
faith among African citizens that state elites were capable of solving basic 
problems of socioeconomic and political development. Leaders had 
damaged their own claim to rule by engaging in nepotism and corruption, 
which led to popular perceptions that those with access to political office 
were living high on the hog while ordinary people suffered (1997: 98-9). 
The decline in state resources available for clientelist distribution by the 
neopatrimonial state was aggravated by the demand for structural adjustment 
reforms in the 1980s as economic crisis worsened. This made it even harder for 
the neopatrimonial state. Bratton and Van de Walle further wrote 
this problem [of resource contraction] was exacerbated when, during the 
1980s, international donors and lenders demanded structural adjustment 
reforms to restrict the number of jobs in the public sector and curb the free 
availability of public services. The penetrative public capacity of central 
govemment,.... was further undercut as key public services - especially in 
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education, health, and public security-deteriorated or collapsed (1997: 
100). 
For Allen, the effect of economic contraction and structural adjustment reforms 
was intricate; it weakened the ability of the state to combine the distribution of 
clientelist resources with autocratic management, and thereby compromising the 
stability of the centralised-bureaucratic state (1995: 312). Peter Lewis noted that 
in Nigeria structural adjustment involved an "unavoidable contraction of 
traditional outlets for state patronage, including a sharp reduction in government 
contracts and the withdrawal of rents from import licences and subsidised 
commodity distribution" for the neopatrimonial state (1996: 89). The 
neopatrimonial state needed significant resources to distribute clientelist resources 
as a way of accumulating clients to ensure regime acceptance. Thus, with the 
introduction of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) in the 1980s, the 
neopatrimonial state strategy of patronage soon became unsustainable. These 
reforms not only reduced the resources at the disposal of the neopatrimonial state 
to distribute to its followers, but also threatened its very means of survival. 
Richard Joseph observed that 
in Zambia and elsewhere the stabilization and structural adjustment 
programs that African authoritarian governments were forced to 
implement as conditions for loans from multinational agencies steadily 
eroded their popular support. They had to sharply devalue the currency, 
cut back the public sector, remove price controls on basic commodities, 
impose fees on a range of public services, and liquidate unproductive state 
enterprises (1997: 370). 
These polices eroded the support for authoritarian governments in the sense that they 
affected the way the regime was able to reproduce itself by distributing spoils. The 
I 
problem lies in the fact that "developed countries have pressed Third World 
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countries to adopt open economies without embedding these policies in the realities 
of domestic state-society relations" (Callaghy, 1989 quoted in Gadzey, 1992: 456). 
Although the architects of free market policies were calling for the withdrawal of the 
state in the economy, African govenunents were reluctant to do so because they 
were afraid of the negative effects these policies were likely to bring; their "political 
costs" (Graham, 1997: 85). For instance, in Zambia in the 1980s, structural 
adjustment policies resulted in riots. In Kenya, Arap Moi was against the 
introduction of multiparty democracy because he was of the view that it promoted 
ethnic rivalries. 
Resource contraction meant that new tactics had to obtain to ensure regime 
survival. The neopatrimonial state resorted to repression and force, "at least 
insofar as they were able to retain the loyalty of the best-armed factions within the 
military" (Bratton and Van de Wall, 1997: 100). Thus, economic decline and debt 
crisis led to an increase in corruption as the different factions competed for the 
declining public resources and the use of force intensified as the ruling factions 
engaged in a ferocious fight to maintain control of public office (Szeftel, 2000b). 
In this sense, economic crisis served the interests of corrupt officials by allowing 
them to loot public resources. As institutions fell apart, this looting became easier. 
Thus chaos and disintegration suited such people (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). 
As a result, for much of Africa those who held political office were committed to 
derailing Africa's transition 'to democratic and more open governance and 
economid structures. This was because they perceived successful reforms as a 
threat to their positions and benefits. Incumbents were the major recipients of 
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corruption (Mbaku, 1998). Moreover, neo-liberal reforms threatened the political 
establishment as they "undercut the usual advantages of being the party in power 
and able to shape public policy and public spending in ways intended to mobilize 
electoral support" (Burnell, 1998: 13). Sandbrook noted that the World Bank and 
IMF policies "undercut the power and/or wealth of political insiders" (1986: 330). 
Donor policies and strategy not only threatened the positions of the Affican petty 
bourgeoisie but also the very nature of the post-colonial African state as well. As 
noted earlier, the post-colonial state functioned on the basis of patronage-client 
networks. Donor policies undennined the ability of the post-colonial state to 
distribute clientelist resources. As Mbaku asserted 
incumbents, who now benefit from existing institutions and are able to use 
them to extort bribes from society for their own benefit see successful 
reform as a threat to their privileges. Entrenched interest groups whose 
relationship with the incumbent politicians and bureaucrats has allowed 
them to extract significant extralegal benefits from the economy also see 
changes in the status quo as detrimental to them. Throughout the 
continent, such groups have even hijacked the transition and are carefully 
managing it to make certain that change is undertaken on their own terms 
and designed to effect as little harm on their privileges as possible (1998: 
27-8). 
In this sense, neo-liberal refonns were 'ahistorical' because they did not recognize 
"the central role played everywhere today by govenunents in directing capitalist 
development" (Sandbrook, 1986: 330). Given that politicians and public officials 
extort extra-legal benefits from the state, they were opposed to refortus that may 
harm t heir p rivileges. S zeftel w rote t hat " anti-corruption i nitiatives t hreaten t he 
dependence of much of Africa's petty bourgeoisie on state power and state 
resources for access to personal wealth, opportunities for accumulation and 
affluent lifestyle" (2000b: 301). He argued that underdevelopment made the 
process of accumulating capital in the open market not only risky but also 
54 
relatively unprofitable. National entrepreneurs were unable to venture into capital- 
intensive business because of the legacy of imperialism. This pushed them to the 
peripheral sectors of business. Thus, if they were unable to gain access to state 
resources, the possibility of future success was highly circumscribed. Where the 
bourgeoisie class has prospered in Africa, it has relied on state resources as well 
as on the ability of its individual members to embezzle or pocket state resources. 
Thus, public resources and power were central to the process of class formation in 
Africa. In this sense, exclusion from state resources threatens the process of 
accumulating capital. It is in this context that a political office is important and in 
many ways a source of corruption. Corruption was inextricably intertwined with 
the process of capital accumulation, abuse of power and the use of force. In this 
sense, the state became a resource as well as a means of maintaining support and 
control (Szeftel, 2000b). Khan observed that "accumulation and allocation of 
public resources in developing countries very frequently involves changes in 
established property rights and institutions or the creation of entirely new ones" 
(1998: 18). To this extent, the state or political office in Africa was a source of 
advancement, wealth accumulation and empowen-nent. Moreover, political office 
was used to reward one's followers and supporters with the sole aim of 
maintaining and retaining office through available means. "Thus to have power 
was to have the means to reproduce it; to lose power ... was to risk never having 
the means to regain it" (Allen, 1995: 304). Since political power or office was so 
important in Africa, an electoral defeat or a loss of a political office not only 
marks the end of political influence or power for the office bearer, but it also ends 
the only means of accessing state resources (Mokoli, 1992). 
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The foregoing discussion showed why both old and new leaders have a tendency 
to hold on to power, and why refonn was often bitterly resisted in Africa. This 
was because change or reforrn reduces the material basis or benefits of 
maintaining popular support. In this sense, "economic liberalization and 
privatization were unlikely to be implemented by governments that held tenuously 
on to power by systematic patronage and rent-seeking" (Van de Walle, 1999: 21). 
Thus Hope observed that "owing to the softness of African states, public officials 
are reluctant to uphold laws which would get in the way of their personal or 
sectional interests" (2000: 28). It is in this context that public officials are 
unwilling to support and enforce anti-corruption reform. In turn, anti-corruption 
reform has produced disappointing results. This was because reforrn undermined 
the capacity of the state to distribute clientelist resources, and thereby affecting 
the very nature of the state. By so doing, anti-corruption agencies not only 
threatened the positions of the politicians but also the political establishment 
itself As a result, anti-corruption agencies became victims of the political process. 
There was lack of political support to such organisations and they lacked both 
independence and the means to do theirjob. Moreover, weak states lack resources 
to implement anti-corruption measures. This was exacerbated by economic crisis. 
Corruption and politics in the three country cases 
The first half of this chapter has demonstrated that clientelism in Africa leads to 
instability and in turn became a source of corruption. It is the nature of African 
clientelism that makes Africa different from other regions that had been able to 
t develop amid factions and corruption. At this juncture, we need to relate our case 
studies of Botswana, South Africa and Namibia to the above general discussion of 
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Africa by showing how different and similar the three countries were to the above 
pattern. Botswana, South Africa and Namibia are different from the rest of Affica 
although there is pressure to meet mass needs and elite aspirations. The three 
countries have rather different forms of crisis but nevertheless still have to cope 
with factionalism, social divisions and inequalities. Patron-client networks operate 
in Botswana, Namibia and less so in South Africa, but they have not yet 
degenerated in spoils politics. 
Botswana 
Botswana is different from much of Africa. Since its independence in 1966, it 
experienced low levels of corruption compared to most states in Africa. The 
importance of the state, the pressure for public resources to be distributed and 
clientelism have not created corruption that is out of control in Botswana. We 
suggest a number of reasons for this. First, Botswana is ethnically homogenous. 
Its e conomy g; ew s teadily s ince i ndependence, a nd i ts p opulation isa Iso s mall 
compared to most African states (Holm, 2000). A small population means the size 
of the political class is small. As a result, there is less competition amongst elites 
in accessing state resources. Moreover, the size of the population meant that the 
state had relatively less political pressure or demands. Although the demands on 
the state had been moderate, mineral revenues strengthened the ability of the state 
to respond to demands placed on it (Wiseman, 1977). As a result "there is an 
absence of overloading on the input side of government which has also 
contributed to political stability and to the maintenance of the multi-party system" 
(ibid. 77). The state was able to satisfy elite demands and to some extent mass 
t 
demands. Thus, "the government [of Botswana] has managed to spread the 
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benefits of [mineral led] growth widely enough to keep the population reasonably 
satisfied" (UNDP, 1997: 48). Riley asserts that Botswana possesses some unique 
features that are lacking in much of contemporary Africa. These features include 
amongst others "political stability, sustained high economic growth rates whose 
benefits are reasonably widely spread, and a relatively unified elite committed to 
foreign investment and maintaining public integrity" (2000: 153). 
Second, Botswana has ensured a moderate reputation of good political and 
economic management since independence; a characteristic dissimilar to much of 
Africa. Corruption and patronage politics have not been at the heart of Botswana 
politics. Good management did not only limit corruption but also limited 
patronage and clientelism. For example, in most African states the public service 
was used as a major source of patronage and this was not the case in Botswana 
because entrance into the public service was mainly based on qualification and 
merit. However, the public service is not free of patronage especially when senior 
appointments are made and in devising policies which favoured the ruling class. 
Third, reasonable levels of corruption in Botswana are attributed to the nature of 
the ruling elite that obtained political power at independence (Holm and Molutsi, 
1992; Good, 1993; Lodge, 1998). They were relatively wealthy even before rising 
to power because they were engaged in cattle production. Therefore, rising to 
power was not a means of attaining wealth but of gaining influence. We examine 
the nature of the ruling class in detail in chapter four. 
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Nonetheless, Botswana can still be compared to other Affican. states as far as the 
use of patronage and clientelism are concerned. As we demonstrate in chapter 
four, the state used patronage and clientelism in a number of ways. First, it used 
public resources to change the positions of the cattle based bourgeoisie. For 
example, besides benefiting from the land tenure system, rich cattle owners also 
took advantage of government policies such as agricultural subsidies and loans 
from NDB to enhance their economic positions and influence as shall be 
discussed in the Botswana case study chapter. Second, it used state resources to 
ensure public support by introducing agricultural programmes meant for the poor 
sectionsof the population, and ploughed part of its diamond wealth to improve the 
living standards of the general populace. It is in this context that the ruling party 
has b een able tom aintain i tself inp ower w ithout o utlawing o pposition parties. 
However, state polices have not created corruption that is out of control. 
South Africa 
South Africa is the most singular of African countries. First, it is relatively highly 
industrialised with an economy which is domestically integrated and diversified. 
its economy is the biggest in Africa, with a GDP approaching $130 billion 
(Overseas Trade, October 2000). Therefore, South Africa is the dominant player 
in the Southern African region mainly becapse of its economic strength. It is a 
multiracial society with a population of approximately 50 million. In part because 
of the size of the population, there is more pressure on state resources than it is the 
case in Botswana and Namibia. Pressure on state resources is exacerbated by its 
history of social exclusion and racial conflict. This history acts to reproduce many 
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of the political pressures on the state found elsewhere in Africa, namely the 
intensity of demands on the state to redress poverty and social exclusion. 
Second, South Africa differs from most Aftican states because it had a large 
settler population. Thus, while other sub-Saharan African states were 
characterised by patrimonial institutions, the South African state had features of 
an exclusionary democracy as shall be discussed later in chapter five. Irrespective 
of these differences, there are still some similarities between the apartheid state in 
South Africa and other post-colonial states in Africa. The apartheid state 
institutionalised patronage and clientelism and thus corruption by I. imiting and 
using access to state resources to transfonn the positions of their supporters in the 
same way as factions did in spoils politics discussed earlier in the chapter. Among 
other things, the apartheid state used state patronage to change the circumstances 
of AfHkaners as compared to other groups, to keep Indians and Coloureds 
halfway between Whites and Blacks, to generate a large number of black 
dependents and through the rise of the security state which led to authoritarianism 
and lack of transparency. These factors promoted corruption in many ways. We 
discuss these factors in more details in the South African case study chapter. 
Under the new South Africa, and the processes of clientelism and thus corruption are 
still in their infancy. However, there are indications that corruption and patronage 
have become part of the new state. Corruption in democratic South Affica is 
attributable to the need to redress apartheid policies and imbalances which facilitated 
corruption. For example, the introduction of affirmative action implies that public 
I 
service appointments are not based on qualification and merit values; certain awards 
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of government tenders are not based on the capabilities of concerned companies but 
to appease emerging companies; and the pressure to reward those previously 
disadvantaged leads to the creation of clientelist benefits. Finally, there is tension 
between party loyalty and democratic principles. Instead of solving the problem, 
these factors lead to a vicious circle of corruption. 
Namibia 
Namibia's political and socio-economic situations are different from other Affican 
countries. Namibia is a multiracial society, yet one ethnic group, the Ovambo 
dominates. Compared to other African nations, Namibia has a small population of 
approximately 1.7 million, which means there is less pressure on public resources 
although there is a need to attend to problems of social exclusion and inequalities. 
While most other sub-Saharan Africa's politics was influenced by the key 
institutions of Africa's patrimonial states, Namibia's politics - as in South Africa - 
is a product of settler oligarchies. Namibia had a small and dependent white settler 
population. Thus although Namibia is not immune from the peculiar 
characteristics of patronage and clientelism, the path through which patronage is 
carried out is similar - but on a small scale - to that of the colonial master (South 
Africa). For example, patronage was practised to appease the few white settlers 
who acted as overseers for the South African state. Patronage was also used as a 
weapon ofd ivide and r ule. T hat i s, b lacks w ho c ollaborated or worked for t he 
South African state were rewarded financially and otherwise. This was 
particularly shown by the privileges enjoyed by members of the DTA as opposed 
to the punishment endured by members of SWAPO. 
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In 1990 when Namibia received its independence it did not only inherit the legacy 
of socio-economic disparities from the white state but it also inherited their type 
of patronage. Under the new state patronage was used to appease those who 
fought for the independence of Namibia in a number of ways. For example, blacks 
were appointed to senior positions in government. There was a need to make these 
appointments at independence because the new state needed allies in government. 
Members of the Ovambo ethnic group were considered to have been more loyal 
during the liberation struggle and demanded favours and better treatment from the 
state. There is also tension between democratic principles and party loyalty and 
this leads to low levels of accountability in government. However, corruption and 
clientelism under the new state have not yet led to spoils politics as described 
earlier in the chapter. 
The fact that Botswana, South Africa and Namibia have not yet travelled down 
the crisis road makes the prospects for the control of corruption all more hopeful, 
and the prevention of a slide into post-colonial crisis all more important. The three 
countries are different from the rest of Africa, and yet they are vulnerable. They 
have learnt from what has happened elsewhere, especially in Africa. The most 
important thing is not what they are but what might be. Therefore there is a need 
for effective anti-corruption agencies in order to strengthen their democratic 
credentials, including the reputation for honesty in the eyes of international 
investors, donors and their own voters. Reassuring foreign investors is very 
important because in the context of underdevelopment these countries are heavily 
dependent on foreign investment. A closer look at Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) shows that these countries are not completely 
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clean even though they are considered the least corrupt in Africa. In this sense, 
there is need for these countries to double their efforts in tackling corruption. 
There is concern amongst these countries to tackle corruption. There is evidence to 
this effect. Presenting the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) 
Bill in the National Assembly for its second reading in 1994, the then Minister of 
Presidential Affairs and Public Administration, Lt. General Mompati Merafhe, noted 
that 
Government wishes it to become known, both within and outside 
Botswana, that ours is a country in which public and private business can 
be carried out honestly and fairly, and whose citizens do not tolerate 
abuses of the law by those with the power and financial resources to usurp 
them (Republic of Botswana, 1994: 37). 
President Festus Mogae also echoed concern over the problem of corruption. 
Giving a keynote speech at the ninth International Anti-Corruption Conference 
(IACQ held at Durban, South Africa in 1999, with regard to Botswana's response 
to the problem of corruption, Botswana's President Festus Mogae noted that "we 
wanted our citizens to be confident that we supported their desire to have a 
Govenu-nent, public and private institutions which could be trusted", and 
furthen-nore, "we wanted international investors to know that when they came to 
do business in our country there would be a level playing field which could not be 
influenced by the offer of bribes" (Mogae, 1999: 2). Moreover, speaking at a 
discussion on Anti-Corruption and Co-operate governance in Mexico on the 21" 
of March 2002, Mogae said "it was important for developing countries to 
recognise that they had institutional weaknesses, which needed strengthening, 
while developed nations must ensure that the briber did not go unpunished" 
(Botsivana Daily News, 25 March 2002: http: //Nv%v-, v. gov. bNv/cgi-bin/news). 
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In South Africa, the ninth International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC) was 
held at Durban from 10-15 th October 1999. This was the first International Anti- 
Corruption Conference to be staged in the African continent. It demonstrated the 
increasing concern over the problem of corruption in Affica amongst governments 
and civic organisations. The conference, which was hosted by South Africa's 
Minister of Justice, P. Maduna, was officially opened by President Thabo Mbeki, 
and officially closed by Deputy president Jacob Zurna. This conference is one 
notable example of how global processes influence the development of anti- 
corruption agencies. Earlier in 1997, when addressing a seminar in Midgard, 
Namibia, the fon-ner South African Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, Kader 
Asmal observed that "corruption is potentially one of the greatest forces for the 
destruction of democracy throughout the world, but particularly in Africa where 
parliamentary democracy is still in a fledging and vulnerable state" (1997: 1). In 
Namibia, two national anti-corruption conferences were staged in 1997 and 1998, 
with the aim of devising a national integrity strategy for Namibia. The country's 
Prime Minister spearheaded the anti-corruption conferences. 
These initiatives demonstrate that there is a declared intent to curb the problem of 
corruption. Through these initiatives these countries want to show foreign 
investors, donors as well as voters that they are concerned about the problem of 
corruption. Moreover, these countries want to protect their fragile democratic 
gains and strengthen their reputation for honesty. It is in this context that the 
control of corruption is important for these countries hence the establishment of 
anti-corruption agencies. For the donors, the problem of corruption needs to be 
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tackled through reform. Therefore, in the next chapter we deal with the issue of 
reform, and this will be followed in the subsequent chapters by reforrn in our 
cases studies of Botswana, South Africa and Namibia. 
Conclusion 
This c hapter h as e xplored w ays inw hich t he c entral i mportance oft he s tate to 
politics in Africa makes corruption a catastrophe in its effects on development and 
why the state is so vulnerable to corruption. Corruption in Africa was embedded 
in the politics of the state from the outset. First, class formation and the 
accumulation of private wealth are dependent on state power and access to state 
resources. Second, clientelism is used as a means of mobilising political support 
in Africa. These forces give rise to competition for public resources, which in turn 
leads to looting of public resources. The nature of clientelism and in turn 
corruption work against capital accumulation in Africa. In the context of 
underdevelopment, clientelism is unsustainable. As a result it leads to political 
instability and in turn becomes a source of corruption. It is in this sense that the 
state in Africa becomes vulnerable to corruption. In turn, the chapter has shown 
why anti-corruption agencies are important. It is in this context that the control of 
corruption in Botswana, South Africa and Namibia is all more important to 
prevent a slide into post-colonial crisis. 
In t he e yes oft he d onors, c orruption c an bet ackled t hrough r efonn. H owever, 
anti-corruption reform have had limited results. We identified a number of reasons 
why this is the case. First, anti-corruption agencies do not affect forces that give 
rise to corruption in Africa, and this in turn unden-nines institutional reform. 
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Second, anti-corruption agencies threaten or affect the ability of the state to 
distribute clientelist resources. By so doing, anti-corruption agencies threaten the 
very nature of the state. In the next chapter we discuss the broader context of 
reform more generally and in Affica. The chapter is concerned with the specific 
nature a nd c ontent oft he i nstitutional org ovemance reforins a nd t he p roblems 
that attend them generally in Africa. The chapter demonstrates that anti-corruption 
reforms do not necessarily curb the problem of corruption, rather they give rise to 
new forms of corruption. Thus corruption becomes privatised or decentralized. 
66 
Chapter three: The anti-corruption strategy 
Chapter two explored. socio-political forces and economic problems that drive 
corruption in Africa and give rise to anti-corruption agencies. The focus was on 
the importance of corruption as a problem facing contemporary Africa, and why 
corruption b ecame ani mportant i ssue inA frican p olitics int he I ast p art oft he 
twentieth century. It sought to explain why corruption was seen as destructive to 
African development in terms of the politics of the state in Africa and to illustrate 
the factors that made anti-corruption agencies important and why they needed to 
be effective. 
This chapter examines the broader context of reform policies in Aftica and more 
generally. With the increasing concern over the problem of corruption in the past 
ten to fifteen years, there emerged a new global consensus that corruption had to 
be tackled through institutional refon-n. This chapter is concerned with the specific 
nature and content of institutional or governance reforms and the problems that 
attend them generally in Africa. Donor goverm-nents and agencies are pushing for 
a liberal democratic reform agenda, one which entails economic liberalization and 
political democratization underpinned by "good governance". Moreover, reform 
entails instituting anti-corruption measures and the establishment of stable, 
accountable and transparent government. In the eyes of the western donors, 
political and economic refon-ris are necessary to curtail the devastating effects of 
corruption in Africa. As a result of donor and local pressures, African states have 
embarked on a range of political and economic reforms. This chapter will help us 
to understand why there is a sudden push for institutional reform in Africa. 
Despite a push for reform to curb the problem of corruption, this chapter 
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demonstrates that anti-corruption reforrn has so far produced mixed results 
especially in terms of tackling high-level corruption, which indicates that reform 
is not sufficient to curb the problem of corruption. 
The chapter also spells out the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (ICAQ model in detail and its application to Africa. We examine the 
organisation and structure of the ICAC, its anti-corruption strategy, powers as 
well as factors behind its success in fighting corruption. Botswana, South Africa 
and Namibia are not in the same economic crisis as elsewhere in Africa yet they 
have adopted the Hong Kong model. This is because the three countries are 
vulnerable and have learnt from what has happened elsewhere in Africa. The fact 
that the three countries have not yet travelled down the crisis road makes the 
control of corruption more hopeful and all more important to prevent the slide into 
post-colonial crisis. Therefore there is a need for effective anti-corruption 
agencies in order to strengthen their democratic credentials in the eyes of 
international investors, donors and their own voters. In the section that follows we 
discuss the call for reforra in Africa. 
The rationale of reform in Africa 
The last ten to fifteen years marked a fundamental departure in donor policies as 
donor agencies and governments linked economic aid to political reform, 
including the curbing of corruption, in pursuit of good governance. Internationally 
and locally, Africa's crisis and, in turn, the problem of corruption came to be 
perceived as one of governance; 'a governance crisis' (Hyden, 1992: 5). Chikulo 
observed that "Aftica's problems were increasingly perceived to be of a political 
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nature, political reforrn was elevated to the top of the refonn agenda" (1997: 25). 
According to the donors and western governments, Structural Adjustment Policies 
(SAPs) had failed to achieve their intended objectives because of intrinsic 
obstacles in the political system of the beneficiary states (Leftwich, 1994; 
Chikulo, 1997). Kpundeh (1995) attributes widespread corruption in the African 
continent to the overcentralized nature of African states, and lack of openness and 
accountability. For the donors, therefore, poor development performance and 
adjustment failures are a result of dictatorial rule and poor governance all 
stemming from too much concentration of economic and political power in the 
state and, especially, its executive (Leflwich, 1994: 369). 
Partly because of this, donors and western governments moved a step further from 
supporting or encouraging economic liberalization and made good governance 
(and democracy) a prerequisite for development aid (ibid. 369). In the aftermath 
of the Cold War, western countries were "freed from the perceived need to turn a 
blind eye to the domestic excesses of Cold War allies" (Wiseman, 1995: 3). As a 
result, western governments as well as international financial institutions (IFIs) 
such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and most donor 
organisations became ever more persuaded that lack of democratic rule and 
political accountability in Africa was a fundamental cause of economic problems. 
Thus donors linked economic assistance and investment with political reform in 
Africa (Wiseman, 1995). This is the case because, as Szeftel observed 
"corruption, over-regulation and economic crisis were seen as characteristics of 
authoritarian regimes and their ultimate unpopularity had paved the way for 
political reform" (1998: 226). And as Chikulo noted, "since then political reform 
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has become a package deal linked to the structural adjustment programmes" 
(1997: 25). In this way, donors encouraged governance reforms through the use of 
aid and political reforms. 
The linking of economic aid to political reforms came to be known as 'political 
conditionality' (Robinson, 1993; Baylies, 1995; Chikulo, 1997). According to 
Robinson 
political conditionality refers to the linking of aid to administrative and 
political reform in recipient countries, in the pursuit of what is termed 
'good governance'. There are four components to this: sound economic 
policies, that is adherence to market principles and economic openness; 
competent public administration; open and accountable government; and 
respect for the rule of law and human rights (1993: 90). 
In this way, political conditionality marked a radical departure or shift from the 
Cold War politics in which serious shortcomings of dictatorial regimes were 
disregarded (Nwokedi, 1995), autocratic regimes befriended despite their poor 
human rights record (Sorensen, 1993), associations between covert activities and 
politicians of questionable character were supported and deals with criminals were 
struck (Ellis, 1996: 193). The end of the Cold War, as Nwokedi noted 
ushered in a new mood in inter-state relations as it represented an 
opportunity for the Western donor nations to anticipate a review of the 
criteria on which aid had been accorded in the past to political regimes in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere whose record on human rights had- 
caused considerable disquiet (1995: 181). 
The new criteria of according aid, it was envisaged, would lead to greater 
efficiency, accountability and transparency and thereby curtail corruption. This is 
the case because political reforms would result, on the one hand, in legitimate 
government, the rule of law, respect for human rights, competitive multiparty 
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elections which were free and fair, and checks and balances which would ensure 
openness and accountability. On the other hand, structural adjustment policies 
would reduce the size and role of the public sector (Sandbrook, 1986) and thus 
further help to curb rent-seeking practices and corruption. 
Because of these donor pressures, and parallel local demands for reform, Affican 
states have embarked on economic liberalization and political democratization, as 
a way of acceding to the new criteria of obtaining international aid (Chikulo, 
1997). These reforms were seen not only as a way of overcoming Affica's socio- 
economic crisis but in turn as strategies for curbing corruption: "economic 
liberalization, democratization and the battle against corruption, it was assumed, 
marched hand in hand" (Jones, 1996: 72). The section that follows examines 
reform strategies for combating corruption in Africa. 
The general democratic reform strategy 
Corruption and economic liberalization 
The most straightfonvard pressure for African states to liberalize in the early 
1970s and 1980s came from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Some 32 
African states had adopted structural adjustment policies by 1990, marking a 
widespread shift from state-driven to market-driven development strategies 
(Chikulo, 1997: 27). As noted, liberalization was soon linked'to democratization: 
"the attractions of the market and of legal-rational norrns governing public 
administration were [considered to be] preferable to the caprice of authoritarian 
one-party and military regimes" (Szeftel, 2000b: 293-4). 
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Economic liberalization is about the reduction of government involvement in the 
economy. For the World Bank "liberalization involves freeing prices, trade, and 
entry from state controls" (1996: 22). In this way, economic liberalization 
decentralizes the decision-making structures in the economy. Thus in a market 
economy, the prices of goods and services are believed to be determined by the 
forces of supply and demand instead of by government officials who extract 
crents'. It was envisaged that by embarking on economic liberalization, corruption 
will be reduced because economic liberalization would result in a detachment of 
the state from economic resources. Thus the incentive of public officials to 
conspire and extract rents or favours would diminish. As Yan Kong put it: 
economic liberalization leads to the separation of government and 
business. The motivation for collusion, the exchange of financial favours 
for domestic monopoly, disappears with the competitiorf that liberalization 
brings (1996: 52). 
For the donors, corruption was an outcome of state interference in the economy 
(Heywood, 1997; Szeflel, 1998). As Rose-Ackerman noted, "corruption is taken 
as a signal that government has overextended itself' (1978: 9). Thus the donor's 
point of departure was that corruption was prevalent because the state was playing 
a big role in the economy. The expanded role of the state in the economy "as a 
regulator, allocator, producer, and employer" coupled with "the widening of 
government power by increased economic activities" presented opportunities for 
corruption to flourish (Sun, 1999: 2). Opportunities for corruption occurred 
because public officials "have the power to allocate scarce benefits and impose 
onerous costs" (Rose-Ackerman, 1999: 39). The government's monopoly of force 
allows it to become involved in economic affairs. This authority, together with the 
ability to gain access to information that is not open to members of the public, 
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opens up possibilities for state officials to further their personal interests, or those 
of their friends or associates, at the cost of the general public. In this sense, the 
opportunities for corruption and rent seeking are substantial (World Bank, 1997: 
99). 
To reduce the possibilities of corruption and rents, donors insisted that African 
states should reduce their role in the economy and increase that of the market. For 
the World Bank "corruption flourishes where distortions in the policy and 
regulatory r egime p rovide s cope f or i t" ( 1997: 102). T herefore, r eform policies 
which intensify or improve the ability of the economy to compete globally will 
limit corruption (World Bank, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). The World Bank 
puts the case thus: 
any reform that increases the competitiveness of the economy will reduce 
incentives for corrupt behaviour. Thus policies that lower controls on 
foreign trade, remove entry barriers to private industry, and privatize state 
firms in a way that ensures competition will all support the fight. If the 
state has no authority to restrict exports or to license businesses, there will 
be no opportunities to pay bribes in those areas. If a subsidy program is 
eliminated, any bribes that accompanied it will disappear as well. If the 
price controls are lifted, market prices will reflect scarcity values, not the 
payment of bribes (1997: 105). ' 
Under the neo-liberal framework, the state should provide an 'enabling 
environment' for the private sector in Africa, despite the fact that that sector's 
underdevelopment prompted state intervention in the first place. 
Corruption and political democratization 
Political democratization has been tendered by donors as yet another effective 
strategy for curbing corruption in Africa. According to the donors, political 
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democratization needed to be implemented along with economic liberalization as 
one package. This is the case because for the donors, "economic liberalization 
requires also a democratization strategy to restrain state power: a liberal economy 
needs a liberal state" (Szeftel, 1998: 226). The need to implement economic and 
democratic reforms together was recently noted by U. S. Secretary of State Powell 
at a 2001 Annual Meeting of the Bretton' Woods committee. He observed that 
political and economic reform had to be implemented as one package if each one 
of them was to be effective (USAID, 2001: 
http: //-vvNv,, v. usaid. gov/democracy/dusni. html). Even more important was the need 
for a stable good government because transparency, honesty and accountability in 
government were the foundation of a healthy investment climate (USAID, 2001: 
http: //xv-%vNv. usaid. gov/democracy/dusni. html). Thus, Doig observed that 
democratization is seen by Western governments, international donors, 
academics and commentators as a significant developmental step that 
could (or, more conjecturally, should) provide the impetus needed to 
resolve such countries' political, economic and social problems and lead 
the way to the establishment and eventual consolidation of democratic 
governance, including universal political association and participation 
alongside a limited, transparent and responsive state and end to the 
debilitating impact of corruption, misappropriation and waste 
characterised earlier regimes (1999: 13). 
Donor organisations and governments have since linked aid to democratic 
refonns. For instance, article 2 (2) of The Council of the European Union 
regulation which lays down the requirements for the implementation of 
development, states that the European Community will provide economic aid to 
processes of democratization which encourage and reinforce the rule of law, 
promote the separation of powers between branches of government, encourage 
pluralism, good governance, participation, electoral processes and the separation 
of military and civilian functions (Commission for the European Communities, 
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1999: 5-6). For Japan, the new criteria for aid allocation require a cut in military 
expenditure, economic liberalization, the promotion of democracy and respect for 
human rights. As Leftwich observes, donors contend that 
democratic politics and a slim, efficient and accountable public 
bureaucracy are not simply desirable but also necessary for a thriving free 
market economy, and vice versa, for the two are inextricably implicated 
with each other. Neo-liberals thus regard an obese state apparatus with a 
large stake in economic life as being both inefficient from an 
administrative point of view and also incompatible with an independent 
and vibrant civil society which is held to be the basis of effective 
democracy (1994: 369). 
Moreover, democracy is identified with liberal democratic norms. U. S. Secretary 
of State Colin Powell put the position of the Bush administration bluntly: 
America stands ready to help any country that wishes to join the 
democratic world - any country that puts the rule of law in place and 
begins to live by the rule, any country that seeks peace and prosperity and 
a place in the sun. In that light, there is no country on earth that is not 
touched by America, for we have become the motive force f6r freedom 
and democracy in the world. 
(USAID, 2001: http: //Nv-Nv, %v. usaid. gov/democracy/dusni. html) 
Africa's response to these demands was a series of multiparty elections from 
1989. It was hoped that the shift to political pluralism would also make African 
governments more efficient and less corrupt. This is captured by Chikulo who 
states that 
concomitant w ith t he I iberalization oft he e conomy h ave b cen m oves to 
open up the political system by the adoption of reforms to pennit greater 
pluralism, political competition and good governance within the polity.... 
It was assumed that pluralism would make African governments more 
responsive and hence better managers of their economies (1997: 27). 
As much as economic liberalization is about reducing state intervention in the 
economy, political democratization is about limiting the role of the state in the 
political sphere. It is about restoring political pluralism or multiparty democracy, 
whereby different political and civic organisations participate in the political 
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process without hindrance. Political reform was consciously designed to limit the 
role of the state, as Bratton and Van de Walle make clear. Democratization, they 
suggest, 
entails the reform of authoritarian regimes. It comes to pass when public 
authorities relax controls on the political activities of citizens. Often 
described as a political opening, political liberalization involves official 
recognition of basic civil liberties. In such openings, governments restore 
previously repudiated freedoms of movement, speech, and association to 
individual and groups in society. As an analogue of economic 
liberalization, political [democratization] reduces government intervention 
in the political market, breaking up monopolies of political authority and 
allowing a plurality of opinions and organizations. In short political 
[democratization] broadens political competition" (1997: 59). 
By enhancing transparency and accountability, it was envisaged, political 
democratization would reduce or limit corruption as it puts the activities of the 
state and its officials under constant scrutiny through 'due process'. Shleifer and 
Vishnky argued that "countries with more political competition have stronger 
public pressure against corruption - through laws, democratic elections, and even 
the independent press" (1993: 610). In this way, Transparency International (TI) 
notes that 
democratization ... presents an opportunity to control systemic corruption by opening up the activities of public officials to public scrutiny and 
accountability. It has been suggested that democracies, more so than any 
other political system, are better able to deter corruption through 
institutionalised checks and balances and other meaningful accountability 
mechanisms. They reduce secrecy, monopoly and discretion (TI, 
2001: http: //NvNv,. v. transparency. de/documents/source- 
book/b/chapter_5/index. html). 
LeVine emphasises the same point: 
[ifl administrative corruption cannot be eliminated, it can be limited in 
[democratic] states. The operative consensus with which I agree, is that 
attempts at limitation are more likely to succeed the further the country is 
along the democratization path. The more democracy, the more likely that 
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mechanisms will have been put in place to monitor the performance of 
administrators and bureaucrats (LeVine, 1993, quoted in Szeftel, 1998: 
226). 
In this view, corruption flourishes "where institutions of restraint are weak" 
(World Bank, 1997: 102), and state power is not limited and controlled. Public 
accountability restrains political power and hence corruption; "public 
accountability is necessary for the control of corruption" (Rose-Acken-nan, 1999: 
143). Therefore, as Yan Kong notes, "in theory we should expect democratization 
.. to erode the conditions on which corruption thrives" (1996: 52). For neo- 
liberals, political democratization would result in what Schwarzmantel called the 
"core democratic values", being "participation, accountability of the leaders and 
the idea of equality" (1994: 33). 
Corruption and good governance 
Alongside democratization, donors and western governments called for 'good 
governance' to limit corruption. Donors soon came to realise that without good 
governance, democratization lacked substance. This gave rise to "a new will, or at 
least a proclaimed will, to make African governments more accountable both to 
their own population and to aid donors" (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 117). 
The concept of governance gained popularity and momentum at the turn of the 
twentieth century. This concept has been popularised mainly by donor agencies 
and governments, at the end of the twentieth century as part of 'aid 
conditiofiality'. According to Gibbon, good governance refers to "forms of 
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political management" (1993: 52). For the World Bank, good goyernance 
essentially entails efficient management of resources, proper policy and executing 
functions in an effective way - all aimed at attaining good economic performance 
(Baylies, 1995: 326). Because of the poor record of neopatrimonial states in 
economic management, for the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), 
politically good governance refers to a slim state. And on the economic front, 
good governance m cans p rivatisation and d eregUlation, t hus I eaving t he m arket 
forces of demand and supply to determine the prices of goods and services 
thereby promoting efficiency. Thus good governance embraces political as well as 
economic issues. 
However, good governance is a long tenn goal. To facilitate it, there is need for 
good govemment. For Doig, a good government refers to 
political legitimacy for the government through democratic elections and 
transfer of power, political opposition and representative government; 
accountability through the provision of inforination, separation of powers, 
effective internal and external audit, low levels of corruption and 
nepotism; official competency such as having trained public servants, 
realistic policies and low defence expenditure; and human rights as 
indicated by freedom of religion and movement, impartial and accessible 
criminal justice systems, and the absence of arbitrary government power 
(1995: 151-2). 
Doig and Theobald echoed similar sentiments when they observed that 
good governance requires that the state be both efficient and effective, 
which can be achieved only by the state limiting its activities to those 
which itisb est q ualified top erform. H owever, t his s limmed s tate m ust 
also be generally perceived as legitimate. That is to say, the process of 
government should be open and honest as well as meeting the needs of its 
citizens. In order that these needs be met, the state must be constrained by, 
aý well as work with, a vigorous civil society (1999: 9). 
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Good governance is about building state capacity, transparency and 
accountability. It is about building a competent public administration, an open and 
accountable state, as well as adherence to the rule of law. For the World Bank, 
good governance is built around a number of aspects which include; 
accountability, the legal framework for development, information and 
transparency (Moore, 1993; Leftwich, 1994). According to Leftwich, these 
aspects of good governance were defined as follows: 
(a) accountability; basically refers to holding public officials responsible 
for their actions. 
(b) a legal framework for development; means a structure of rules and 
laws which provide clarity, predictability and stability for the private 
sector, which are impartially and fairly applied to all, and which provide 
the basis for cabinet resolution through an independent judicial system. 
(c) i nformation; rn eans i nformation about e conomic c onditions, b udgets, 
markets and government intentions is reliable and accessible to all, which 
is crucial for private sector calculations. 
(d) transparency; calls for an open government, to enhance accountability, 
limit corruption and stimulate consultative processes between government 
and private interests over policy development (1994: 3 72). 
Wohlmuth argues that good governance is consists of six elements - which are; a 
legitimate g overnment, a suitable legal framework, popular participation, where 
freedoms of expression and association are guaranteed, a bureaucracy which is 
accountable and transparent, and where organisational structures of g overnment 
are based on rationality (1999: 7). Thus good governance entails "reinvigorating 
institutional capability" (World Bank, 1997). As the World Bank noted 
this means designing effective rules and restraints, to check arbitrary state 
actions and combat entrenched corruption. It means subjecting state 
institutions to greater competition, to increase their efficiency. It means 
increasing the performance of state institutions, improving pay and 
incentives. And it means making the state more responsive to people's 
needs, bringing government closer to the people through broader 
participation and decentralization (1997: 3). 
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For the donors, it was envisaged that good governance would curtail corruption 
through its principles of openness and accountability. Moreover, by laying down 
the legal framework for development and by reviving the capacity of state 
institutions, good governance would expose and thereby reduce the incentives for 
public officials to extract rents because their actions would be under constant 
scrutiny. More importantly, this would result in a government which was 
responsive to the needs of the electorate. It was in this context that good 
governance also came to be seen as necessary to combat corruption. 
, 
The anti-corruption element of democratic reform 
Creating anti-corruption agencies 
With ar ecognition ont he p art oft he d onors t hat ' good govemance' h ad m ade 
little progress towards curbing corruption, there had been a change or shift in 
donor policies. For the donors, good governance had not produced the necessary 
results because corruption was there. Donors called for effective measures to 
combat corruption, because corruption had come to be seen as a threat to good 
governance reforrns. "As a result, almost all of Africa's principal aid donors and 
trading partners have recently developed policies on these issues" (Riley, 2000: 
138). The basic idea was to channel aid to countries that were prepared to 
introduce refonns to tackle organized corruption (Klitgaard, 1997: 503). In this 
way, "action on corruption became yet another of the Bretton Woods institutions' 
conditionalities, on top of the long list of other economic and political conditions 
already attached to their lending criteria" (Harsch, 1999: 77). This came following 
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a 1996 joint annual meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), at which James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, called for 
the "need to deal with the cancer of corruption" (Wolfensohn quoted in Harsch, 
1999: 77). Since then, the World Bank and IMF "began to speak more explicitly 
and forcefully about corruption, both in their own procurement and aid 
programmes" (ibid. 77). According to the President of the World Bank, James 
Wolfensohn, corruption was never openly mentioned by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund until in 1996, because it was regarded as a 
"politically sensitive issue", which fell outside the remit of the Bank's non- 
political mandate prior to the mid-1990s. This was the case even for many other 
bilateral and multilateral donor agencies (World Bank, 
2001: http//vrw%vl. worldbank. org/publiesector/anticorrupt/helping. htm). 
We argue that since the Bank started to tackle corruption directly, other donor 
agencies followed and, made combating corruption a matter of high priority. 
Donors have since linked economic aid to anti-corruption efforts. Thus donors 
were promoting and supporting institutional and legal reform, including the 
setting up of anti-corruption agencies. This was the case in part because 
corruption in Africa had come to be associated with political instability, deep- 
rooted crises of economic development, poverty and spiralling public debt. More 
recently, corruption had come to be seen as an obstacle or threat to the very 
refonns a dvanced byt he d onors. T he c oncems about t he d evastating e ffects of 
corruption in Africa were also shared by Africans themselves (Szeftel, 2000a). 
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As a result, donors were using aid and sponsoring a number of measures such as 
international conferences and seminars, which were aimed at advancing a global 
anti-corruption culture. This resulted in the publication of a wide range of 
literature on combating corruption. More importantly, there was the emergence of 
agencies, most notably Transparency International (TI), which encouraged and 
supported anti-corruption initiatives. TI does not investigate individual cases of 
corruption but fights corruption by raising awareness on the dangers of corruption. 
Other a gencies w hich sp onsor a nd p lay as ignificant r ole int he anti-corruption 
crusade include; The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 
For USAID, its approach to corruption entails promoting economic reforms that 
curtail the role of government in the economy, enhancing openness and 
accountability, strengthening the rule of law, supporting legal refonn as well as 
civic organisations initiatives to combat corruption (USAID Bureau for Africa, 
1998). The World Bank's new anti-corruption strategy entails four elements, 
which a re: p revention ofc orruption inp roj ects financed byt he B ank, a ssisting 
countries curtail corruption, mainstreaming anti-corruption activities in the Bank, 
and supporting International efforts to fight corruption (Riley, 2000). To counter 
the devastating effects of corruption, the Bank suggested 
eliminating policy "distortions" that provide opportunities for corruption, 
raising civil service salaries to the levels of those in the private sector, 
hiring a nd p romoting c ivil s ervants ont he b asis ofm erit n ot p atronage, 
mechanisms to enhance the monitoring and accountability of officials, the 
establishment of clear rules and an independent judiciary, the naming of 
ombudsmen to hear citizens' complaints, and anti-corruption commissions 
to investigate serious allegations (Harsch, 1999: 75). 
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The increasing concern over corruption on the part of donors created pressures on 
African states to tackle corruption. As a response to donor pressures, African 
states introduced a number of specific legal and institutional reforms, which 
included anti-corruption agencies, to counter the problem of corruption. The 
section that follows discusses the legal and institutional refonns that were 
introduced. 
Legal and institutional reforms 
One reforra measure that had been proposed to control corruption in Africa was 
the creation of an independent and effective judiciary through judicial refon-n. An 
independent judiciary was necessary to hold the other branches of govenunent 
accountable for their actions. In this way, the judiciary would act as a check on 
the activities of the state and its agents. However, the judiciary can be able to 
perfon-n this noble role only when it is independent, effective and posses the 
power to enforce its decisions (World Bank, 1997: 100). An autonomous, neutral 
and knowledgeable judiciary plays an essential role towards the fulfilment of a 
fair, sincere, transparent and accountable government (Transparency International, 
2000: http: //Nv-%v-, v. transparency. de/). This is the case because an independent 
judiciary was necessary to ensure that the rule of law obtains. A judiciary that 
performed well was a fundamental basis of the rule of law (World Bank, 1997). 
The independence of the judiciary could be enhanced if its tenure of office and 
adequate remuneration were guaranteed. Moreover, the judiciary needs to be free 
from political interference. 
The judiciary plays an important role in the fight against corruption because 
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judicial decisions help determine the distribution of wealth and power, 
judges can exploit their positions for private gain. A corrupt or politically 
dependent judiciary can facilitate high-level corruption, undermine 
reforms, and override legal norms. When the judiciary is part of a corrupt 
system, the wealthy and the corrupt operate with impunity, confident that a 
well-placed payoff will deal with any legal problems (Rose-Ackerman, 
1999: 151). 
Thus, a sincere and revered judiciary has a unique function to perfonn in 
countering corrupt g overnments and upholding the rule of laxv (ibid. 15 1). In a 
good number of countries in Africa, judicial institutions were not only weak and 
ineffective, but they were subject to executive influence. For instance, in Nigeria, 
a state governor used mobile police to detain the Chief Judge and his other judges 
who were in charge of an election case. The judges were not set free until after a 
supportive judgement had been tendered down (Transparency International, 
2000: http: //NvNv-ýv. transparency. de/). 
In order to enhance the effectiveness of the judiciary, donors called for judicial or 
legal refonus. As the World Bank notes 
legal and judicial reform may include: amending a country's law to 
improve the business environment and improve investment, han-nonizing 
law for internal consistency, or adapting law to contemporary conditions. 
The Bank may aid existing legal institutions by rehabilitating or building 
court buildings, training judges, funding the publication of judicial 
decisions, or buying law books for the court library. Legal and judicial 
institutions may also be created or reformed by, for example, establishing 
schools for judges, adopting improved case management techniques, or 
creating commercial courts (World Bank, 
2001: http: //,, vNvNvl. worldbank. org/publicsector/legal/). 
Legal reforms seek to tackle problems within the administration of justice as well 
as change the parallel relationship between the judiciary and the other branches of 
government (Domingo, 1999). Thus, reform intended to improve horizontal 
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accountability would be perceived as compromising the rent-seeking ability of 
power holders as well as their patronage networks (ibid. 166). Legal reforms seek 
to enhance the running of legal institutions (World Bank, 2001: 
http: //NvNvwl. worldbank. org/publiesector/legal/). This underscores the imPortance 
of an independent judiciary in controlling political power and in turn, corruption. 
One other reform strategy that had been tried to control corruption in Africa was 
administrative and civil service reform. As Klitgaard pointed out 
civil service reform and, more generally, the improvement of the 
functioning of the public sector are especially important where institutions 
have grown 'sick'- where salaries have plummeted, where information 
about performance is scant and unreliable, where corruption has become 
widespread (1997: 504). 
Administrative and civil service reform entailed a number of aspects. One such 
aspect involved a significant reduction in the size of the public service (Klitgaard, 
1997; Hope, 2000), which was the common remedy to corruption (Theobald, 
1994). Downsizing of the public service was found to be necessary because 
the civil service in most African countries is much larger than those 
countries require, much more costly than they can afford, and significantly 
less effective and productive than they should be. In many of the countries, 
patrimonialism and expanding state activity have contributed to a civil 
service which contains many who are superfluous and none who are paid 
well; and the ministries and agencies in which they work tend to be ill- 
equipped and poorly structured (Hope, 2000: 32). 
In an attempt to clean up and invigorate the public service, African countries 
embarked on extensive reforrns to curtail overstaffing in the public sector (World 
Bank, 1997). A variety of measures or initiatives were used to remove extra- 
employees from the payroll. These included 
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enforcing mandatory retirement ages, abolishing job guarantees for high 
school and university graduates, ensuring attrition through recruitment 
freezes, introducing voluntary departure schemes, making outright 
dismissals, and. eliminating 'ghost' (fictitious) employees from the payroll. 
For example, Cameroon and Uganda significantly reduced civil service 
employment by removing 5840 and 20000 ghost employees, respectively, 
from their payrolls during 1981-1990 (Hope, 2000: 33). 
Similarly, in Zimbabwe, a major facet of Civil service Refonn was a cut in the 
size of the Public Service. From 1992, the govermuent of Zimbabwe used a 
number of initiatives to down size the public service. These included; eliminating 
posts which were vacant for more than 12 months, compulsory reductions and 
optional retirements. By 30 June 1994, Zimbabwe's Public Service was cut by 
some 12,700 (Kau], 1996: 140-1). "A common measure of government size is the 
ratio of government expenditure to the economy's total expenditure or total 
output" (World Bank, 1997: 33). Theobald argued that the justification behind a 
cut in the size of the civil service was that not only would it reduce opportunities 
for favouritism, graft, and misappropriation respectively, but it would largely 
enhance the training and terms of *service of the remaining public servants whose 
number had been decreased considerably (1994: 705). 
The other aspect of public service reform entailed merit based recruitment and 
promotion. The World Bank noted that "cross-country evidence reveals that 
bureaucracies with more competitive, merit-based recruitment and promotion 
practices and better pay are more capable" (1997: 9). It was in the light of this, 
that the World Bank was calling for countries to establish 
a. rule-based bureaucracy with a pay structure that rewards civil servants 
for honest efforts, a merit-based recruitment and promotion system to 
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shield the civil service from political patronage, and credible financial 
controls to prevent the arbitrary use of public resources (ibid. 105). 
These measures were necessary to ensure a well motivated and capable public 
service. Linked to merit-based recruitment, was the need for adequate 
qompensation or better pay for civil servants. Most African public sectors are 
characterised by low wages, insufficient benefits, and fragmented labour markets 
(Cohen et al, 1997: 317). As the World Bank pointed out 
in many countries, civil servants' wages have eroded as a result of 
expanding public employment at lower skill levels and fiscal constraints 
on the total wage bill. The result has been a significant compression of the 
salary structure and highly uncompetitive pay for senior officials, making 
it difficult to recruit and retain capable staff (1997: 9). 
Thus, the World Bank noted that in order for governments in developing countries 
to employ staff of a high calibre, promote productivity and discourage corruption, 
they needed to pay their employees no less than a living wage (World Bank, 2001: 
http: //Nv,, vývI. worldbank. org/publicsector/civilservi, ce/). Moreover, better wages 
would make working in the public service more attractive (World Bank, 1997: 
94). Low salaries were seen as a good recipe for corruption because poorly paid 
public servants would be more vulnerable to accept bribes than well paid 
employees. It is an open secret that insufficient salaries encourage state officials to 
engage in unethical fonns of conduct (Wai quoted in Klitgaard, 1997: 489). 
Therefore, 
as a measure for controlling corruption, pay/grading reforin generally has 
five objectives: (a) an increase in overall real pay levels; (b) the 
decompression of pay scales to improve the competitiveness of civil 
service pay at higher levels; (c) a new grading system based on job 
evaluations; (d) the introduction of performance-based pay; and (e) the 
ithprovement of pay policy-making and admnistration (Hope, 2000: 32). 
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The other aspect of public service refonn involved training of civil servants. 
Training of public servants was not only seen as necessary but it was also of 
fundamental importance in improving service delivery. Training does not only 
improve the skills of public servants but it also gave to a public service that was 
effective and efficient. This is captured by Hope who states that 
training is a very important element of the process of behaviour 
modification and instilling of values of moral accountability and ethical 
behaviour. Many African countries now have ifistitutes of public 
administration or management, or administrative staff colleges, to train 
their civil servants. Many of these training activities are supported by 
donor agencies [such as the World Bank] because there is recognition of 
the importance of training in any attempt to reforin a given civil service 
for improved perfon-nance. Training is intended to enhance the knowledge 
and skills of individuals as well as inculcate proper ethical attitudes toward 
and about work (ibid. 33). 
The various aspects of civil service refonn were intended to strengthen openness, 
accountability as well as efficiency and effectiveness in the public service, and 
thus in turn, curtail the problem of corruption. An effective and capable public 
service was necessary because for the government to be successful, the public 
service should spearhead the process of national transfon-nation by leading, 
instigating, designing and overseeing the process of transformation (Kaul, 1996: 
150). 
Yet another refon-n strategy that had been tried to limit corruption in Africa was 
public campaigns, whose aim was to make the public aware of the damaging 
consequences of corruption, the punishments for taking part in corrupt acts and 
the kind of conduct that was expected of state officials (Kato; 1997; Hope, 2000). 
This is the strategy which Transparency International utilises in its anti-corruption 
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crusade. Transparency International seeks to make limiting corruption an issue of 
high priority in the agendas of international organisations and govenu-nents. 
African states also embraced Codes of Conduct as an anti-corruption strategy. 
These may take different forms such as Codes of Ethics and Leadership Codes 
(Hope, 2000). A good example is Uganda's Leadership Code Statute of 1991, 
which requires 
the annual declaration of income, assets, and liabilities by leaders. The 
Code specifies minimum behaviour and conduct standards for leaders 
regarding gifts and benefits in kind, conflicts and tenders, and use or abuse 
of public property. The Code also provides sanctions for violations of its 
provisions (Kato, 1997: 17). 
Despite its good intentions, this Code has so far not had a major effect on 
corruption (Kato, 1997), as it came into force in 1997 (Hope, 2000). In some 
countries, political leaders subverted Codes of Conduct. President Robert Mugabe 
of Zimbabwe was one such leader who described the 1984 Leadership Code 
meant to curtail corruption, as a "despicable piece of paper" (ibid. 30). In South 
Africa there is a Code of Conduct and all office bearers are required to declare 
their assets (Transparency International, 2000: http: //NvNvNv. transparency. de/). 
Moreover, South Africa has an Ethics Code for its Members of Parliament, whose 
aim was to attain an accountable and transparent political order (Hope, 2000). 
The influence of the Hong Kong model 
Given the growing concern over the problem of corruption, anti-corruption reforrn 
had also come to be pursued through independent anti-corruption agencies which 
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were a recent feature in the fight against corruption (Johnston, 1999). Johnston 
argued that independent anti-corruption agencies led to major and continued 
reductions of corruption in countries where it appeared improbable at one point. 
Moreover, these agencies proved to be efficient barriers against corruption (1999: 
217). It was in this context that autonomous anti-corruption agencies were an 
admired or accepted reform proposition intended for developing countries (Rose- 
Ackerman, 1999: 161). Anti-corruption agencies were modelled along the famous 
Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (ICAC) in Hong Kong. Following the 
success of the ICAC in reducing corruption in Hong Kong, the ICAC has been 
seen, cited and used as a model which other countries should follow. It is 
necessary therefore, to examine the Hong Kong ICAC which has been so 
influential as an anti-corruption model for Africa. 
The anti-corruption model: The Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong 
The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong was 
established in February 1974 as a response to public outcry to the problem of 
corruption. At the time corruption was a major problem in Hong Kong especially 
in the Police Force. Corruption reached a crisis point in 1973, when Peter Godber, 
a Chief Police Superintendent with unexplained wealth of over HK$4.3 million 
became the subject of an investigation. The Godber affair gave rise to protests led 
by students calling for government action against corruption and the extradition of 
Godber, who had fled Hong Kong. As a response to this, the government 
appointed a Commission of Inquiry. As a result, the Hong kong ICAC was set up 
in 1974 (ICAC, 2002: http: //Nv-%v,. v. icac. org. hk/eng/about/index. html). Its first 
priority was to ensure that Godber was brought to justice. Godber's successful 
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extradition and prosecution demonstrated that the ICAC was determined to fight 
corruption, and this case marked the beginning of 'a quiet revolution' against 
corruption (ICAC, 2002: http: //NvNvw. icac. org. hk/eng/about/index. html). Today the 
ICAC in Hong Kong has not only become a popular focus of international 
attention but it was also widely held as a good example of the most effective anti- 
corruption agency. As Johnston noted, Hong Kong's ICAC "has become a model 
for anti-corruption activity elsewhere and is widely credited with significantly 
reducing corruption" (1999: 221). 
Organization and structure of the Hong Kong ICAC 
From the outset, the ICAC in Hong Kong adopted a three pronged strategy in its 
fight against corruption, which entails investigation, corruption prevention as well 
as public education (Klitgaard, 1988; Thcobald and Williams, 1999; ICAC, 
2002: http: //NvNvw. icac. org. hk/). This strategy, which continues to be the guiding 
principle of the ICAC, was important "to develop a new public consciousness. For 
it was recognised that prevention was as important as the deterrent prosecution, 
and the battle against corruption could only be won by changing people's attitude 
towards corruption" (ICAC, 2002: http: //NvNv,, v. icac. org. hk/). The three-pronged 
strategy is carried out by three departments of the ICAC, which are 
interdependent. These are Operations Department, Corruption Prevention 
Department and Community Relations Department. The three departments report 
to the Commissioner, who in turn reports directly to the chief executive. 
The Operations Department, which is the largest department of the ICAC, is 
responsible for investigating allege d cases of corruption both in the public and 
private sectors. The Corruption Prevention Department examines procedures of 
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public organisations that promote corruption with the aim of reducing 
opportunities for corruption. Upon request, the Corruption Prevention Department 
can also provide advice to private institutions. The Community Relations 
Department on the other hand educates the public on the dangers of corruption 
and fosters public support in fighting corruption. The three functions of the Hong 
Kong ICAC enabled it to develop a coherent and focused strategy that proved 
successful in reducing corruption, for which the Hong Kong ICAC is widely 
accredited for today. The Hong Kong ICAC is a big organization with a staff 
establislunent of 1,314. Over half of the staff has been working in the ICAC. for 
more than ten years (ICAC, 2002: http: //Nvývýv. icac. org. hk/). 
The powers of the ICAC 
Given that corruption was difficult to investigate, the ICAC in Hong Kong was 
granted extensive powers to enable it to tackle the problem of corruption. These 
powers are enshrined in three specific laws, which are the Independent 
Comrpission Against Corruption Ordinance, Prevention of Bribery Ordinance and 
the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Ordinance. Section 3 of the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption Ordinance establishes the Hong Kong ICAC. 
Section 10 of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance gives 
the ICAC powers of arrest. In terms of this section, an ICAC officer may without 
warrant arrest a person if the officer reasonably suspects that such a person is 
guilty of an offence. Upon effecting such an arrest, an ICAC officer may use 
reasonable force. Section I OC of the Independent Commission Against Corruption 
Ordinance confers the ICAC with powers to search, seize and detain anything that 
an officer may believe to be or to contain evidence of an offence. 
Ar 
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In tenns of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, the ICAC has the power to 
search bank accounts, detain travel documents, and the power to restrict the 
disposal of property connected to an offence. More importantly, section 10 of the 
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance makes it an offence for a person to be in 
possession of unexplained property or assets. Section 10(l) states that any person 
who maintains a standard of living that is beyond his present or past official 
emoluments, or posses resources or assets which are disproportionate to his 
present or past known emoluments, then such a person is guilty of a criminal 
offence u nless s uch ap erson g ives as atisfactory explanation tot he c ourt asto 
how he or she has been able to maintain such a standard of living or how he or she 
obtained such assets. This section has shifted the presumption of innocence until 
proven otherwise. The burden of proof rests with the accused person. Section 24 
of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance states that "in any proceedings against a 
person for an offence under this Ordinance, the burden of proving a defence of 
lawful authority or reasonable excuse shall lie upon the accused". In tenns of 
section 12 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, penalties for offences under 
section 10, which makes unexplained wealth. an offence, carry a fine of up to 
HK$1,000,000 or a ten year prison sentence. Moreover, a person found guilty 
shall be directed to pay back an amount or advantage received by such person as 
the court may direct QCAC, 2002: http: //NvNv-%v. icae. org. hk/eng/power/index. html). 
In order to prevent abuse of these wide ranging powers by the ICAC, an elaborate 
system of checks and balances was put in place to monitor the work of the ICAC 
in Hong Kong. These include; advisory committees, Legislative Council, ICAC 
Complaints Committee, Media, Internal Monitoring and Staff Integrity, Chief 
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Executive / Executive Council, Judicial Supervision as well as Separate Powers of 
Prosecution (ICAC, 2002: http: //Nv-vvw. icac. org. hk/eng/power/powe-acct-3. html). 
A conjunction of factors enabled the Hong Kong ICAC to be effective and 
successful in reducing corruption. These included amongst others; the ICAC's 
unique strategy, broad powers, detailed system of checks and balances, political 
support and will amongst the leadership to tackle corruption. The effectiveness of 
an anti-corruption agency also depends on other institutions such as the judiciary 
and the criminal justice system, which support anti-corruption agencies. The 
question that arises is, can the Hong Kong model work in Africa? 
Anti-corruption agencies in Africa have produced disappointing results especially 
in tackling high-level corruption because the Hong Kong model on which such 
agencies have been set up is inappropriate to the African setting and assumes 
conditions that cannot be replicated in the subcontinent. The Hong Kong model 
was designed for a colonial system with huge material resources. As Camerer 
noted, "the ICAC is a particular product of a particular environment" (1999: 204). 
It also functioned "within a supportive political enviromnent" (ibid. 216). Moran 
situates the effectiveness of the ICAC in tackling corruption in the context of a 
complex set of interrelated factors of the Hong Kong political economy. He 
attributes the effectiveness of the ICAC to "state capacity, favourable relations 
with the metropolitan power [Britain], the rule of law and the balance of power 
within the political economy" (1999: 112). Furthermore, Moran pointed out "the 
Hong Kong experience suggests that the absence of democracy is not necessarily 
a drawback to controlling corruption if there is a favourable political context and 
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functioning rule of law" (ibid. 113). As Camerer further observed, "the ICAC's 
powers of search, seize and compel suspects and witnesses to divulge information 
are far in excess of that which is customary in liberal democracies" (1999: 202). 
We demonstrate in our case studies of Botswana, South Africa and Namibia in the 
subsequent chapters, that the Hong Kong model was applied in the three countries 
in systems that operate on the basis of transparency and accountability. These are 
not authoritarian regimes. They are democratic regimes that are obliged to employ 
the rule of laxv in response to democratic demands from their citizens. Moreover, 
as we shall show, the application of the ICAC model to our case studies has had to 
take, of necessity, a very modified and diluted form. 
Moreover, the replicability of the Hong Kong model in these countries may not be 
easy because the Hong Kong ICAC has been in existence for many years, since 
1974, and "is extremely well resourced; operates in an envirom-nent where legal 
and financial institutions are extremely well developed; and is subject to a 
demanding regime of external regulation" (Theobald and Williams, 1999: 130). 
Camerer underlines the same point. He notes that the ICAC in Hong Kong 
functions "within a relatively well-regulated administrative culture alongside a 
large, well-resourced police force under a political and legal framework which 
supports anti-corruption activities" (1999: 204). In this sense, countries that have 
tried to reproduce the Hong Kong model have produced disappointing results in 
tenns of investigating and prosecuting high-level corruption. This is the case 
because anti-corruption agencies are under-resourced resulting from lack of 
political support and the general problem of underdevelopment. Secondly, there is 
lack of political will to prosecute high-level corruption. Thirdly, apart from the 
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model used being inappropriate, anti-corruption agencies do not affect factors that 
promote corruption in these countries. And finally, the purpose of anti-corruption 
agencies in Africa might possibly have more to do with reassuring investors and 
aid donors in an age of globalisation than about actually attacking high-level 
corruption. 
Anti-corruption agencies in Africa 
Following the successes of the Hong Kong ICAC, African countries have also 
established specialised anti-corruption agencies in an attempt to curb the problem 
of corruption. These have taken different forms. They may be in the form of 
independent anti-corruption commissions, ombudsmen or some specialised anti- 
corruption agency. Some examples of these institutions are; the Directorate on 
Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) in Botswana, The Public Accounts 
Committee and the Inspector-General of Government in Uganda, The Anti- 
Corruption Commission (ACC) in Zambia, The Ombudsman in Namibia, The 
Special Investigating Unit (SIU), the Independent Directorate: Serious Economic 
Offences (IDSEO) and the Public Protector (PP), all in South Africa, the 
Ombudsman in Zimbabwe, the Serious Fraud Office in Ghana, the Anti- 
Corruption Squad and the Permanent Commission of Inquiry in Tanzania. 
The bottom line of establishing these institutions was to strengthen mechanisms 
for monitoring and punishment by providing pen-nanent oversight. Hope observed 
that the collective objective of these watchdog organisations was to introduce 
major changes in attitudes and conduct of state officials with the aim of 
encouraging integrity and honesty in the public service, through watchdog powers 
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to reveal as well as probe every alleged acts of corruption (2000: 31). According 
to Transparency International, the reasoning behind the establishment of anti- 
corruption agencies was that as the corrupt became more complex, ordinary law 
enforcement organisations found it difficult to investigate and prosecute 
complicated cases of corruption (Transparency International, 
2000: http: //xvNv, %v. transparency. de/). 
As we noted earlier, the success of the ICAC in Hong Kong was attributable to a 
number of factors. These included amongst others; political will, heavy penalties, 
its wide-ranging powers as well as the multi-pronged strategy it used in fighting 
corruption, which entails investigation and prosecution, prevention, and public 
education. Moreover, the success of an anti-corruption corruption agency depends 
on the context under which it functions. In most African states, it would appear 
the fundamental limitation of anti-corruption agencies was lack of autonomy or 
independence from the executive. An independent and well resourced anti- 
corruption agency was seen not only as a threat to the positions of the politicians 
and t heir a ccess tos tate r esources b ut tot he p olitical c stablishment i tself. T his 
explains why in most African states, these agencies were accountable to the 
president. In such a situation, an anti-corruption agency risks being perceived as 
not immune from executive patronage, "perhaps protecting the machinations of 
kin and cronies" (Theobald, 1999: 151). Even if the anti-corruption agency faced 
low levels of political interference in its operations, without the proper measures 
to ensure openness in its activities, such an organisation risks being perceived by 
the general public as one that mainly targets the 'small fish' (Theobald, 1999). 
Moreover, given its broad powers, an anti-corruption agency that was answerable 
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to a dictator may be used to harass the opponents of the regime (Rose-Ackerman, 
1999; Thcobald, 1999). Some of the ways of checking on the activities of these 
agencies was by making them accountable to parliament and establishing an 
oversight body to review their operations (Rose-Acken-nan, 1999). 
The role of the political leadership was very important in combating corruption 
(Scottj 1972; Kpundeh, 1995). To date, "the activities of most of these institutions 
have produced mixed results which have been variously'due to their lack of 
sufficient autonomy; their lack of demonstrable support from the political 
leadership; their vulnerability to changes in political regimes; and their 
susceptibility to bureaucratization" (Hope, 2000: 3 1). However, it should be noted 
that the war against corruption was not an easy one, and remarkable results should 
not be expected within a short period of time because corruption was 'an adaptive 
process' (Johnston, 1999). Although its "control, while often possible, may at 
times require political and social changes that are quite substantial particularly 
given that corruption is much harder to eliminate once established than to prevent 
in its formative stages" (Clarke, 1983: x). Similarly, Robin Theobold noted that 
its elimination cannot be realistically anticipated until certain fundamental 
changes have taken place. The most important of these are the rise to 
predominance of universalistic nonns, the emergence of new centres of 
power outside the bureaucracy and the development of competitive party 
politics. Such changes, however, can come about only after a long period 
of social and economic development (1990: 113). 
Such characteristics "that could soften the destructive effects of corruption" seem 
to be lacking for most of the developing world, and where they existed they were 
particularly w eak (Werlin, 1973: 8 4). H owever, the d onor s trategy p resupposes 
that such centres of power outside the bureaucracy were in place. In this sense, the 
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donor anti-corruption strategy was bound to fail because institutional reforins "are 
imposed in environments where liberal democracy is not established and where 
crisis obliterates most. of the conditions necessary for its existence" (Szeftel, 
2000a: 429). For Lawson, "sub-Saharan Afhca is perhaps least equipped to 
support democratic governance" (1999: 3). Thus, Szeftel argued that the donor's 
strategy 
tackles corruption as if it were the cause of democratic and development 
problems rather than a symptom or consequence of them. Thus it fails to 
address the deeper political and class forces which drive the ' politics of clientelism and corruption. And secondly, in their demonization of the 
state and determination to substitute themselves for the state to force 
adjustment through, the donors and international agencies undermine the 
institutional development needed to sustain a more democratic, transparent 
and accountable political system. The result is that the important 
institutional structures and principles they seek to mobilize against 
corruption are unlikely to take root (1998: 23 8). 
Despite concerted efforts to fight corruption, corruption has in recent years 
flourished more than before mainly because. such reforms have not tackled the 
structural factors that promote it, and in most cases, these reforms have not 
tackled corruption (Szeftel, 1998). We argue that the reduction of corruption 
would come through real democratization, accompanied by and leading on to the 
new institutional arrangements such as the Directorate on Corruption and 
Economic Crime (DCEC) in Botswana, the Ombudsman in Namibia, the Public 
Protector, Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences (IDSEO) and the 
Heath Special Investigating Unit in South Africa. These institutions can only 
function if adequate resources and mandate back them. As all these bodies 
frequently say, they cannot clean up corruption without the assistance of an active 
public - again a democratic and active citizenry. We examine these anti- 
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corruption institutions in our case studies of Botswana, South Africa and Namibia 
in the subsequent three chapters. 
However, as we demonstrate in the section that follows, anti-corruption reforms 
have not worked, much to the expectations of their proponents. Although 
institutional reforms (economic liberalization, democratic reforms and good 
governance) were seen as necessary to undermine corruption, corruption seems to 
have adapted and it appears to have done so with more vigour. Thus reforms have 
produced new incentives and opportunities for corruption. Whereas economic 
liberalization led to the privatisation of corruption, democratic reforms resulted in 
the weakening of state capacity to control corruption. 
Weaknesses of democratic reform and anti-corruption strategy 
By reducing t he s ize oft he s tate int he e conomy through p rogram e limination, 
deregulation and marketization, economic reforms were expected to prevent and 
limit corruption which was ravaging most African states. Thus, it was assumed 
that by reducing the size and power of the state, which was "traditionally 
monopolistic, over-powerful, inefficient, and unaccountable", through 
downsizing, privatization and deregulation, the allocation of goods would be done 
in an open and effective way because the state survived by extracting corrupt rents 
from the private sector (Little, 1996: 65). On the other hand, political 
democratization was also, by definition, expected to limit corruption. This is the 
case because, by limiting state intervention in the political market through the 
restoration of political pluralism, democratization would reduce secrecy, 
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discretion as well as state monopoly of political power, and this in turn would lead 
to openness and enhance public accountability hence corruption would be 
curtailed. As Harriss-White and White noted, the foregoing arguments were based 
on the assumption that "in the long run, since competitive markets will destroy the 
bases of rent-seeking and democratic institutions will create the political 
constraints necessary to enforce accountability, corruption will wither away" yet 
this "took a very long time in the currently industrialized countries and corruption 
is far from withering away" (1996: 4). Thus, donors assumed that the envisaged 
democratic institutions would limit political power in every polity and this in turn 
limit corruption. That is, they "presuppose the existence of a functioning 
pluralism and an effective accountability" (Philip, 1999: 241), in which there "is a 
freely and regularly elected representative legislature, with the capacity at least to 
influence and check executive power" (Leftwich, 1994: 371). Donors and local 
reformers alike assume this proposition. 
On the contrary, however, liberalization policies have contributed to an increase in 
openings for corrupt activities or behaviour, the very problem they were meant to 
solve (Della Porta & Meny, 1997; Szeftel, 1998; Rose-Acken-nan, 1999). Thus 
"privatization a nd economic r eform m ay easily open t he d oor ton ew f onns of 
corruption" (Jones, 1996: 72). Similarly, Szeftel observed that 
it is ... clear that liberalization creates a set of new problems while not 
always eradicating the old sources of dishonesty. The use of patronage and 
bureaucratic 'rent-seeking' have not been ended by market reforms; rather 
they have been joined by new kinds of graft (1998: 233-4). 
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In this way "deregulation in one area may increase corruption elsewhere" (Rose- 
Ackerman, 1999: 40). It is worth noting that free market or privatisation policies 
have certain limitations to which they could produce good results. Corruption has 
since adapted to the new conditions. It has been established that economic reforms 
which were advocated for by the neoliberals and donor agencies in general led to 
new forms and patterns of corruption: "governmental policies that seek to 
promote economic development or a new economic class may themselves 
generate new problems" (Doig, 1995: 156). For instance 
in China, the government's immediate concern over the stagnant economy 
and therefore the necessity of revitalizing society's as it relaxed its control 
over resource allocation, given great autonomy to local authorities to 
direct investment and decentralized its managerial power over enterprise in 
the economic sector, led not only to the revival of old patron-client 
networks but also new patterns of corruption (ibid. 156). 
Thus economic liberalization and political democratization are not a panacea for 
the problem of corruption. Sun observed that "by loosening up the economy, 
market reforms have drastically increased both the opportunities and motivations 
for corrupt pursuits" (Sun, 1999: 2). In this way, marketisation and democratic 
reforrns do not necessarily lead to a reduction in the possibilities or incentives for 
corruption as asserted by neoliberals. Jones was more categorical: 
the current style of economic reforin carries its own opportunities for 
corruption: first, through the emergence of private monopoly in sectors 
long reserved to the state because of their public sensitivity; second, and 
more subtly, by placing excessive concentration of executive power in the 
hands of small bands of technocratic reformers, confident that their fine 
ends justify dubiously constitutional means, or worse (1996: 7 1). 
By definition economic liberalization and democratization were expected to curb 
corruption by reducing the size and power of the state. However, evidence reveal 
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that a cut in the size and power of the state does not automatically limit 
corruption. Rose-Ackennan noted that "a general progrdm to shrink the size of 
government will not necessarily reduce corruption" (1999: 41). This is the case 
because a reduction in the size of the state leads to scarcity, and scarcity in turn 
leads to corruption. Thus, as Rose-Ackerman observed 
scarcity produces corrupt incentives, and ... that reductions in government 
spending can produce scarcity when spending programs are cut or when 
regulatory budgets fall with no change in the underlying statutes. Even 
worse, if a government under fiscal pressure cuts back spending, it may at 
the same time seek to maintain its influence by increasing regulations and 
mandates. The result can be increased corruption (ibid. 41). 
More importantly, these free market policies have through deregulation weakened 
the ability of the state to police corruption (Szeftel, 1998). Szeftel argued that 
in particular, deregulation has weakened the capacity of the state to 
control corruption. Deregulation - almost by definition - reduces the 
capacity of government to tighten rules governing government-corporate 
relations. In Africa, where the rules have traditionally been poorly 
observed and enforced, deregulation reduces government capacity still 
further and makes it particularly difficult to control interactions between 
private interests and public officials (1998: 233). 
Moreover, privatization generates a horde of openings for personal accumulation 
(ibid. 233). Rose-Ackermah also echoed similar sentiments. She observed that 
"privatization is both an anti-corruption refonn and a new potential source of 
corrupt gains" (1999: 42). Similarly, Galtung and Pope observed that "the 
experiences of many countries over the past few years indicates that the 
privatization process can in itself be a significant source of corruption" (1999: 
262). Nigeria and Uganda are cases in point. In Nigeria, economic restructuring 
provided; public officials with a degree of control over emerging markets, offering 
new possibilities for corruption, and presenting economic elites who were hard- 
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pressed a safety valve (Lewis, 1996: 89). Similarly, Uganda's privatization in the 
1990s w as t arnishcd by mismanagemcnt and m anipulations I inking g overnment 
politicians and well placed individuals (Tangri and Mwenda, 2001: 117). Thus, 
Tangri and Mwenda observed that 
discriminatory and corrupt privatizations have been common because 
political leaders have wanted public companies to be divested to their 
favoured clients. Privatized enterprises may no longer serve as patronage 
vehicles, asd id t he e arlier p arastatals, b ut i neumbent g overnments h ave 
wanted them to be in the hands of political loyalists rather than political 
opponents, partly because this may help them to consolidate their political 
control (ibid. 132). 
Russia is yet another case where privatization gave rise to new corrupt 
opportunities. Although there are many people at the World Bank who believed 
that the most suitable way of dealing with corruption was through extensive 
privatisation, in Russia this gave rise to substantial corruption: "to completely 
scandalous and fraudulent sell-offs" (LeMonde, quoted in Harsch, 1999: 74). 
Thus, instead of reducing corruption, liberalization policies resulted in a 
privatization or decentralization of corruption. Chabal and Dalozwrote that 
it is increasingly plain that economic liberalization, and its attendant 
reduction in the resources available in the public sector, has not 
contributed to a lessening of corruption. The most recent studies on this 
subject would highlight the adaptation of corrupt practices to the new 
economic climate. What happened in Africa ... 
is merely a change of 
strategy, moving away from the state and giving greater prominence to the 
market and to NGOs. Corruption, as it were, has been decentralized. 
Indeed, a closer examination of the evidence would reveal that a large 
number of key political actors have now shifted their operations to the 
local level, which currently enjoys wide international favour and receives 
substantial assistance (1999: 105). 
According to Yan Kong, evidence from countries in which economic reforms 
were well ahead indicate that liberalization was to a greater extent a way of 
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ensuring efficiency in a limited scope than a curb of corruption (1996: 55). 
Richard Snyder argued that economic reform legitimizes rent-seeking. Rather than 
clearing the way for free market forces, neoliberal policies in Mexico gave rise to 
the emergence of new institutions for market governance (Snyder, 1999). Thus, 
instead of paving the way for market forces, Snyder noted that neoliberal policies 
may trigger two-step reregulation processes: first, political entrepreneurs 
launch projects to build support coalitions by reregulating markets; 
second, societal actors respond to these projects by mobilizing to influence 
the terms of reregulation (1999: 174). 
Similarly, experience suggests that multiparty democracy too is not a remedy for 
the problem of corruption. This is the case because "democracy, seen by many as 
the natural concomitant of economic liberalism provides strong temptations for 
corrupt behaviour" (Jones, 1996: 71). Thus, democratization is imperfect as a 
strategy of curtailing corruption. That is, democracy is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition to curb corruption (Riley, 2000). According to Doig 
seeking to encourage countries to undertake steps towards good 
government ... may not be straightforward and will 
have to take account of 
the functions of the public sector, the complexities of economic 
development, and the roles of the existing political leaderships (1995: 
154). 
The foregoing analysis shows that it is too simplistic to regard corruption in 
Africa as a result of too much state interference in the economy, which was 
"easily to be dissolved by thoroughgoing liberal economic reform and 
democratization" (Jones, 1996: 71). Experience from elsewhere shows that a 
reduction in the size and power of the state does not necessarily reduce corruption. 
Instead ii weakened the ability of the state through deregulation and public sector 
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reforms to curb corruption (Szeftel, 1998). Rather than curtailing corrupt 
opportunities, removing the regulatory capacity of the government may lead to 
other undesirable effects (Williams, 1987). Szeftel argued that a reduction in the 
size of the public sector with no corresponding fortification of state institutions 
and capabilities, changes "a bloated weak state into a small weak state, further 
reducing its capacity to check corruption" (1998: 234-5). Thus, combating 
corruption requires efficient regulation (Yan Kong, 1996: 55), demonstrating that 
corruption cannot be easily dealt with by a mere introduction of economic as well 
as political refonns, an indication that corruption is much more complex and 
deeper than it was understood by the donors. 
Despite earlier claims that economic liberalization and democratic reforms were 
necessary to undermine corruption, there emerged a new claim that, market and 
democratic reforms were failing to produce the desired results because corruption 
undermined them. Corruption was seen as "a set of obstacles to the 
implementation of economic reform and democratization left over from the 
corporatist past" (Jones, 1996: 72), as well as a threat to the very refonns 
advocated byt he d onors. This is an admission on the p art ofd onors t hat good 
governance made modest progress against systematic private accumulation of 
public resources (Szeftel, 1998: 227). This proposition has increased concern over 
the problem of corruption and in turn, created global pressures to tackle 
corruption through effective anti-con-uption agencies. As a result 
eradicating, or at least reducing, corruption has over the past couple of 
years become a more prominent element in the international discourse on 
development, with such weighty institutions as the World Bank and 
qnited Nations urging countries in Africa and elsewhere to carry out 
reforms to prevent the abuse of public office (Harsch, 1999: 66). 
106 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the specific nature and content of institutional or 
goyernance reforms and the problems that attend them generally in Africa. Donor 
countries and agencies are pushing for a liberal democratic reform agenda, one 
which entails economic and political democratization underpinned by 'good 
governance'. Moreover, reforin entails instituting specific anti-corruption 
measures and the establishment of stable, accountable and transparent 
government. In the eyes of the western donors, political and economic reforms are 
necessary to curtail the devastating effects of corruption in Africa. As a result of 
donor and local pressures, African states have embarked on a range of political 
and economic reforms. 
This chapter helped us to understand why there was a sudden push for 
institutional reforra in Africa. Nevertheless, as we noted above, the donor refonns 
have so far produced mixed results especially in terms of tackling high-level 
corruption. Despite reforms, corruption continued to grow and prosper more than 
ever before. The chapter has demonstrated that the donor strategy of controlling 
corruption was flawed because it did not address the factors that gave rise to 
corruption. 
In the next chapter, we discuss the politics of controlling corruption in Botswana. 
Botswana has also experienced- some demands for reform to curb corruption 
following a series of corruption scandals in the early 1990s. The response to these 
cases of corruption was to create the Directorate on Corruption and Economic 
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Crime (DCEC) in 1994, a specialised anti-corruption agency. The chapter that 
follows focuses on the DCEC, the reasons for its establishment and the nature of 
its perfonnance. 
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Chapter four: Corruption and its control in Botswana 
Having examined the*broader context of reform in chapter three, and having 
highlighted the limitations of what can be expected of governance refonns, this 
chapter examines the nature of corruption and efforts to curtail it in Botswana. 
Botswana is widely perceived as a successful, working democracy in Africa. It 
has remained a multi-party state for the past 36 years in a continent ravaged by 
political and economic crisis. What is striking about Botswana is that one party 
dominance over the past 36 years has not led to a proliferation of corruption as it 
did in most African countries. Indeed, Transparency International (TI) ranks 
Botswana as the least corrupt country in Africa. 
In 1994, Botswana established a specialised anti-corruption agency, the 
Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), following a series of 
corruption scandals. The DCEC combats both corruption and 'economic crime', 
which is "thefts and frauds perpetrated on the public revenue" (Milford, 1998: 1). 
The focus of this chapter is on the DCEC, the reasons for establishing it, and the 
nature of its performance. Before giving a detailed examination of the DCEC and 
the nature of its activities, the chapter explores the nature and political economy 
of corruption in Botswana. 
Corruption and the state in Botswana 
"Botswana has not been plagued by the systemic corruption so prevalent 
elsewhere in Africa" (UNDP, 1997: 48). Although cases of corruption have been 
reported in recent years, corruption does not affect the whole political system in 
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Botswana as is the case in most African countries. As already noted, Transparency 
International considered Botswana to be the least corrupt country in Africa in its 
2001 C orruption P erception. Index ( CPI) w hich r anked t he c ountry 26 th (with a 
score of 6.0) out of 91 countries assessed worldwide (Transparency International, 
2001: http: //,, v-%v%v. transparency. org/documents/cpi/2001/cpi200l. html). 
Although Botswana inherited a legacy of underdevelopment at independence 
(Pierre du Toit, 1995; Holm, 2000), the discovery of minerals, especially 
diamonds, in the late 1960s transformed it's economic situation from one of the 
poorest to being a middle income country according to Word Bank rankings. 
Since the sixties, Botswana has experienced rapid economic growth based on 
diamonds, the largest source of government revenue. However, many analysts 
also attribute its growth to good economic management (Lewis, 1993; Tsie, 1996; 
Theobald and Williams, 1999) and political stability (UNDP, 1997; Tsie, 1996). 
Wiseman emphasis 
the contributions to development made by the operation of an efficient 
and, despite a few recent blemishes, essentially non-corrupt state structure 
and sound policy choices made by an astute political leadership: economic 
success is due to a combination of good luck and good management (1995: 
1). 
Sifice independence, Botswana maintained a relatively good record of good 
governance (Tsie, 1996; UNDP, 1997). Unlike countries such as Kenya, MalaNvi, 
Nigeria, Zaire and Zambia, corruption, authoritarian rule, patronage and 
mismanagement have not consumed Botswana politics (Tsie, 1996). In this way, 
Botswana appears to many as a political and economic success story in Affica. It 
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has been dubbed "an economic miracle" (Chipasula & Miti, 1989: 116); "an 
exceptional case of democratic success" (Pierre Du Toit, 1995: 17); the oldest 
multi-party democracy in Africa (Wiseman, 1997); "an oasis in a desert of 
corruption" (Thcobald and Williams, 1999: 117). "For many, Botswana is 
regarded as an island of stability in a sea of turbulence, a long-standing 
democracy which has never known military government" with an "administrative 
probity ... unequalled in tropical Africa" (Doig and Theobald, 1999: 10). In 
consequence, Botswana has managed to curb corruption through the creation of 
institutions which promote democratic accountability (Holm, 2000). Tsie argues 
that the Botswana state 
has been relatively successful in establishing a record of accountability, 
transparency and efficiency in managing the affairs of the state than 
governments in Sub-Saharan African countries like Gabon, Nigeria or 
Zimbabwe. Corruption has been restricted and Botswana is outstanding in 
creating and maintaining effective structures of control, including an 
independent audit (1996: 612) 
The constitution empowers the Auditor General to inspect and report on the state 
and use of public accounts in all government departments and parastatals. Apart 
from ensuring the observance of all laws relating to the use of public funds, the 
Auditor General has the duty to ensure that all necessary precautions are put in 
place and any improprieties are reported to parliament. In addition to the Office of 
the Auditor General, there is the Internal Audit Unit in the Ministry of Finance 
and Development planning. The Unit which "is an integral part of the Ministry's 
management and control of the public finances ... acts to ensure that public 
finances are properly accounted for and utilised for the purposes authorised" 
(Republic of Botswana, NDP7: 482). 
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Moreover, Botswana "has the reputation of being the only major Aftican state to 
have remained a multiparty democracy since independence" (Allen, 1995: 311). 
Unlike most African states, which moved "away from pluralism towards the 
centralisation of power in the bands of a single party" (Todorff, 1993: 4), 
Botswana has retained its formal multi-party democracy. It has, since 
independence, functioned as a dominant party system with observable features of 
pluralism byA frican s tandards. S ince i ridependence, e ight rn ulti-party elections 
have been held, the most recent in 1999. All have been won by the ruling 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). The survival of multi-party democracy in 
Botswana is ascribed by some to the small size of both the ruling elite and counter 
elite as well as the impressive performance of the economy (Wiseman, 1977). 
Along with this reasonable level of stable democracy has come a low level of 
corruption. As Johnston notes 
Botswana is in many respects an African success story. Since 
independence in 1966 it has not only maintained democratic politics and 
respect for human rights, but it has also avoided the devastating corruption 
found in many other countries on the continent. Indeed, through the end of 
the 1980s, the general view both in and outside of Botswana was that 
whatever the country's other challenges might be, serious corruption was 
not among them (1999: 223) 
In part this has been ascribed to the nature of the ruling class that assumed power 
at independence (Holm and Molutsi, 1992; Good, 1993; Tsie, 1996; Lodge, 1998). 
This ruling class acquired its wealth before taking power (Lodge, 1998); it was 
involved in cattle production before independence (Good, 1993; Tsie, 1996). In 
this way, the ruling elite in Botswana "were not an elite of Nkrumahist "verandah 
boys", or party militants, or military men; they were an elite with literally a real 
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stake in the economy" (Good, 1993: 15). That is, those who took over control of 
the state at independence were a group "of large cattle owners, an agricultural 
bourgeosie" (Holm and Molutsi, 1992: 90). As such they "did not look to the state 
for income and status" (ibid. 81). Nevertheless 
the post-colonial state has played a significant role in the transfon-nation of 
Botswana's cattle accumulators into a dependent national cattle-based 
bourgeoisie. Historically, the livestock sector has been heavily subsidised 
by government through investments in boreholes, vaccines and drugs, trek 
routes, fencing, bull subsidy schemes and so on. More importantly, the 
government has, through various agricultural development policies and 
programmes such as the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP), assisted this 
class to privatise grazing land and/or buy privately-owned ranches (Tsie, 
1996: 610). 
Thus, Botswana's cattle owners were favoured by the land tenure system and 
benefited from government policies, subsidies of livestock products, and loans ftom 
the National Development Bank (NDB), which were at times rolled back. For 
instance, fanners, including politicians, "have not only enjoyed substantial grants, 
subsidies and soft loans but they have on two occasions, 1984 and 1988, had part of 
their debts w ith the Parastatal N ational D evelopment B ank (NDB) w ritten o ff by 
government" (Molutsi, 1989: 103). It is estimated that less than 20% of the 
households in the country, who are mainly politicians and senior civil servants, okvn 
around 80% of Botswana's 2,5 million cattle (The Botswana Guardian, 4 September 
1998). Drought has also contributed to this state of affairs. Apart from "decimating 
the national herd size, drought served to concentrate cattle ownership in large herds" 
(Valentine, 1993: 111). In addition to government-funded schemes, the government 
has been able to secure a lucrative market for the beef industry in Europe. Thus the 
European market "has also played an important role in the development of 
Botswana's cattle accumulators into a national-based bourgeoisie" and "since 1975 it 
113 
has provided a lucrative market in which Botswana beef is bought at 30 per cent or 
more above world market prices" (Tsic, 1996: 611). 
Although the post-colonial state played a central role in promoting cattle 
accumulation in Botswana, it did not develop into the one and only vehicle of 
amassing wealth as in Lesotho or Zaire (Tsic, 1996). To this extent, the ruling elite in 
Botswana "have not followed the path of many African political elites who seem to 
pursue relentlessly their selfish interests at excessive cost to the rest of the 
population" (Molutsi, 1989: 129). Thus, 
instead of the cattle economy being plundered for private gain, it was 
deliberately nurtured, subsidized and supported for profitable gain by 
individuals within the state who along with private-sector elites, were 
entrepreneurs in their own right (Du Toit, 1995: 65). 
"Botswana ... appears to 'lack' the period of development of clientelist politics 
followed by clientelist crisis" (Allen, 1995: 311). In Botswana, clientelism was used 
to support the propertied class, and members of the opposition often benefited. 
Clientelism was bound up with class fonnation and it does not have factional 
conflict. As the United Nations Deyelopment Programme noted, "economic 
pragmatism has always taken priority over political ideology or factional 
favouritism" (1997: 49). This is what distinguishes the Botswana state from many 
Aftican states. Although patronage was not the foundation of the Botswana state, 
"political patronage has been observable in the nomination of MPs, councillors, and 
senior officials for appointed positions" (Healey, 1995: 20). The Constitution of 
Botswana gives the president the power of patronage e. g. to appoint public officials 
both in government and parastatals. It also gives the president the power to nominate 
four specially elected members of parliament. The current president of Botswana, 
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Festus G. Mogae and Vice President General Ian Kharna, the son of Botswana's first 
President, are some of those who benefited from this provision. 
Political patronage has also been extended to businessmen (Healey, 1995). For 
instance, in 1998, the government bailed out citizen owned construction companies, 
which were in financial difficulties with 50 million Pula. Relatives of Botswana's 
political leaders and senior civil servants own some of these companies. Yet another 
bail out, the Citizen Entrepreneur Mortgage Assistance Equity Fund has been put 
in place to assist Batswana who have invested in property and have since "fallen 
behind on loan re-payments" (77ie Botsivana Gazette Online, 
2001: http: //,, výv%v. gazette. bw). These bailouts have been criticised from certain 
quarters as measures aimed at assisting members of the ruling party and a few 
influential Batswana. 
However, as much as the Botswana state facilitated programmes which promoted 
the interests of the dominant propertied classes, it also used part of its wealth to 
advance welfare programmes for the poorer sections of the populations (Molutsi, 
1989: 126). The government launched a number of rural development 
programmes such as the Accelerated Rural Development Programme (ARDP), 
Accelerated Rainfed Agricultural Programme (ARAP) and Arable Lands 
Development Programme (ALDP). These programmes strengthened "the 
popularity of the BDP amongst the peasantry" (Tsic, 1996: 605). More 
importantly 
these programmes not only cushioned the poorer sections of the peasantry 
ftorn proletarianisation and the effects of drought but also went a long way 
toward 'demonstrating' the concern of the government with 'people's 
welfare'. They also served to mystify and hide the crisis of social 
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reproduction in that drought could be used as a scapegoat for growing 
inequalities and poverty in Botswana (ibid. 605). 
The BDP govemment. has effectively used policies such as the Drought Relief 
Programme to maintain its support in the rural areas. Through the Drought Relief 
Programme "many people are fed, subsidized, employed and assisted in so many 
ways, the ruling party has successfully resisted political inroads into its 
popularity, especially in the rural areas" (Molutsi, 1989: 128). Moreover, the 
Botswana state managed to use the benefits of the diamond-led economic growth 
in improving the standards of living for the majority of the people. This in part 
explains why the BDP continues to enjoy support amongst the rural dwellers 
where most of its support is based, despite problems of poverty, inequality and 
unemployment. The BDP enjoys the benefits of being the party in power (Healey, 
1995; Wiseman, 1998). This gives it an edge over other parties. Healey observed 
that 
BDP Members of Parliament can associate themselves with projects, which 
benefit voters (relief, clinics, schools etc. ). Policy changes can be timed to 
coincide with elections. Because of generally buoyant revenues the 
government has been able to spend its way out of political trouble (e. g. the 
ARDP in the 1974 elections). Drought relief schemes have been extended 
unnecessarily before elections (1995: 19). 
This demonstrates that the ruling party "has been compelled to utilise public policies 
to maintain political support" (Danevad, 1995: 393). Apart from agricultural 
schemes and loans, civil servants benefited from some reasonable salary adjustment 
e. g. the 1998 25% salary increase. These measures seem to have paid political 
dividends for the BDP. It seems all these measures were possible in part because of 
impressive economic performance. Moreover, the size of the population (1.7 
million) meant that the state had relatively less political pressure or demands, 
compared to most African countries, which have bigger populations. Although 
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demands on the state have been moderate, the ability of the state to respond to 
demands were fairly strengthened (Wiseman, 1977: 77). 
The nature of corruption in Botswana: how serious a problem? 
For all that has been said thus far, Botswana has its share of corruption. However, 
corruption is not yet a way of life. This has been acknowledged by the DCEC, 
which noted in its 1995 annual report that 
here in Botswana, there is thankfully little evidence that corruption has 
become a way of life for the majority and it is encouraging that the 
population abhor the actions of those who enrich themselves at the 
expense of their country's development. Unfortunately however, the fact is 
that corruption and economic crime have invaded many walks of life here. 
They are evident in government, both central and local, and they are 
prevalent in the private business sector. More worrying, is the emerging 
evidence that some of those involved occupy very senior positions 
(Republic of Botswana, 1996: 2). 
Below we document the pattern corruption takes in Botswana. We seek to 
minimise any speculation: it comes in the form of fraud, bribes, sleaze, inflating 
government tenders, cost overruns, ghosting, fronting, inflating allowances, 
misleading tender boards, forging documents, obtaining money by false pretences, 
illegal sale of passports, embezzlement of trust funds, misappropriation of money, 
money laundering, unnecessary travel and travel claims, and general unethical 
behaviour. 
The first prominent case of corruption in Botswana occurred in January 1975 
when a case involving a Mr Kunz, who was an engineer in the Ministry of Works 
and Communications, was brought to the attention of the government following 
allegatiops of official corruption by the opposition Botswana National Front 
(BNF). Mr Kunz received an effective nine months jail sentence for each of the 
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two counts of official corruption (Republic of Botswana, 1994: 58). According to 
the United Nations Development Programme 
several scandals in the 1980s involved Botswana's economically and 
socially important cattle industry. In 1985 the management of the 
Botswana Meat Commission, a parastatal, was accused of mismanagement 
and corruption. Earlier, another official was accused of illegally enriching 
himself through a cattle-related business, and a relative of a top official 
was accused of illegally obtaining cattle ranches under a government 
grazing-land policy (1997: 49). 
Scandals of corruption in and around the cattle industry are no surprise in light of 
the role the industry has been playing to economic development especially in the 
early years of independence. Despite these allegations, no one was brought to 
book. More recently, however, a number of more serious and damaging scandals 
caused widespread concern. In what follows we will examine a number of these; 
including cases which led to the appointment of three Presidential Commissions 
of Inquiry to investigate corruption and misuse of public office in the early 1990s. 
Healey notes that 
the last few years has seen unprecedented exposure of corruption and 
mismanagement, largely as a result of informal and Presidential enquiries. 
It includes revelations on land allocation (Kgabo Report), the mishandling 
of contracts, bribery and allocation of housing and land in the Botswana 
Housing Corporation (Christie Report), and mismanagement in the 
procurement of primary school textbooks (1995: 46-7) 
These Commissions documented some disquieting evidence of rules being defied 
and instances of misuse of office by some cabinet ministers including a Vice- 
President, and senior government officials who were forced to resign when the 
findings were made public. The three reports are briefly discussed below because 
of their political importance; they led to some scholars questioning the quality of 
Botswana's democracy (Theobald and Williams, 1999; Johnston, 1999). As 
Johnston noted "most disturbing was the fact that much of this corruption 
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involved not poorly paid, low levels bureaucrats, but prominent officials who 
were very well paid by Botswana's standards" (Johnston, 1999: 223). 
Before the DCEC: Three Presidential Commissions of Inquiry 
The first major corruption scandal to become public involved the acquisition of 
school books for primary schools. On 16th April, 1991 a Presidential Commission 
of Inquiry, headed by Isaac R. Aboagye, presented its findings about the supply of 
school books and materials for primary schools by the International Project 
Managers (IPM) company. I PM was g ranted at ender to supply primary s chool 
books and educational materials during 1990 on behalf of the Ministry of Local 
Government Lands and Housing (MLGL&H). The commissioners discovered that 
regulations, whiph govern the award of tenders in goverranent, were entirely 
ignored and that all senior officials who were supposed to check the award of 
tenders failed to do so. The IPM report also revealed that IPM was a company in 
an 'embryonic stage', and that its owner, 'lacked formal education' and had no 
experience in the acquisition of school books. IPM was allowed an 'initially open- 
ended' contract without any 'financial ceiling' (Republic of Botswana, 1991: 10). 
Moreover, the Central Tender B oard did not approve the tender. As a result of 
defects in the tender, P27 million could not adequately be accounted for (Republic 
of Botswana, 1991). On this basis the commission concluded that 
government has suffered considerable losses arising out of the IPM 
consultancy. Not only was Government overcharged, but through the 
misdeeds of the IPM, Government lost a minimum of PIA million due to 
wrong allocations in the tender. It is likely that Government has suffered 
far more considerable but unascertained losses by way of short or 
unverified deliveries. Government has had to bear the expense of trying to 
create order out of the chaos that resulted from the 1990 tender (Republic 
of Botswana, 1991: 56). 
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The second major corruption scandal concerned land problems in Gaborone Peri- 
Urban Areas. In December, 1991 a Commission chaired by Englishman Kgabo 
found that positions of power were used to acquire land in Mogoditshane. 
Explicitly implicated were Peter Mmusi then Vice-President and Minister of 
Local Government, Lands and Housing (MLGL&H) and Daniel KNvelagobe, then 
Minister of Agriculture. Mmusi and K%velagobe were Chairman and Secretary 
General of the BDP respectively. Kwelagobe was said to have used his position to 
avoid Land Board procedures in order to acquire land already marked for 
community projects. The Kgabo Report says 
on October, 1989, Mr Kwelagobe wrote an appeal and personally handed 
it to the Minister of Local Government, Lands and Housing who later 
directed the Land Board to comply with Mr K%velagobe's request. The 
appeal did not follow the normal channels. The Land Board granted Mr 
K%velagobe a customary grant certificate, that is for a tshinio (field). This 
provoked a second protracted dispute since Mr Kwelagobe wanted the 
tshinio converted to a common law grant which enables the holder to 
initiate commercial activities on the property and again the Minister ruled 
in Kwelagobe's favour (Republic of Botswana, 1991: 44). 
The involvement of supposedly 'responsible people' in controversial land 
acquisitions motivated residents in the area to engage in their own illicit land 
grabbings. This, the commissioners argued, put 'government credibility and 
integrity' at question in the area (Republic of Botswana, 1991: 43). The illicit 
acquisition of plots was a result of housing shortages in the city, due to the 
internal growth of the villages; economic opportunities in the city; failure 
of Department of Surveys and Lands to deliver sufficient number of plots; 
failure of Botswana Housing Corporation to deliver enough houses; 
failure of Self Help Housing Agency (SHHA) to allocate; the freezing of 
plot allocations by Land Board and SHHA; easy access to land in rural 
areas; zero option; proximity to the city; failure of MLGL&H to provide 
pToper guidance to the Land Board; high rentals for decent houses in the 
open market; and high prices for serviced plots in towns (Republic of 
Botswana, 1991: xi). 
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Faced with all these problems, the Report concluded that people were left with no 
option but to resort to illegal means because government "failed to provide 
shelter" for them (Republic of Botswana, 1991). This case demonstrates that 
"corruption among an elite not only debases standards popularly perceived, it 
forces people to undertake the underhanded approach out of self-defense" 
(Bayley, 1989: 943). However, Daniel Kwelagobe and Peter Mmusi challenged 
the Kgabo Commission for failing to grant them a hearing and the High Court set 
its report aside. The problem of land in the peri-urban areas continues at the time 
of writing to be a problem. 
The third major (and perhaps most damaging) corruption scandal involved the 
Botswana Housing Corporation (BHC). On 30th November, 1992 a Commission 
headed by Richard Christie handed in a report of its inquiries into the activities of 
the BHC. BHC is a semi-autonomous corporation charged with building public 
housing. The Christie report documented disturbing evidence of the misuse of 
high office. Peter Mmusi, the then Vice-President and Local Government and 
Housing Minister, under whom the BHC fell, was implicated once again. The 
Commission concluded that 
we find that Mr Mmusi should be absolved from any personal 
wrongdoing, but it is with him the buck stops at a political level, and he 
must take political responsibility for massive corruption and dishonesty 
which has been revealed at the BHC (Republic of Botswana, 1992: 205). 
Peter Mmusi was not alone. Also implicated were two Assistant Ministers, Ronald 
Sebego, and Michael Tshipinare; Joseph Letsholo the general manager until his 
death in February 1992, and G. F. Rabana a deputy General Manager, as well as the 
pennanent secretary of the ministry, Ms Pelonomi Venson, whom the 
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commissioners held to be responsible for administrative failures of the BHC. 
There was a longer list of other, less prominent, miscreants. Sebego is said to 
'have used his position for the benefit of his friends' whilst Tshipinare received a 
loan of P500,000 from Spectra Botswana (Pty), a company awarded a contract to 
build the offices of the BHC. As Tshipinare was one of the directors of Spectra, 
the Commissioners concluded that "the payment of P500,000 by Spectra 
Botswana Ltd to M. Tshipinare on 12 December 1991 was a bribe in connection 
with his assistance in obtaining the BHC headquarters building contract for the 
company" (Republic of Botswana, 1992: 88). Tshipinare was given a one year 
prison sentence for failing to disclose his personal share in the firin but his 
sentence was nullified following a successful High Court appeal. 
The main BHC scandal however, centred around its general manager, Letsholo. 
The Report observed that 
following Mr. Letsholo's death a cash sum of P8,530 was found in his car. 
Thereafter a further sum of P218,076 was recovered from his office safe, 
to which only he had access. In the light of 
' 
all that has emerged in this 
inquiry, we have no option but to find that these unbanked sums were the 
fruits of corruption. Prior to his death Mr. Letsholo had embarked upon a 
personal investment programme so far beyond his means that it is 
impossible to avoid the conclusion that he was and expected to be in 
receipt of large and regular bribes (Republic of Botswana, 1992: 192). 
The BHC debacle shows how misuse of positions of power led to "gross 
mismanagement and dishonesty resulting in the loss of tens of millions of Pula 
that should have been used for providing houses" (ibid. 8). According to Good the 
above cases of corruption "came to light through public controversy - fuelled by 
able investigative reporting in the independent newspapers - and not as a result of 
internal, governmental checking mechanisms. These throughout were absent or 
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ineffective" (1994: 504-505). It is worth noting that in Botswana reports of 
commissions of inquiry "are not automatically meant for public consumption" 
(MinegilThe Reporter, 01 -07 July 1999). 
However, where there was no Presidential Commission of Inquiry, there was no 
one to pick corruption as was the case with the National Development Bank 
(NDB). In this case, some senior politicians including the former President 
(Masire) borrowed large sums of money from the bank but failed to service their 
loans. This ended in the NDB incurring huge losses and retrenching some of its 
employees. The 'near ruination' (Good, 1994) of the NDB puts the leadership of 
the BDP government in question. The NDB case was a combination of bad 
management and corruption. It undermined the popularity of the BDP resulting in 
the opposition winning 13 scats in 1994. Healey attributes corruption to new 
demands and argues that "growth in the scale of public expenditure and 
complexity of contracts have combined with the greater role and influence of 
outside companies in seeking these contracts" (1995: 47). Rather than growth in 
the scale of public expenditure scale, it is growth in personal fortune that drives 
corruption. 
The DCEC and corruption 
The Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) has dealt with a 
number of cases since its establishment in 1994. Perhaps the most sensational 
corruption scandal is the Nicholas Zachem case which many believe was a test for 
the DCEq. It led to the resignation of a cabinet minister and the conviction of the 
former Director of the Department of Roads. The case involved politicians, civil 
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servants, the private sector and a multinational company, Zachem Construction 
which operated in a number of countries in Africa. In this case, the former 
Director of the Department of Roads was charged with receiving a bribe of some 
P100,000 from Nicholas Zachem [contrary to sections 384 and 385 of the Penal 
Code]. The offence was committed a few days before the DCEC was established. 
The bribe was an inducement to award the multi-million Monametsana-Rasesa 
road project to Zachem Construction Botswana (ZCB). Nicholas Zachem was the 
fon-ner area manager of ZCB. Also charged was a senior roads engineer for 
allegedly receiving some U$25,000 from Zachem. The roads engineer was cleared 
and the former roads director was sentenced to four years in jail. ' 
At the time of writing, the former director was yet to face another charge of 
failing to give the DCEC a satisfactory answer for being in possession of property 
valued at over P300,000 (The Botswana Gazette, 27 May 1998). Zachem, 'a self 
confessed fraudster', told the court that "he was involved in a string of criminal 
activities, including bribery, fraud, money-laundering and the inflation of 
government tender certificates". These "cost him P700,000 to win his former 
employer, Zachern Construction, government tenders" (MinegilThe Reporter, 27 
August-02 September 1999) and "the money in question was used to bribe 
government officials and other influential people" (ibid., 27 August-02 September 
1999). 
More worrying about this case was the involvement of a minister (The Botswana 
Gazette, 16 June 1999). The concerned minister obtained P10,000 for being a 
director in Zac Construction. Furthennore, it was revealed that Nicholas Zachem 
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while still working for ZCB in 1993 "spent an undisclosed amount of money to 
partly bail out at least one minister who was heavily indebted to the National 
Development Bank (NDB)" (MinegilThe Reporter, 23-29 April 1999). "This was 
done at the height of the bidding for the Rasesa-Monametsana road project" and 
"the project was ultimately awarded to Zachem Construction" (ibid., 23-29 April 
1999). Zachem also "pumped some money into one minister's cash strapped 
family company" and the minister's wife "made numerous visits to Zachern 
Construction offices asking for favours" (ibid., 23-29 April 1999). Nearly two 
weeks before Zachem Construction was awarded the Rasesa-Monametsana road 
project, another former cabinet minister received a cheque of P5,000 in 1994 from 
Zachem Construction (ibid., 29 April-06 May 1999). 
Moreover, "during his bribery spree, Zachern maintained strong contacts with 
cabinet ministers, government officials and some members of the ruling Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP) trading money and favours" (ibid., 23-29 April 1999). It 
was also alleged that Nicholas Zachem had links with "cabinet ministers, as well 
as senior officials at a ttorney general's chamber [sic], directorate on corruption 
and economic crime and administration of justice" (ibid., 23-29 April 1999). At 
one point during the court case, Zachem claimed to have a list of influential 
people whom he had bribed. Nicholas Zachem became a prosecution witness in 
the above case and was given immunity from prosecution. 
As a result of this, various sources in Botswana drew their own conclusions. The 
press for instance, observed; "some sources suspect that the involvement of the 
two ministers and other top government officials led to the withdrawal of a case 
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against Zachem, who had warned that should he be charged 'heads will roll in the 
present cabinet"' (ibid., 23-29 April 1999). Although Nicholas Zachem admitted 
to inflating tenders whilst still working for Zachem Construction Botswana, his 
company, Zac Construction continues to win lucrative tenders from government 
(The Botsivana Guardian, 12 March 1999; The Botswana Economist, 20-24 
January 2000). 
Another i mportant c ase of c orruption t he D CEC h as d ealt w ith ist hat of Jo hn 
Stoneham. Stoneham was the General Manager of the Motor Vehicle Insurance 
Fund (MVIF) and previously Acting Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of 
Finance and Development Planning. Stoneham was jailed for one year with a 
further two years suspended 'for fraudulently obtaining over P 16,000 from the 
fund'. When sentencing him, the Chief Magistrate, Leonard Sechele, called the 
matter "an embarrassment to the public service. This amount of money involved, 
though recovered, is substantial to government" (The Midweek Stin, 28 May 
1997). There were three other charges Stoneham faced but were withdrawn by the 
state. In one of the three, it was alleged Stoneham 'stole more than P200,000.00 
by falsely claiming that he had ministerial approval for the refinancing of his 
mortgage' (ibid., 28 May 1997). In another case, a University of Botswana Senior 
Business Officer was sentenced to three years, wholly suspended, and fined 
P5000 for corruptly obtaining PlOO 000 from an England based company, SMI 
Limited. It was alleged the officer used his position to expedite a payment for 
SMI Limited Company by the University of Botswana (The Botswana Gazette, 
27 May 1998). The officer has been cleared following an appeal. 
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Cases of private attorneys who embezzle trust funds are common in Botswana. A 
private attorney was jailed for five years for conspiring to obtain R550,000 by 
false pretences from a bank. Another private attorney was found by the Court of 
Appeal "to be 'a cog' in a P62,000 fraud case" (MmegilThe Reporter, 18-24 
February 2000). 1n another case, a private lawyer was charged with embezzling 
more than P100,000. In yet another case a fon-ner General Manager of Botswana 
Technology Centre (BTC) challenged the constitutionality of section 34 of the 
DCEC Act.. This section makes it an offence for one to live beyond his or her 
"present or past known sources of income" (The Botsivana Guardian, 28 May 
1999; ibid., 22 September 2000). In another case, two managers of a parastatal 
organisation were charged for conniving to 46steal a total sum of P53,000 and 
R1,000" (Minegilflie Reporter, 18-24 September 1998). Finally, a managing 
director of a private company was charged for obtaining P98,000 from the 
government of Botswana by false pretences (The Botsivana Gazette, 29 April 
1998). 
Other more important cases are built in and around the Financial Assistance Policy 
(FAP). A "total of 40 other FAP projects are under active investigation by the 
DCEC. The amount of money at risk is around P27 million" (MinegilThe Repoi-ter, 
04-10 June 1999). New opportunities tend to open other avenues for corruption. 
With the expansion of FAP toc over t ourism " several cases are n ow b efore the 
courts and they include charges such as faking the number of employees on the 
pay roll" (ibid., 22-28 May 1998). FAP funds have been hit by what came to be 
known as 'fly-by-night' investors. Most of the cases the DCEC is handling involve 
fraud. One former Zambian businessman "was convicted of defrauding the 
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government of P2.5 million Financial Assistance Policy monies" (The Botsivaiia 
Gazette, 3 December 1997). Two foreign nationals attempted to obtain a grant of 
P486,000 by false means from government through the Financial Assistance 
Policy. A warrant of apprehension for the two has been issued (Republic of 
Botswana, 2000). 
In addition to the above examples and cases of corruption, a number of 
questionable practices, have of late caused great concern. Perhaps the most 
interesting is the P2.4m secret donation for the BDP from an undisclosed source in 
Switzerland (The Midiveek Sun, 26 May 1999), in preparation for the 1999 general 
elections. The BDP has refused to disclose the source of the donor except to label 
them as "friends and business communities" (The Botswana Guardian, 23 July 
1999). The BDP Executive Secretary observed that the BDP "is not going to tell 
anybody the source of its funding because there is no reason to do so" and further 
stated that "it is common practice elsewhere in the world for political parties to ask 
for donations and thereafter not divulging their sources of funding" (The Midweek 
Sim, 26 May 1999). According to the BDP Treasurer "any political party has the 
freedom to raise money from whatever source" (Minegilflie Reporter, 04-10 
August 2000). 
Failure to disclose the source of the secret donation especially in a country which 
has been described as a model of democracy in Africa, clearly violates the 
principles of transparency and accountability discussed earlier. Asked if they were 
investigating the source of the P2.4m donation, the DCEC Director said "we do 
not know if the donation is soiled or not. We do not have any infonnation that it is 
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soiled money. If anybody has that infon-nation let him come forth so that we can 
start our investigations on the basis of the bits and pieces of infon-nation that he 
would have passed to us" (The Midiveek Sim, 26 May 1999). This partly explains 
why the DCEC was perceived as failing to catch the "big fish". However, it was 
later revealed that the money "originated from a subsidiary of De Beers, the South 
African diamond mining giant which owns 50% of Botswana's Debswana Mining 
Company" (The Botsivana Gazette, 26 May 1999). 
Other questionable practices include the use of a Botswana Defence Force (BDF) 
helicopter by Vice-President General Ian Khama in BDP political campaigns 
followed by his controversial and unusual one year sabbatical and the use of 
public funds to bail out businesses of party leaders and their close associates as 
noted earlier. In another case, "eyebrows have also been raised over the indemnity 
given to the wife of the newly appointed Minister, who was charged with selling 
driver's licences". Others who benefited from the indemnity grant include 
"business associate of deputy AG [Attomey-Gencral] (Prosecutions)" and "a 
Gaborone attorney, who was facing criminal charges for allegedly defrauding a 
client of P45,000" (MinegilThe Reporter, 19-25 November 1999). Granting 
indemnity to certain individuals gives rise to the perception that only "small" 
people can be investigated. In another case, a high-ranking g overnment official 
was alleged to have entertained a girlfriend, then a student abroad, at the expense 
of the state. In the view of a senior opposition politician; this was the kind of 
corruption which often takes place in Botswana but was difficult to prove 
(Interview, 24 January 2000).. 
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Confronting corruption: the road to reform 
In spite of these cases of corruption, Good observed that 
corruption and mismanagement in Botswana is relatively pale and 
restricted. It is almost an elite phenomenon, and when it extends to others, 
as in state-run financial organisations and over land in Mogoditshane, it is 
under conditions seemingly sanctioned by some participating government 
leaders and officials. It is not systemic to the whole of the political 
economy as in Zaire ... Nor is it epidemic, afflicting the whole society, as in Nigeria, and there is decidedly no 'culture of corruption' as it exists in 
Brazil ... Responsibility and accountability have been seriously reduced 
within the top-most levels of the government, but to-date many state 
institutions and most citizens remain untarnished (1994: 516). 
The foregoing observation by Good was based on dubious grounds. Clearly 
corruption exists in elite and at lower levels. Evidence for elite corruption was the 
scandals discussed above and low-level corruption was evidenced by cases the 
DCEC has dealt with. This has been acknowledged by the DCEC Director who 
obsbrved that: "a majority of cases involve petty corruption such as someone 
failing to pass a driver's (licence) test and finding a way around it" (Business Day, 
8 April 1998). This was the case despite a warning by the founder Director of the 
DCEC that "some of those involved occupy very senior positions" (Republic of 
Botswana, 1996: 2). We are yet to witness the prosecution of those who hold very 
senior positions. However, the political and economic consequences of corruption 
were far less destructive in Botswana. 
Corruption in Botswana did not start with IPM, BFIC or Peri-urban land scandals. 
Its roots seem to be decidedly deeper than that. Healey noted that 
it seems likely that financial mismanagement and lax and corrupt practices 
have been 'creeping up' for some time at all levels. The discovery of 
malpractice in the 1990s shows no systemic pattern; it has come to light in 
ail accidental ad hoe way and its real extent remains unclear (1995: 47). 
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In certain quarters, it was believed that the roots of corruption were traceable to 
the 1982 Presidential Commission on Economic Opportunities. Prior to this 
Commission, there was a prohibition of civil servants from taking part in business 
apart from traditional agriculture. The same prohibition applied to ministers 
(Interview, 21 January 2000). Following this commission, civil servants and 
ministers were 
allowed to invest in business as long as they declared their interests. But 
they have never declared their interests. Since then there has been an 
explosion of ministers and senior civil servants involved in business. 
David Magang is a classic case. He was forced to resign as Assistant 
Minister of Finance for backing Phakalane Estates (Interview, 21 January 
2000). 
Prior to this commission, there were isolated cases of corruption. Following this 
commission, civil servants and ministers started forming consortiums and 
becoming shareholders. A development of these consortiums meant senior civil 
servants were involved in business with some private companies. As senior civil 
servants, they had access to critical infonnation of government projects and 
policies. They also had access to ministers. Later in the 1980s, a lot of 
consortiums were going on, with construction boom and most came from South 
Africa. With companies like the First National Bank (FNB), which in the 1980s 
by definition were corrupt because of its association with apartheid, they found a 
fertile ground for corruption. South Africa was a very corrupt economic society 
and it is still is (Interview, 24 January 2000). 
All these events, led to the BHC scandal. There was land shortage in Botswana, 
and this resulted in a circle of corruption in land. Strict regulations on land 
development still exist but the will to enforce these regulations is absent. A lot of 
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syndicates were f onned in the 1 980s w ith overlapping m embership. The I 980s 
and 1990s saw the introduction of policies such as writing off debts in the 
National Development Bank, bailing out etc, which entrenched a culture of 
wiping out good business decisions (Interview, 24 January 2000). As Fombad 
noted "the political and administrative ethos of Botswana since the late 1980s has 
been characterised by its symbiosis with business and a controversial system of 
overlapping directorships" (Fornbad, 2001: 62). According to Frimpong 
64 corruption became a problem in Botswana as a result of political complaceny" 
(Frimpong, 1997 quoted in Johnston, 1999: 224). 
Out of 'moral panic' (Theobald and Williams, 1999), the response of the 
Botswana government to these major cases of corruption, which caused a public 
outcry, was to create the DCEC. According to Good, the DCEC was established in 
1994 "largely as a result of the considerable malpractice just then revealed" 
(Good, 1996). Political reasons, too may have worked as a catalyst towards the 
speedy creation of the DCEC. The scandals embarrassed the government which 
wanted to be seen to be doing something. The scandals also increased the 
popularity of the opposition, mainly the BNF. To clear itself, the government 
created the DCEC. 
The Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) 
Presenting the DCEC Bill in the National Assembly for its second reading on II th 
July 1994, the then Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration, Lt. 
General Mompati Merafhe, elaborated the rationale for the bill as follows 
the Corruption and Economic Crime Bill ... represents the Government's 
resolute response to the rising problems of corruption and economic crime 
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in this country .... Corruption and economic crime severely undermine the 
very fabric of society and, in consequence, are considerably more 
damaging in the long term than crimes of violence. ... Corruption and 
economic crime do exist here to an extent which not only justifies, but 
demands that the utmost effort be made to eradicate them from our public 
and business affairs. ... The danger exists that ordinary members of the 
public may develop the belief that it is not objectionable to pay a bribe for 
a service they are entitled to for free and that corruption and economic 
crime are acceptable.... Government wishes it to become known, both 
within and outside Botswana, that ours is a country in which public and 
private business can be carried out honestly and fairly, and whose citizens 
do not tolerate abuses of the law by those with the power and financial 
resources to usurp them (Republic of Botswana, 1994: 36-37). 
As shown in chapter two, this demonstrates that; first, the government was keen to 
reduce corruption because it was a danger to social, political and economic 
development. Second, despite Transparency International Corruption Perception 
Index which considered Botswana as the least corrupt country in Africa, 
corruption was a danger to Botswana. Third, by introducing the DCEC, Botswana 
was addressing a legitimacy problem. Following the three Presidential 
Commissions of Inquiry, the government wanted to address the problem of public 
perception and apprehension. Fourth, it wanted to ensure business confidence 
including t he r cassurance off oreign i nvestors a nd a id d onors. T hat i s, tom ake 
Botswana a place where investors can invest their money without any fear of 
losing it. 
The DCEC Bill was enacted on the 25 th Of jUly' 1994. However, throughout its 
discussion in Parliament, the DCEC Bill met some opposition from a considerable 
number of MPs including those from the ruling party. The fact that the 
backbenchers of the ruling party were critical of the DCEC Bill was unusual in 
Botswan. a. For their part, opposition MPs were concerned with the independence 
of the DCEC. It has to be noted that some of the MPs who were critical of the 
1 133 
DCEC Bill were implicated by the Kgabo and Christie Presidential Commissions 
of Inquiry. They had mixed feelings about the Bill. Some vehemently expressed 
concern about the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Bill and its 
intentions whilst others labelled its powers as draconian. Some felt that not 
enough consultation had occurred; others wanted the government to give the 
police more resources rather than to establish a nexv agency because they saw the 
DCEC as nothing more than duplication of efforts. Their concerns were 
understandable. 
Following enactment in July 1994, the DCEC was established in September 1994. 
As already noted, it is modelled on the Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong. But the ICAC and the DCEC were established 
under different backgrounds. The DCEC was set up following damaging reports of 
corruption and abuse of public office; the ICAC was created in the context of 
widespread police corruption and so separated from t he p olice f orce. T here w as 
some good justification for establishing the ICAC as a separate organisation but 
this was not the case in Botswana.. The police force in Botswana was not 
noticeably corrupt; rather, it lacked the capacity to tackle complex white-collar 
crimes. Therefore, logic dictated that the government should have strengthened 
the role of the police service by establishing a specialised unit within the police. 
Instead, the DCEC was constituted as a quasi-police force in the Office of the 
President. It thus reflected the trend world-wide to establish specialised and 
independent agencies to fight corruption. The DCEC's 1994 annual report states 
that "success had been enjoyed in countries which had established separate bodies 
specifically set up and designed to deal with the problems rather than imposing 
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additional burdens on existing law enforcement agencies" (Republic of Botswana, 
1995: 8). 
Prior to the setting up of the DCEC, issues of corruption were dealt with under 
sections 99,100,101,384,385 and 386 of the Penal Code. Section 99 deals with 
official corruption and extortion by public officers, whereas section 10 1 covers 
I 
public officers who receive property in return for favours. On the other hand, 
section 384 covers corrupt practices and section 385 secret commissions on 
government contracts. According to section 387 of the Penal Code, prosecution 
for these offences is only with the consent of the Attorney-General. Under the 
Penal Code, the penalties for these offences range from three to six years. Thus, 
the existing legislation was inadequate in the face of emerging cases of 
corruption. Moreover, the Botswana Police lacked the capacity to combat 
corruption. 
Organisation and staffing of the DCEC 
Functions of the DCEC 
Botswana has adopted an approach that jointly fights corruption and economic 
crime. H owever, its hould ben oted t hat t he d istinction b etween c orruption a nd 
economic crime is at times blurred, as they both constitute the misuse of office for 
personal gain. The DCEC is charged with three main duties as spelt out by section 
6 of the DCEC Act. These are investigation, crime prevention and public 
education. This is known as the 'three pronged strategy', which has proved to be 
effective in Hong Kong. This is an all-encompassing strategy as it seeks to fight 
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corruption and economic crime by investigation, prevention and public education. 
The DCEC "has adopted the policy that anti-corruption work requires more than 
just investigation and prosecution. It also has a branch concerned with prevention, 
that is to say reducing the opportunities for corruption, and another whose task is 
to involve the public" (Palmier, 1983: 213). A strategy, which combats corruption 
by investigation without any preventative measures or without increasing public 
awareness, is unlikely to bring better results. 
The public education section is charged with the task of changing the attitude of 
the public towards corruption and economic crime. This is not an easy task. It has 
to be noted that corruption and economic crime have a lot to do with the peoples' 
attitudes. Public education on the dangers of corruption is seen as a key weapon in 
combating corruption internationally. This is the strategy used by Transparency 
International (TI) in its anti-corruption crusade. TI does not investigate individual 
cases but it simply sensitises the world community on the effects of corruption. 
The DCEC public education section needs to give special attention to the youth in 
trying to convey. the anti-corruption message. The public education section uses a 
number of strategies in trying to convey its message. These include amongst 
others posters, radio programmes, school talks and seminars. 
The DCEC also assists government departments to search for loopholes in the 
existing rules and regulations to ensure that the corrupt and would be corrupt find 
it difficult to exploit such laws. This would help to reduce the opportunities for 
corruption and economic crime. Prevention is better than cure. Williams observed 
that "trying to control corruption, without changing the conditions which generate 
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and sustain it, is like trying to change a car wheel when the vehicle is still moving; 
the remedial effort is overwhelmed by the momentum of the larger body of which 
the wheel is an integral part". (1987: 121). 
Staffing 
The DCEC deals with complicated and time-consuming cases on corruption and 
economic crime. It therefore needs competent and honest personnel who have 
been trained and have the necessary experience to investigate such cases. 
Theobold says 
staffing seems to present particular problems as investigatory officers must 
have exceptionally high levels of skill and motivation if they are to be 
effective and, most of all, constitute a deterrent. They must, first of all, be 
able to develop the investigative talents that will enable them to penetrate 
the often forinidable defensive screens which departments under scrutiny 
typically throw up in self-protection. These screens will comprise- such 
tactics as non-co-operation, withholding information, laying false trails, 
accusing investigators of victimisation, ethnic bias and so on. Agents must 
also be highly motivated because the task on which they are engaged is 
fairly unrewarding (1990: 142). 
For any organisation to be able to fulfil its mission, the right people with the 
necessary experience and expertise have to be in place. The DCEC started its 
work with an establishment of 66 and out of this 49 posts were occupied. Some of 
these officers were secondees from various govermnent departments notably 
police, customs and taxes, and others were either directly recruited or transferred 
permanently from other departments. At present, some of the secondees have 
returned to their respective departments with the exception of two from Customs 
and five police officers who requested to be transferred to the unit. It should be 
stated that at the time of writing, there were very few Batswana who have 
specialised skills in the areas of corruption and economic crime. The DCEC 
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Director in his 1994 annual report pointed out that the DCEC had to "import 
skills" and "it has been agreed ... initially" that "14 posts" of its "establishment 
would be filled by expatriates" (Republic of Botswana, 1995). 
Presently, the DCEC has an establishment of 116 and the staff compliment stands 
at I 11. The crime prevention section and the public education section have five 
officers each. The investigation section has 49 officers. These were divided into 
six investigation teams with five based in Gaborone and one in Francistown (the 
northern office). Out of the 49,15 are supervisors, 18 investigators and 16 
assistant investigators. The Francistown office has eight investigators and was 
responsible for between half and three-quarters of the country geographically 
(Interview, 6 October 1999). It should be noted that Botswana is a big country in 
terms of size, and there should be a lot of travelling by officers of the DCEC if the 
DCEC is to be known in all the comers of Botswana. This means that there is a 
need for more resources in terms of personnel, finance, transport etc. to be 
allocated to the DCEC. This does not suggest that there is need for too many 
people to work for the DCEC as that would make proper supervision difficult. The 
World Development Report noted that "corruption is usually better fought by a 
combination of fewer, better paid officials controlling only what needs to be (and 
can effectively be) controlled in the full light of public scrutiny, than by 
occasional anti-corruption "campaigns" (The World Development Report, 1983: 
117 quoted in Theobold, 1990: 157). 
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Budget 
The DCEC does not have an independent budget. Its budget forms part of the 
larger budget of the Ministry of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration. 
When the DCEC started its operations in September 1994, it had no budget. The 
first budget for the DCEC was in the 1995/1996 financial year with a recurrent 
budget of P4 million. For the 1996/97 financial year, its recurrent budget stood at 
P5,914 000.00, and there was no development budget. In the 1997/1998 financial 
year, the recurrent budget was about P6 million, and the development budget was 
P4.5 million. For the entire National Development Plan 8 (NDP 8) period 
(1997/8-2002/3), the development budget is P50 million. The question is, are the 
financial resources given to the DCEC adequate? The Director of the DCEC in the 
1995 annual report noted that 
for the 1995/96 financial year, the Directorate prepared its own estimates 
and its finances are administered directly with the assistance of a Senior 
Accounting Officer seconded from the office of the Accountant General. 
The estimates had to be somewhat speculative as there was little historical 
data of expenditure trends upon which to base them. Overall provision has 
been adequate b ut ith as b een n ecessary tov ire funds from o ne v ote t0 
another in the I ight of expenditure trends (Republic ofB otswana, 1996: 
15-16). 
The problems experienced by the DCEC in its daily work suggest that the 
financial resources allocated to the DCEC are inadequate. However, it should be 
noted that, it is difficult to budget for a problem without knowing its extent. It is 
still difficult to establish the extent of corruption and economic crime in Botswana 
because some of the corrupt acts may go unnoticed. 
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Powers of the DCEC 
The DCEC Act conferred the DCEC with wide and sweeping powers to 
investigate corruption and economic crime according to section 6 of the DCEC 
Act. It is a civilian organisation with powers like those of the police. The DCEC 
has the power to arrest, search and seize with or without a warrant. It also has the 
power to obtain information and to use reasonable force. It also has the power to 
access suspects's bank accounts without their knowledge. The DCEC, like the 
police, can institute extradition proceedings against fugitive suspects. Most of the 
DCEC's powers are exercised with the authority of a magistrate. Two reasons 
stand out for giving the DCEC these powers: first, these powers enable the DCEC 
to gather evidence in its investigations of corruption and economic crime without 
fear; and second, such enonnous powers are necessary because corrupt acts are 
committed under the cover of secrecy. 
Certain provisions of the DCEC Act are worth highlighting. According to section 
4(l) of the DCEC Act, the President appoints the Director of the DCEC. Section 
4(l) reads; "the president may appoint ý Director on such terms and conditions as 
he thinks fit". The Director is in charge of the day-to-day administration of the 
DCEC and is also accountable and reports directly to the president. The powers of 
the DCEC are not absolute. Access into certain premises or documents may be 
denied under section 15(2) if the president is of the view that access may endanger 
national security. The issue of national security clearly increases executive control 
over the DCEC. In Spain the Supreme Court "held that public officials could not 
use state security as a defense if criminal activities are suspected" (Rose- 
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Ackennan, 1999: 152). In Botswana, the law presently overrides such a 
consideration. 
Moreover, although under section 16(l) of the Act, the Director of the DCEC may 
apply to a magistrate for a suspect to surrender his or her travel documents to the 
Director, the problem of suspects fleeing the country continued to be a problem 
for the DCEC. The 1995 annual report of the DCEC observed 
a number of ... concerns about the administration of justice in Botswana. Principal amongst these is the granting of bail to persons charged before 
the courts. Whilst the country's constitution emphasises, in effect, that 
bail is a right not a privilege, there have been a number of cases in the 
Directorate's short history where that right has been abused. This is 
particularly so in relation to a number of expatriates who, having been 
granted bail, have absconded from the country before trial (Republic of 
Botswana, 1996: 4). 
For all that, the Act gives the agency wide powers along conventional ICAC lines. 
Any person who corruptly offers a bribe is guilty of corruption under section 23. 
The DCEC Act also makes conflict of interest an offence. According to section 31 
(1) 
a member or an employee of a public body is guilty of corruption if he or 
an immediate member of his family has a direct or indirect interest in any 
company or undertaking with which such body proposes to deal, or he has 
personal interest in any decision which such body is to make, and he, 
knowingly, fails to disclose the nature of such interest, or votes or 
participates in the proceedings of such body relating to such dealing or 
decision. 
The Hong Kong influence is seen, too, in section 34(l) of the DCEC Act which 
spells out that individuals are guilty of corruption if they fail to account for their 
assets. If a person's property or assets are questionable or they are living 
disproportionately to his or her known official emoluments, they can be called to 
141 
explain how they accumulated such assets. The onus is on the suspect to show that 
they did not accumulate assets through corrupt means. This section has been 
challenged in court as unconstitutional and the court is yet to pronounce on this. 
As the law stands, the DCEC can investigate any person in Botswana including 
the President but has no powers to decide who should be prosecuted or not. The 
power to prosecute rests with the Attorney-General to whom cases are referred 
following investigation. With regard to the President, it is entirely the prerogative 
of the Attorney-General to decide whether to prosecute him or not. According to 
section 41(l) of the constitution of Botswana the President is immune or is 
protected from legal proceedings. No criminal or civil proceedings may be 
brought against an incumbent president. Parliament has no powers to impeach the 
president. 
However, the president is only immune from prosecution and not from liability. 
Once the President ceases to be the President, proceedings may be brought against 
him for offences he or she committed whilst in office. Section 92 of the 
Constitution of Botswana provides for a motion of no confidence, which is not 
that useful in policing the President or the executive. A motion of no confidence 
negatively affects Parliament in that Parliament will stand dissolved as well. But 
as long as he is still a president, Parliament cannot take away his immunity and 
therefore cannot be prosecuted unless the President consents. The logic behind 
these constitutional provisions is to protect the Office of the President. As matters 
stand, without impeachment provisions in the constitution, there is little sense in 
investigating the conduct of the presidency. In all other cases, the DCEC has 
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power to investigate limited only by the willingness, or otherwise, of the 
Attomey-General to prosecute. 
Under the DCEC Act decisions to prosecute carry heavy penalties against 
corruption. Section 36 of the DCEC Act states that anyone found guilty of 
corruption could be sentenced to prison terms of up to 10 years or a maximum 
fine of P500,000, or both. The Act also has a provision for offences committed by 
Botswana citizens outside Botswana. Such people can be charged as if the act was 
committed in Botswana under section 46. 
Section 21 of the Act also provides for the immunity of DCEC officials for 
actions undertaken in good faith so that they discharge their duties without fear of 
prosecution. M ore controversial h as b een s ection 44oft he A ct w hich sets o ut 
penalties f or p ublic d isclosure t hat s omeone is under i nvestigation f or possible 
corruption. When the DCEC Bill was before Parliament, the Press was critical of 
Section 44, expressing fears that this provision would curtail its freedom. The 
reasons for section 44 are clear - to protect investigations and reputations during 
lengthy procedures which require care and fairness. Disclosure of the identity of 
the person under investigation would pre-empt and interfere with the work of the 
DCEC. As McMullan notes: "there are plenty of reports, histories and trial 
records exemplifying corruption in different countries, but corruption is not a 
subject which can be investigated openly by means of questionnaires and 
interviews" (1996: 183). 
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Section 44 is designed to facilitate the gathering of evidence by the DCEC but 
also to ensure that unnecessary damage is not done to any suspect. The press is 
free to report on any case as long as it is before the courts. The Constitution of 
Botswana talks about the protection of the freedom of expression but that right is 
not absolute. To date, two journalists have been charged under section 44 of the 
DCEC Act and there is a clear tension between the two principles. 
The Act also seeks to protect whistle-blowers from exposure. Section 45 talks 
about the protection of informers by not disclosing their names or identity. This is 
to ensure that anybody can report corrupt acts without fear of identification. The 
name of an informer can only be disclosed if one makes a report that he or she 
knows to be false, and then only on the finding by the court. Section 43 makes it 
an offence for one to make a malicious report. 
The problem of DCEC autonomy 
The DCEC Act did not make the DCEC an independent institution, which casts 
doubt on its legitimacy and public reputation. The Director of the DCEC is 
politically appointed (by the President) and is also directly accountable to him as a 
political appointee. The appointment of the Director by the President defeats the 
whole intention of the DCEC. Moreover, according to the Act, the President also 
detennines the Director's tenns and conditions of service 'as he thinks fit'. The 
other factor that is important and impacts on the independence of the DCEC is the 
tenure of office of its Director, a matter on which the Act is silent. This suggests 
that the Director of the DCEC is subjected to the whim of the President, which 
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further undermines its need to be seen to be free from political interference. As 
one senior DCEC official put it: 
under the current arrangement, the DCEC was not in a position to address 
corruption among the high-ups. The current director was too loyal to the 
government (Interview, 5 October 1999). 
It was also reported that Stockwell, the founder Director of the DCEC, and a 
former official of the ICAC in Hong Kong, may have decided not to renew his 
contract because he was "disgruntled as a result of government's interference in 
the department's work. ' Apparently investigations involving high-ups were 
constantly being obstructed" (Mmegifl7ie Reportei-, 24-30 January1997). This 
view was confirmed by a DCEC line official who said: "with my little experience 
in the DCEC, I have come across cases where little has been done about them. 
They were not reported in the piess. They were not treated like other cases" 
(Inter-view, 2 November 1999). DCEC investigators complained that "some 
cabinet ministers have been reported and investigated and no action was taken" 
(MmegilThe Reporter, 28 April-04 May 2000). This suggests that the political will 
necessary for the DCEC to be effective is not always present. This does not 
suggest that the President interferes with the operations of the DCEC but that 
there is a possibility that he could do so. In turn, this could discourage action by 
the DCEC. 
Another factor that impacts on the independence of the DCEC was that it referred 
its dockets to the Attomey-General. It was believed that this also eroded 
effectiveness of the DCEC. Following an investigation, a docket is sent to the 
Attorney General to decide whether to prosecute or not on the basis of the 
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evidence before him. In the view of an official of Transparency International, 
Botswana Chapter, it was considered not to be surprising that the DCEC has not 
been able to prosecute even a single minister. There was a belief that the executive 
controlled the DCEC in terms of its appointment, accountability, staffing, budget 
and prosecution. One reason for this belief was what was considered to be a 
cautious approach to prosecution (Interview, 4 February 2000). In theory, the 
Attorney-General is independent but in practice there is room to doubt the extent 
to which an advisor to government can be independent from it. The Attorney- 
General in Botswana wears many hats, which provide for serious conflict of 
interest. He is a legal advisor, advises cabinet, Director of prosecutions and 
advises parliament (Interview, 2 February 2000). 
The independence of the DCEC should also be seen to exist in the area of finance 
- its budget. The DCEC needs to control its own finances and made accountable to 
the National Assembly. There is a need to link appointment, accountability and 
budget of the DCEC with the National Assembly. These need to be detached from 
the executive. The DCEC should not only be independent but it should be seen to 
be. Palmier observes that "without such intelligent independence those 
responsible for curbing corruption, even within the political limits set, have no 
way of knowing the true state of affairs, since their own officials are very prone to 
submit only favourable reports. For all these reasons, one cannot be sanguine 
about the likelihood of any lessening of corruption in the country" (1983: 218). 
The foregoing discussion shows how the DCEC can easily be controlled. The 
independence of the DCEC would be guaranteed if the Director was not only 
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appointed by Parliament but also answerable to it, and his salary paid from the 
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Consolidated Fund. This would enhance the credibility of the DCEC. Its 
independence is important if it has to carry out its duties diligently. The above 
factors give rise to the perception that the DCEC was not immune from executive 
influence, and was as such sedn as a toothless bulldog as far as fighting high-level 
corruption was concerned. 
Problems faced by the DCEC 
In addition to the issue of autonomy, the DCEC faced some technical limitations. 
One such problem was shortage of trained personnel in the areas of combating 
white-collar crimes. The DCEC is a big organisation that lacked the internal 
support mechanisms. The questions that arise are: is the DCEC really tackling 
some of these problems or issues? Does it have the right skills? At the moment, 
the DCEC heavily relies "on expatriates (mostly retired) who are believed to be 
lacking the latest investigative skills. The feeling is that they have yesterday's 
skills. There are also problems of the leadership, which fails to understand the 
direction the DCEC is going. Obstacles within the DCEC (e. g. internal 
communication problems) prevent conversion of skills. Others are disillusioned 
and the brightest people soon resign. Older people ignorant of modem concepts 
are at the top with young and talented people at the bottom. This is a general 
problem in the Botswana Public Service" (Interview, 14 January 2000). 
The other limitation or problem has to do with inadequate funding. For instance, 
its training budget for the year 1999/2000 was cut by about 66% (Interview, 10 
January ý000). Botswana is such a vast country and the work of the DCEC 
involves a lot of travelling. There is shortage of transport and drivers. For 
147 
example, the Francistown branch of the DCEC is responsible to between half and 
three-quarters of the country (geographically). The DCEC lacks an independent 
budget. Generally the DCEC lacks the capacity to tackle the problems of 
corruption and economic crime. The Director of the DCEC notes that "the 
insufficiency of resources, financial and human, and the need to maintain 
operational capability, have meant that our ideal training targets have not been 
met" (Republic of Botswana, 2000: 5). 
The DCEC also faced "continuing and worsening problem of delays" at the 
Attorney-General Office because of its inability to urgently prosecute cases. This 
was attributable to shortage of staff at the Attorney-General Office (Republic of 
Botswana, 1998). According to the Director of the DCEC 
the creation of the Directorate has had a significant impact on the Attorney 
General's Chambers and cases produced by the Directorate constitute over 
50% of the work of the Prosecution Division. There has been no 
corresponding increase in the staffing levels of the Prosecution Division 
and the inevitable consequence is that cases are taking longer to be 
processed (Republic of Botswana, 1997: 6) 
Delays at the Attomey-Gencral's Office 
are c ompounded byt he f act t hat t he s ame c ounsel w ho e xamine D CEC 
dockets often have to prosecute the cases in court and counsel's 
availability, especially when the Court of Appeal is sitting, becomes a 
critical factor in setting trial dates-delays are commonplace and in my 
view unacceptable (Republic of Botswana, 1998: 6). 
Linked to this, was the problem of delays within the administration of justice. As 
further noted by the DCEC Director 
the creation of the Directorate has had a major impact on the Magistrates 
Cpurts, particularly within Gaborone. At the end of the year under review, 
new contested cases were being set down for trial 6 to 7 months later. The 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that often unrealistic timetables for 
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cases are set with the result that when a trial eventually commences it 
proves impossible to complete it in the allotted time resulting in further 
lengthy adjournments (Republic of Botswana, 1997: 6). 
The criminal Justice System has been overtaken by events. Botswana is a country 
undergoing rapid transformation. The population is growing, there is 
unemployment, rapid urbanisation etc. In the view of one respondent, the criminal 
justice system is not commensurate with these problems. There is shortage of 
magistrates and courts. The government is not able to keep judicial officers on the 
job. These have an immense impact in terms of output, in dealing with cases 
before the courts because of postponement. The prisons get clogged because of 
pending cases and at times witnesses die. These problems result in a chain 
reaction which slows down the administration of justice (Interview, 2 February 
2000). 
However, as one senior opposition politician put it: 
some of the problems in the criminal justice system are self-created. It is 
the individual magistrates who create problems. It is not our system. Our 
system s ays ap erson s hould bet ried w ithin ar casonable t ime. It ist he 
implementation part of the system that is problematic. There is shortage of 
courts and magistrates but magistrates are lazy and do not research. The 
criminal system is okay. It is the wheels of the system that are rotten 
(Interview, 24 January 2000). 
Another respondent who is an attomeY in private practice considers that 
there is chaos within the criminal justice system. In the past it was 
believed that magistrates could supervise themselves but experience has 
shown that they need supervision. This also makes our life very difficult. 
They are disorganising us. We cannot properly plan our work. If you have 
a case in court you have to cancel your day's appointments (Interview, 10 
January 2000). 
149 
Commenting ont he i nability oft he A dministration of Ju stice a nd t he A ttorney 
General's Office to expeditiously deal with the cases, the Director of the DCEC 
said 
only 29 cases arising from DCEC work were completed by the courts 
during 1998 and a further 66 are pending, some of which date back to 
1994.75 cases were referred by the DCEC to the Attorney General's 
Chambers during 1998 and at the year end we were awaiting responses on 
37 prosecution dockets, which as will be seen, represents at least I year 
throughput for the courts. The overall position is deteriorating (Republic 
of Botswana, 1999: 5-6). 
This shows that the cases, which originate from the DCEC investigations, create 
an extra load for the already understaffed Attorney General's Office and the 
judicial service system. The DCEC needs to. prosecute its own cases. However, 
the above problems, which bedevil the criminal justice system, should not be 
understood to suggest that the judiciary in Botswana is not independent. The other 
problem the DCEC is facing is that of dealing with the problem of perception. It is 
generally believed that it only concentrates on the "small fish" and the "big fish" 
remains untouchable. This is a serious challenge, which the DCEC needs to 
address. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the politics of controlling corruption, the nature of 
corruption that is prevalent in Botswana as well as efforts to combat corruption. 
The chapter has discussed the powers, functions, organisation, staffing, budget 
and limitations of the DCEC. The DCEC has been given adequate powers to 
investigate, p revent a nd teach t he p ublic a bout p orruption a nd e conornic c rime. 
However, the effectiveness of the DCEC should be assessed in light of political 
and technical limitations. Whether or not it succeeds depends on a number of 
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factors such as the political will, resources (both financial and the right skills of its 
staff), and its independence, co-operation from other government agencies and the 
general populace, and the willingness to investigate and prosecute on the part of 
the DCEC. Therefore, establishing the DCEC is not enough. The DCEC needs to 
be supported with sufficient resources and its independence should not be 
questionable. The DCEC is widely accused of concentrating on the 'small fish'. If 
one looks at the cases the DCEC has dealt with so far, they are mainly petty stuff 
with the exception of a few. This is not the kind of corruption Batswana had in 
mind when the DCEC was first established. 
However, evidence from elsewhere indicates that corruption seem to exist or 
flourish in areas where there are some restrictions and delays in providing goods 
and services such as passports, visas, permits (work and residence), licences etc. 
Such restrictions and delays in the bureaucracy tend to make the officials in- 
charge to feel important, and may start asking for bribes, and those looking for 
such goods and services may offer bribes. Such areas are a breeding ground for 
corruption. This suggests close monitoring of such areas. In the next chapter, we 
discuss the problem of corruption in South Africa both before and after 1994 and, 
assess efforts to combat corruption there. South Africa has numerous anti- 
corruption agencies. However, chapter five focuses on three agencies, namely the 
Public Protector, the Investigating Directorate for Serious Economic Offences, 
and the Special Investigating Unit, because these are the leading anti-corruption 
agencies in South Africa. 
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Chapter five: Corruption and its control in South Africa 
Having discussed the nature of corruption and institutional efforts to combat it in 
Botswana, this chapter now offers an assessment of Corruption and institutional 
efforts to control it in South Africa, the second of our case studies. Various 
institutional measures have been introduced to tackle the problem of corruption in 
South Africa. However, this chapter will limit itself mainly to the Public 
Protector, Investigating Directorate for Serious Economic Offences (IDSEO), and 
the Special Investigating Unit (SIU), commonly known as the Heath Unit, 
because these three are the leading anti-corruption agencies in South Africa. Our 
main focus here is on why these institutions were established and the nature of 
their performance. It explores how corruption is embedded in South African 
politics before examining the work of anti-corruption agencies in South Africa. 
The chapter will help us to understand the roots of corruption in South Africa, the 
nature of these three anti-corruption agencies and the way they function in their 
attempts to combat corruption in South Africa. 
South Africa differs from much of colonial Africa in that it attracted a considerable 
number of European settlers (Beinart, 1994; Beinart and Dubow, 1995). It was one 
of the few "settler oligarchies" which existed in Africa (Bratton and Van de Walle, 
1997). "Settler oligarchies" differ from most African states because they do not 
possess the key facets or "institutions" of Africa's neopatrimonial states. Instead they 
come closer to what have been ten-ned exclusionary democracies (Bratton and Van 
de Walle, 1997; Bauer, 2001). Moreover, settler oligarchies with "their stronger, 
centralized state and military apparatus and their closer adherence to legal-rational 
administrative procedures", more closely approximate the bureaucratic-authoritarian 
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states, which prevailed in Latin America and Southern Europe, than they do the post- 
colonial states of Sub-Saharan Affica. Thus settler oligarchies allowed for high 
competition with low participation in the political process (Bratton and Van de 
Walle, 1997: 77). As Bratton and Van de Walle noted, in settler oligarchies 
the dominant racial group used the instruments of law to deny political 
rights to ethnic majorities, usually through a restrictive franchise and 
emergency regulations backed by hierarchically organized 
coercion.... however, settlers reproduced functioning democracies within 
their own microcosmic enclaves, with features like elections, leadership 
turnover, loyal opposition, independent courts, and some press freedoms, 
all reserved exclusively for whites (ibid. 8 1). 
The history of settler domination ar! d racial conflict gives South Africa a 
distinctive character. Even then the way the apartheid state functioned can be 
compared to other colonial experiences in Africa (Mamdani, 1996). Southall and 
Szeftel noted 
virtually from the beginning of a European presence in South Africa, racial 
domination defined political power. The National Party (NP) goverm-nent, 
which took office in 1948, to defend and promote white (especially 
Afrikaner) interests, intensified this domination through its policy of 
apartheid" (1999: 207). 
Thus, Afrikaner capitalist interests played a significant role in shaping the nature 
of apartheid in the 1950s (Posel, 1995: 227). It is indisputable that segregation and 
apartheid mainly promoted the interests of the whites (Beinart and Dubow, 1995); 
"the c entral i ssue inw hite p olitics w as h ow tom aintain c ontrol o ver t he b lack 
majority" (Friedman, 1995: 534). Apartheid bestowed on South African society a 
distinguishing characteristic (Beinart, 1994), one which continued to influence 
politics even after the country changed from a settler oligarchy to a formal liberal 
democracy with the first non-racial multiparty elections in 1994 (Bratton and Van 
de Walle, 1997). 
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Corruption and the state in South Africa 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (TI CPI) considers South 
Africa to be the third least corrupt country in Africa. Even so, the perception is 
that corruption is widespread in South Afhca. In a study conducted by Merchant 
International Group on 45 emerging countries, South Africa was "above average 
on the danger scale in terms of corruption in business dealings" (Business Day, 15 
March 1999). It emerged "the 14'h riskiest country for business" with a percentage 
score of 68%. The rankings were arrived at on the basis of percentages, the higher 
percentage the higher the risk. Singapore was considered the least corrupt with a 
percentage score of 19% (ibid., 15 March 1999). In a study conducted by IDASA 
in 1996,46 per cent of the respondents were of the view that the majority of the 
officials were involved in corruption (Lodge, 1999: 56). In 1997, corruption, 
unemployment, violent crime, theft, prison escapes, educational 
underperfon-nance and overspending by provincial and local authorities were 
identified as the most serious problems facing South Africa (Editors Inc, 
n. d., c. 1999). Similarly, Hawthorne identified corruption, unemployment and 
crime as serious problems South Africa faces (Hawthorne, 1998: 49). The South 
African Regional Crime Combating Council (SRCCC) "estimates that white- 
collar crimes amount to more than R350 billion (about USS95.5 billion) a year" 
(Khumalo, 1995: 12). Deloitte and Touche, an international accountancy finn 
suggested that in 1997, public sector fraud and mismanagement might have 
exceeded RIO billion (Lodge, 1999: 64). 
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According to the founder head of the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) Willem 
Heath, corruption and mismanagement worth R200 billion is yet to be uncovered 
in the public sector (The Stai-, 24 August 1998). Heath regards corruption in South 
Africa as "a national crisis" (Sunday Thnes, 22 November 1998). For him, the 
level of corruption that has been exposed "so far appears to be just a tip of a 
problem that has taken root through the entire administration" with some of the 
organised syndicates which drain public resources having been in operation for 
the past 20 years (Sunday Independent, 31 May 1998). The SIU has noted that 
a shockingly large proportion of South Africans, including former and 
present government officials and politicians, appeared to regard public 
funds and assets as 'fair game' for corrupt schemes (Business Day, 13 
November 1998). 
The roots of corruption in South Africa are located in the structure and policies of 
the apartheid state. The apartheid state employed patronage in a systematic way to 
achieve two predominant objectives. Firstly, it was concerned to use public 
resources to redress the historic disadvantages of the Afrikaner population in 
relation to English-Speaking whites. And secondly, it used public resources to co- 
opt and reward conservative allies within the non-white communities in the hope 
that they would weaken the political opposition to white domination. The 
distribution of patronage came to be institutionalised through the structures of 
racial segregation in the apparatus of the Bantu Homelands, black urban councils 
and Indian and "Coloured" representative bodies. This use of patronage naturally 
fostered corruption. In some ways, the apartheid state even built in corruption into 
its Homeland policies, allowing the Homeland elites to line their pockets to a far 
greater extent than was permitted within the 'white' state (Friedman, 1995; 
Lodge, 1998). The nature of the apartheid state and its policies made corruption 
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more likely. The apartheid state not only facilitated the growth of corruption, but 
it also provided a favourable environment for corruption to flourish. As SkNveyiya 
points out 
the a partheid sy stem was d riven byad esign t hat c reated t he c onditions 
and opportunities for corruption throughout society. Across the board, 
rewards and benefits were distributed on the basis of racial and gender 
discrimination. Because of the lack of accountability, public resources 
were used to buy political favour and entrench a dehumanising regime 
(1999: 13). 
To this extent, the apartheid state functioned largely on the basis of patronage, in 
ways that presented a parallel, albeit distorted one, of the pattern found in most 
African states. The state was used to dispense rewards and favours to the white 
minority and its allies for a whole variety of reasons and in a variety of ways, all 
of which inevitably fostered corruption and even crime. Corruption in South 
Africa is thus structurally and politically rooted in its past (Balia, 1999). The 
analysis that follows elaborates this argument, focusing on key aspects of the 
apartheid state which were essential to the system of patronage and corruption, 
and relevant to the problem of controlling it. 
First, the apartheid state used state patronage to improve the position of 
Afrikaners relative to other whites, through contracts, jobs, loans, bursaries. As 
Friedman notes 
for much of its forty-six year reign beginning in 1948, the National Party - 
with no serious electoral challenge - acted primarily as an ethnic patronage 
network, using public resources for the economic advancement of 
Afrikaner nationalists. In addition to negating central principles of 
democratic government, such as the requirement that public benefits not 
be distributed in a partisan fashion, the NP packed the military and the 
bureaucracy with its supporters, increasingly blurring the divide between 
party and state (1995: 541). 
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Thus, the bureaucracy was intentionally used to promote the interests of 
Afrikaners. In the 1950s, the Native Affairs Department made a determined effort 
to ensure that as many administrative posts as possible were occupied by members 
of t he N ational P arty, w hilst t he p enetration oft he Land B ank a nd a gricultural 
cooperatives by members of the Broederbond in the 1960s meant that political 
factors would dominate in credit distribution (Lodge, 1998: 164). As Posel 
observed "co-operatives played a key role in assuring fanner's survival, by 
providing production loans needed by fan-ners to buy fertiliser, fuel, and seed" 
(Posel, 1991: 244). According to Nhlapo 
Apartheid created a public sector culture which was bound to sustain the 
ethos and practices of corruption in the public sector. The fragmented 
nature of management structures - duplicate departments, bantustans and 
racially based local authorities - was conducive to the squandering of state 
resources and lack of accountability. For example, jobs for whites only in 
the public sector and puppet regimes in the townships and bantustans were 
all based on a corrupt system of ethos. During the negotiation process 
(1990-1994), there was an increase in government spending, most of 
which had nothing to do with service delivery, but involved 'golden 
handshakes' among the top echelons of the public sector, excessive 
retrenchments and severance packages for old-guard bureaucrats, 
protection of jobs, inappropriate promotions and manipulation of pension 
funds (1999: 64). 
In this sense, the apartheid state had * similarities to African nationalist parties 
elsewhere on the African continent in that they too sought to use politics and the 
state to change the position of their supporters. To this extent, the apartheid state 
can be compared with other colonial experiences, especially in Southern Africa, 
an issue to which we will return in chapter seven. 
Second, the apartheid state used patronage and segregation policies to maintain 
Indians and Coloureds in an intennediate position between black and white, a 
form of divide and rule. One important instance of this was the creation of a 
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Tricameral Parliament in 1983. Worden (1994) argues that the aim of the 
Tricameral Constitution was to involve Indians and Coloureds who were 
previously excluded in government by establishing different parliamentary 
assemblies for whites, Indians and Coloureds. The Indian and Coloureds houses 
were allowed tod iscuss m atters w hich w ere of community c oncern o nly while 
key national decisions remained under the control of the White Parliament. The 
Tricameral Parliament "was clearly a means of sharing power without losing 
control" (ibid. 124). As Jung and Shapiro noted 
Pretoria hoped to draw in the 'coloured' and the Indian communities and 
separate them from the rest of the disenfranchised black majority by 
creating separate Parliaments (still subordinate to the white Parliament) in 
which they would be represented (1995: 283). 
However, the majority of the Coloureds, Indians rejected these changes outright, 
demanding instead a non-racial South Africa in which they were represented in 
parliament (Jung and Shapiro, 1995). 
Third, and related to the second factor, the apartheid state through its policy of 
"differential inclusion" (Friedman, 1995: 542-544) used state patronage to create 
a huge multitude of black dependents and beneficiaries who worked for the 
administration, the police, the Bantu Education system and, above all, the 
Homeland system. The aim of "differential inclusion" was to "offer some black 
people a stake in the system" by sharing power through the establishment of 
subordinate political institutions such as Homelands (ibid. 544). The apartheid 
policy of "differential treatment" was in many ways a source of corruption. As 
Friedman observed, these institutions 
offered opportunities for patronage to those willing to assume office. Most 
of the conservative black elites who joined the system used the 
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opportunity primarily to enrich themselves and a small group of followers; 
they failed or did not build a popular power base (ibid. 544). 
More importantly, because most Homelands lacked a commercial or manufacturing 
base, Friedman contends that the outcome of the Homeland system meant that 
the most attractive patronage vehicle was the bureaucracy. This led to the 
creation of public services with almost half a million personnel. These 
services rewarded scores of officials with promotions for which they were 
unqualified and, in some cases, with benefits exceeding those paid to their 
senior equivalents in Pretoria. The route by which many homeland officials 
had acquired their status - and the reality that this was often nearly the sole 
source of salaried work in homelands - also ensured that they viewed the 
bureaucracy as a vehicle for personal advancement rather than as a public 
service (ibid. 545). 
Thus, the nature of the Homeland structures institutionalised some fonns of 
corruption. In the Homelands, "governance, administration and distribution of public 
goods and services was based on patronage" (Business Day, 12 June 2001). 
A number of commissions of inquiry documented some disquieting evidence of 
corruption in the Homelands and in those departments which dealt directly with 
Homeland 'states' (Lodge, 1998; 1999). A few examples are in order. In 
K-vvaNdebele, the Parsons Commission exposed a kickback of Rlmillion for work, 
which was never carried out. In Lebowa, the Tender Board bought cleaning 
chemicals v alued at RI 5m illion, e nough for u se byt he w hole g ovenunent for a 
period of seven years, despite disapproval from three members of its tender board. In 
the Transkei, ministers and their associates bought farms, finns and houses at 
bargain prices. Bribery was also widespread in the Homelands especially in pension 
departments and magistrates courts (Lodge, 1999: . 
61). In 1988, the Heever 
Commission documented many cases of corruption, kickbacks, 'ghosting' and 
absence of accountability (Bauer, 2000). Similarly in 1991, the Pickard Conu-nission 
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which was established to investigate the then Department of Development Aid 
exposed "a culture of corruption and irregularities, tender fraud, favouritism, 
nepotism and a lack of accountability" (ibid. 220). It appears cases of corruption 
especially in the dying years of apartheid were an inevitable outcome of the 
Homeland system. They were part of the core policy of apartheid. For Lodge 
these occurrences in the final years of these administrations may have 
represented behaviour motivated by the realization among officials that 
their powers and privileges were shortly to be curtailed, but there are other 
reports dating from earlier periods which suggest, as in the case of the 
Transkei, that graft was entrenched and routine in the highest echelons of 
homeland administrations through much of their history. ... the Sk'Vveyiya Commission in 1996 uncovered a carnival of misconduct [in 
Bophuthatswana] dating from 1978, beginning with fori-ner Pýesident 
Mangope's issue of irregular tenders, his application of state owned 
houses and farms, and his establishment of private businesses with public 
funds (ibid. 169). 
These cases of corruption demonstrate that the Homeland administrations were in 
many ways a source of corruption. The public service in particular was a source of 
status and wealth. In this sense, politics in the Homelands was based on post- 
colonial pattern of patronage. Since 1994, the Homeland administrations have 
been incorporated into the regional administrations. This may have shifted 
corruption and in turn contaminated the regional administrations with Homelands 
patrimonial politics (Lodge, 1999). Secrecy and a lack of accountability provided 
a fertile ground for irregularities under the apartheid state. Ministers were allowed 
to "preside happily over corrupt, inefficient departments, safe in the knowledge 
that it is the officials who will take the blame when it is exposed" (Bauer, 2000: 
227). Provincial administrations audits for the period 1992-93 revealed fraud 
worth R339,000, and bed linen valued RI million was taken away from Groote 
Schuur hospital in Cape Province, while vouchers worth R64.2 million were 
fraudulently handed out in Transvaal (Lodge, 1998: 171). 
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Fourth, and more importantly, was the nature of unchecked executive power and the 
rise of the security state under P. W. Botha with the adoption of the Total Strategy 
(TS) in the 1980s as the official policy of the apartheid state. This was also in many 
ways a source of corruption and criminal behaviour. This is the case because the 
Total Strategy led to some of the key factors, which promote corruption, 
authoritarianism and lack of transparency. Attempts to repress dissent inside South 
Africa and in the whole of the Southern Africa in turn led to "a rapid escalation of 
corruption in South Africa itself' (Ellis, 1996: 192). Repression involved an 
illegal world in which the use of public money was intrinsic; "money to please, to 
bribe, to silence, to betray and to kill played a vital role in the pursuit of apartheid" 
(Van Maanen, 1999: 140). Ellis (1996) observed that the Department of Information 
was used by the apartheid state to secretly distribute government funds as bribes to 
solicit influence both within and outside South Africa. The Muldergate scandal is a 
case in point. In 1978, the Muldergate scandal led to the downfall of Prime 
Minister Vorster when the activities of the Department of Infon-nation were 
brought to light. It was revealed that the Information Department 
had not only bribed journalists and secretly bought newspapers at home 
and abroad in a bid to secure better public relations, but that senior civil 
servants and politicians in South Africa had abused the Department's lack 
of parliamentary accountability for purposes of personal enrichment - 
corruption (Ellis, 1996: 173). 
By the 1980s, political corruption was prevalent both in the central and Homeland 
administrations. Corruption was firmly established particularly in areas of 
government which were of 'strategic' importance and which spent covert funds. 
The Department of Defence spent R4 billion per year on covert projects in the 
1980s (Lodge, 1999: 59-60). A company established by the Military Intelligence 
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to generate funds for UNITA "became a conduit for ivory and mandrax 
smuggling" whose proceeds "were shared between UNITA and South African 
Defence Force (SADF) commanders" (ibid. 60). All these were possible because 
of an institutionalised lack of transparency and accountability. 
Under the apartheid state, discussions of parliamentary committees were secretive 
or kept from the knowledge of most people (Southall, 1998; Mail & Guardian, 14 
February 2001). Southall notes that "legislation was tabled behind closed doors, 
and MPs were forbidden to talk about what went on" (1998: 453-454). The 
apartheid state revealed as little infon-nation as possible on the operations of the 
state. "No information was publicised regarding corruption within the public 
service or by public representatives" (Mail & Guardian, 12 June 2001). 
Moreover, "there was a particularly low level of accountability where spending of 
public money was concerned" (ibid., 12 June 2001). As the system was shrouded 
with secrecy, it provided incentives for officials to engage in corrupt and criminal 
activities because secrecy curtailed accountability and transparency. Thus, the 
apartheid state facilitated "the creation of secret or covert networks, maintained 
with secret funds, inevitable attracts the attention of professional criminals and 
tempts otherwise honest people to steal, since the funds involved are publicly 
unaccountable" (Ellis, 1996: 11). As Lodge notes 
covert operations inside South Africa undertaken by the military also 
supplied plenty of opportunities for private gain. Between 1985 and 1990, 
RIO million was paid over to five front companies established by the 
Eastern Cape Command. The companies were intended to organize youth 
camps and leadership training as well as other propaganda activities 
directed against the ANC and PAC (1998: 165). 
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The foregoing analysis demonstrates how South African politics, the structure of 
the apartheid state and the way it functioned institutionalised some forms of 
corruption. To this extent, "the strongest roots of corruption in South Africa lie in 
the policy of apartheid" (Mail & Guardian, 10 June 1997). Thus, South Africa in 
1994 "emerged from a period of corruption, encouraged by politicians who used 
subtle, though usually legal means, of self-enrichment" (Khumalo, 1995: 12). 
It is difficult (and still too early) to assess whether the. apartheid state was more 
corrupt than the new democratic state or vice versa. However, since 1994 
corruption s candals h ave b ecome p art oft he p olitical d pbates oft he n ew s tate. 
Corruption has been widespread in government since 1994 and it appears to be 
growing at all levels of government (Bauer, 2000: 227). As Tom Lodge has 
pointed out 
a major source of financial misappropriation i'n the old central 
government, secret defence procurement, no longer exists but corruption is 
stimulated by new official practices and fresh demands imposed upon the 
bureaucracy including discriminatory tendering, political solidarity, and 
the expansion of citizen entitl9ments. Though much contemporary 
corruption is inherited from the past, the simultaneous democratization and 
restructuring of the South African state makes it very vulnerable to new 
forms of abuse in different locations (1998: 157). 
With the introduction of non-racial multiparty democracy in 1994, South Africa is 
undergoing massive social, political and economic transformation. There is a need 
to rationalise the state, from one which was authoritarian and exclusive, to one 
which is democratic, transparent, accountable and inclusive. In trying to redress 
past practices which were conducive to corruption, the new state would seem to 
have created new opportunities for corruption through some of its policies or 
I 
practices such as affinnative action. Affirmative action is defined "as laws, 
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programmes or activities designed to redress past imbalances and to ameliorate 
the conditions of individuals and groups who have been disadvantaged on the 
grounds of race, gender and disability" (Republic of South Africa, 1998 in 
http: //xv%v,. v. polity. org. za/govdocs/white_papers/affinnative. html). The analysis 
that follows identifies factors which create opportunities as well as pressures for 
corruption since 1994. 
One factor which encourages corruption since 1994 is some types of affirmative 
action in the public service which disregard merit values (Good, 1997; Lodge, 
1998). This has given rise to political appointments in the public service. "The 
temptation to swell the bureaucracy through reward-related jobs, and pay for 
loyalty packages is natural, with the victors in the struggle gathering to share the 
bounty" (Khumalo, 1995: 12). Since 1994, partisan or political appointments have 
been made to the main institutions where power is located. These include, 
amongst others the civil service, the security forces, and key organisations such as 
the Reserve Bank, and parastatals (Good, 2000: 50). Van Maanen emphasises the 
same point. Since 1994, he argues, thousands of new civil servants have been 
elected to some positions in government whose main qualities were not often the 
exact skills required for such positions. They were elected in part because the new 
government wanted partners in the public service who would appreciate and 
encourage its new priorities (1999: 149). Moreover, there is a desperate need for 
govermnent to better reflect all people. For instance, the Department of Foreign 
Affairs introduced a twelve months programme to ensure that 80% of South 
Africa's diplomats were black (October 2000 to October 2001). At the beginning 
I 
of 2000, around 60% of South Africa's ambassadors, high commissioners and 
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consuls-general were white, and at the lower level, around 80% of counsellors 
were white. The purpose of this programme was to ensure that South African 
Missions were representative of the general population (Mail & Guardian, 4 
October 2000). 
Although policies of affinnative action are necessary to ensure that the new state 
reflects all, they may give rise to new opportunities of corruption if they are not 
properly implemented. That is to say, such policies might be exploited in certain 
quarters to employ relatives, friends and fellow comrades even if they do not 
possess the necessary expertise or are of dubious character. There is evidence to 
this effect. For instance, the African National Congress (ANC) committee restored 
two Members of the Executive Council's (MEC) in Mpumalanga province in spite 
of them being suspended for corruption by the province's Premier. Likewise a 
discredited lawyer was appointed consul-general to Delhi despite a criminal 
conviction. When asked why the Department of Foreign Affairs was not able to 
identify the criminal conviction of the concerned lawyer while he was working in 
Parliament in 1996, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs observed that "South 
Africa is a sick society. Corruption is endemic. We were busy on so many other 
issues it might not have come to our attention" (Mail & Guardian, 5 February 
1999). Similarly, Lyndall Shope-Mafole, a former Independent Broadcasting 
Authority councillor was granted a senior government job in Geneva "despite 
having been caught with her snout in the public purse, for which she was sacked" 
(ibid., 5 February 1999; in http: //xv%vNv. mg. co. za). 
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These appoiýtments were made despite efforts at and talk of 'clean government' 
indicating that there is a struggle between pressures for patronage and efforts to 
clean government. The then Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, claimed that two key 
principles of the ANC were "honesty and integrity", and suggested that "people who 
are engaged in corrupt practices should not be allowed to stand for election". 
Moreover, former President Nelson Mandela had earlier withdrawn the appointment 
of Allan Boesak as South Africa's ambassador to the United Nations even before he 
was convicted on allegations of fraud (ibid., 5 February 1999). In KNvaZulu/Natal 
Province, a Culture and Education MEC, Eileen KaNkosi Shandu, was dismissed for 
nepotism following the "appointment of her brother to a senior position [deputy 
director-general for education], which would have earned him in excess of R250, 
000 a year, over more qualified candidates" although her brother obtained the lowest 
marks of all those interviewed (ibid., 23 August 2000; in http: //Nvwýv. mg. co. za). 
Moreover, affirmative action and nepotism led to job insecurity [as well as 
uncertainty] on the part of civil servants appointed under the apartheid state and as 
such b clieve t hey a re j ustified tot ake a dvantage oft he sy stem w hilst t hey s till 
have access to state resources (Painter, 1999: 78). In this sense, affirmative action 
provides a fertile climate for corruption to take place. 
Another factor which appears to facilitate corruption in the new state is tendering 
or procurement policies that give preference to small businessmen (Good, 1997). 
This is an area of corruption common to all states. What gives it different force in 
South Africa is a need to empower those previously disadvantaged and redress the 
deep historical socio-economic imbalances inherited by the new state in 1994. 
Because "the vast material and social inequalities in South Affica still largely 
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follow racial lines" (Van Der Berg, 1998: 255), the South African state is under 
pressure to deliver noticeable results within a short period (Van Der Berg, 1998). 
This is the case because the market changes racial inequalities too slowly to meet 
political demands and the public sector is where quick changes can be made. As 
Van Der Berg observed 
improving the legitimacy of the economic dispensation would require 
visible intervention by the state to provide material benefits for blacks. 
Waiting for the market to restructure opportunities is not enough and ... is 
too slow. Thus the budget will be the major instrument of redistribution to 
the newly enfranchised (ibid. 263-4). 
One way of advancing empowerment is through preferential procurement or 
tendering. The government's procurement budget constitutes around R80bn, equal 
to about 13% of GDP or 30% of total govenunent spending (Mail & Guardian, 16 
October 2000: http: //Nv-%vw. mg. co. za). The South African government has 
embarked onr eform to ensure t hat t he p ublic t endcring s ystem isa ccessible to 
small, medium and micro enterprises (SMME's) so as to favour black-owned 
enterprises. In the past, public tendering favoured big companies. Emerging 
companies had diffiqulties in accessing the public tendering system (Republic of 
South Africa, 1997: httpHNv-%v-%v. polity. org. za/govdocs/green_papers/procgp. htm1). 
Thus, in line with its socio-economic objectives as one senior official in the Office 
of the Public Protector noted 
the government has a macro policy of trying to empower people who were 
previously disadvantaged. For empowerment purposes, specific groups 
e. g. women, black contractors are given certain points, competing with 
well established companies and tendering on the basis of low price would 
not help emerging companies. Some tender boards allowed up to 30% 
preference. In South Africa, there is the state tender board and nine 
provincial tender boards. They are independent from each other on matters 
of procurement. There are lots of complaints on tender issues. At the 
moment, tender issues are not transparent. For instance, you do not know 
how you were compared to other tenderers and why you were 
unsuccessful. It is a very closed operation. Tender boards do not 
167 
automatically write to people. People come with lots of complaints 
suggesting bribery. Tendering corruption has always been with us in the 
provinces and parastatals (Interview, 8 May 2000). 
This suggests that affirmative procurement is vulnerable to corruption if it is not 
efficiently implemented. According to Black South Africa Business, government 
procurement has been overshadowed by fronting so far (Mail & Guardian, 16 
October 2000: http. NvNvw. mg. co. za). For instance, a hunting company, Wilmot 
Safaris was awarded a profitable government contract in the Eastern Cape after it 
had employed Nambita Stofile, the wife of Eastem Cape Premier Makhenkesi 
Stofile, as a partner and shareholder. Nambita Stofile became a member of 
Wilmot Safaris two weeks before the company was awarded a 42.5% share in 
hunting rights of state owned game reserves in the Eastern Cape. Wilmot Safaris 
became a black empowerment partnership with Moses Oomoyi and Nambita 
Stofile in December 2000. This was the second case, brought to public view in 
2001, of companies which secured contracts with the regional government in 
which Nambita Stofile was working as a director. Nambita Stofile was also a 
director and shareholder in Masekhane Security, which secured contracts with a 
number of departments (ibid., 23 March 2001). This is a clear case of conflict of 
interest. In Mpurnalanga, it was revealed that the Minister of Housing granted a 
US$42 million contract, Mpumalanga Rural Housing Project, in January 1997, the 
biggest under the government housing subsidy scheme so far, to a company which 
had not been registered and operated by one of the Housing Minister's friend, 
Thandi Ndlovu (Mail & Guardian, 23 May 1997; ibid., 10 June 1997). Although, 
Mpumalanga Housing project was promoted as a black empowerment project, it 
was revealed that big companies stood to benefit from the project. Moreover, 
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questions were being asked in certain quarters regarding the benefits of the project 
to the rural community (ibid., 30 May 1997). 
In yet another black empowerment scandal, the former chain-nan of the Central 
Energy Fund (CEF), Keith Kunene, and Moses Moloele, a director of High Beam 
Trading International were subject to an investigation by the Scorpions "for 
corruption involving a deal which in effect privatised South Aftica's oil 
purchases" (Business Day, 16 February 2001). Moloele was alleged to have paid a 
"bribe of $60,000 to Kunene in exchange for a contract to conduct..... the 
Strategic Fuel Fund's (SFF'S) to sell South Africa's crude oil ... worth about 
RI. 5bn and use the proceeds to buy better quality crude oil". Kunene was 
pressurised tor esign byt he M inister ofM inerals a nd E nergy " after ite merged 
that he had awarded the contract to High Beam Trading International, a joint 
venture between black empowennent company High Beam Investments and 
commodity trader Trafigura, without government approval or calling for tenders" 
(ibid., 16 February 2001). 
It is important to ask who are the winners and losers in the new policies. A report 
issued in 1999, by Wharton Economic Forecasting Associates, an international 
economic consultancy, shows that "a small black economic elite has benefited most 
from the democratisation of South Africa over the past 10 years". The report shows 
that i ncome of the richest 10% of black South A fricans rose by 17%, w hilst t he 
income of the poorest 40% households declined by about 21% (Mail & Guardian, 
28 January 2000). Good underlines the same point. An elite, he notes, made up of 
politicians, civil servants and business people, seems to have acquired considerable 
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material gains. In the period 1991 to 1996, black capitalists secured around 9 per 
cent of market capitalisation on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and, by the 
middle of 1997, a small group of top black executives were eaming an average 
salary package of around RI million per annum, said to be substantially higher than 
their Nvhite counterparts (1997: 554). The substantial gains by the top 10% of the 
blacks in the past ten years seems to have been an outcome of the policies of the new 
state as well as of the way capitalism has developed since 1994. It has to be noted 
that the new democratic state nurtures the idea of forming 'a black capitalist class'. 
President Thabo Mbeki stated that "goverrayient must come to the aid of those 
among black people who might require such aid in order to become entrepreneurs" 
(Business Day, 23 November 1999). 
In spite of this, the pressure for a more rapid empowerment process remains intense. 
For instance, Cyril Ramaphosa, one of the leading figures in the ANC over the last 
t-wenty years and now a leading businessman, insists that empowerment has not been 
successful because "black people remain at the periphery of the economy" (Mail & 
Guardian, 14 September 2000). Black South Affican Business has described the 
policy of affinuative action as "a practical j oke" and called for "a review of the 
government's procurement policies and for more preference to be given to black 
suppliers" (ibid., 16 October 2000). Ramaphosa wamed govemment of "a po§sible 
backlash if black South Africans are unable to enjoy the economic fruits of 
democracy" and encouraged government to put into effect new legislation to bolster 
black empowenuent (ibid., 26 March 2001). In this sense, the state is the 
battleground for the allocation of public resources. Although the conditions for 
social transfon-nation have been laid down following the democratic elections in 
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1994, income distribution remains highly skewed in favour of the whites who 
constitute about 10% of the population. The Human Rights Commission "found 
marked socio-economic inequalities and racism still divide the country" (77te 
Sbivetan, 18 March 1999: http: //xv,, "v. africanews. org). It is therefore likely that 
pressures, and opportunities, for such forrns of corruption will increase rather than 
diminish. 
Linked to the policy of empowerment, it seems the other source of corruption in 
the new state democratic is the emergence of "the culture of entitlement", that is 
the feeling that "we have been kept down for so long, now we are entitled to our 
share. and no one should blame us" (Van Maanen, 1999: 146). Painter underscores 
the same point. Black South Afticans, he notes, have been excluded from top 
positions in the civil service for so long such that "some of them feel justified in 
'taking their turn in riding the gravy train"' (1999: 78). The chainnan of the 
National Empowennent Corporation, Mashudu Ramano noted that "it is inevitable 
that some blacks will become super rich, and there is nothing to be ashamed of. 
Now is the time. If ever there was a chance, we have it now" (Good, 1997: 555). 
In t his s ense, t hose w ho w ere p reviously c xcluded n ow f eel e ntitled to use t he 
state to advance their interests. 
The other factor that makes corruption more likely in South Africa is the 
dominance of the ANC. Since 1994, two multiparty elections have been held, the 
most recent in 1999. Both were won by the ruling ANC which obtained over 60% 
of seats in parliament. Moreover, Members of Parliament (MPs) in South Africa 
are answerable to their parties rather than their constituencies, an outcome of 
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elections' being based on -proportional representation according to a party list 
system. Party loyalty discourages MPs from criticising the government and, because 
they are answerable to the party rather than to a constituency, it is easy for the party 
to control them. In this sense, MPs have no choice but to toe the party line if they 
want to remain as such because they can be easily dropped from the party's electoral 
list. Thus, the ruling elite are "accountable to themselves" (Good, 1997). Southhall 
observed that "not least of the reasons why the new drive for parliamentary 
accountability may be faltering is the determination of the leadership to make the 
parliamentary. party toe the line" (1998: 455). Ws can easily be replaced without 
altering party ratios in parliament. For instance, "at the national level, the Assembly 
saw 70 of its elected Ws - more than 14% - leave Parliament by the end of 1996" 
(South Africa, 1998-99: 32). 
The system not only frustrates capable, effective and independent MPs, but also 
makes it difficult for MPs to call the government to account for its actions. An 
example is the way in which a senior ANC MP, Andrew Feinstein, was silenced 
afler he had demanded an investigation (and for the involvement of South Africa's 
fearless anti-corruption unit, the Heath Special Investigating Unit) into a 
controversial R43 billion arms contract awarded in 1999. The decision to probe the 
arms contract came following allegations of corruption by senior ANC politicians. 
Some members of parliament were alleged to have received bribes to influence 
the R43 billion anns procurement deal (Mail & Guardian, 30 January 2001). There 
were also allegations of conflict on interest and tendering procedures being 
disregarded when awarding the contract (ibid., 9 November 2001). Moreover, there 
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were allegations that businesses with close connections to the ANC gained from the 
anus deal (ibid., 5 October 2001). 
Andrew Feinstein was an outspoken ANC leader on the Parliamentary Public 
Accounts Committee which took a leading role in the arms investigation. He was 
critical of tender procedures and conflicts of interest involved in the arms contract. 
As a result, he was "demoted, silenced and replaced" by the deputy chief whip, 
Geoff Doidge. Moreover, the ANC "moved three of its heavyweight functionaries 
onto the committee, including ANC caucus chairman, Thabang Makwetla" (ibid., 30 
January 2001). Feinstein was axed for failing to protect the interests of the ANC as 
well as for embarrassing the party (ibid., 30 January 2001), indicating that "no 
ANC member has a free vote" (ibid., 14 February 2001). 
Although Feinstein was at first supported by ANC MPs in the Parliamentary Public 
Accounts Committee leading the investigation, they withdrew their backing when 
President T habo M beki "publicly in aligned t he head oft he u nit, Ju dge Willem 
Heath, and said the committee was 'wrong' in assuming there were grounds for an 
investigation" (ibid., 30 January 2001). Both Mbeki and Deputy President Jacob 
Zuma castigated the Parliamentary Accounts Committee for calling for an inquiry 
into the arms deal (ibid., 30 January 2001). The President "froze the [Heath] unit 
out of the investigation and the government subsequently announced that it would 
be disbanded" (ibid., 30 January 2001). Mbeki stated that "it is ... clear that we 
cannot allow the situation to continue where an organ appointed by and 
accountable to the executive refuses to accept the authority of the executive" and 
to " run o ut ofc ontrol". F urther hen oted t hat " this s ituation ofu ngovernability 
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will not be allowed to continue" (ibid., 20 January 2001). The President insisted 
that the investigation would be properly conducted because the Public Protector, 
the Auditor General and the Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic 
Offences (IDSEO) would take part in it (WOZA News, 7 February 2001), with the 
Auditor General co-ordinating. Moreover, the President dismissed allegations of 
corruption in the arms contract as a campaign to damage the reputation of the 
government (Mail & Guai-dian, 31 January 2001). The President's comments not 
only pre-empted the findings of the inquiry but also cast doubt on its autonomy 
(ibid., 31 January 2001). 
Opposition MPs and political commentators alike were critical of the way the 
arms probe was conducted, noting that the ANC was inviting suspicions of a 
cover-up. Responding to these concerns M. Lekota, Minister of Defence, insisted 
that the ANC "inherited a culture of corruption and was on a huge crusade to 
eradicate it" (Business Day, 15 February 2001). Although there is truth in 
Lekota's assertion, the way the ANC handled the matter and the decision to 
exclude the Heath Unit from taking part raised doubts about the ANC's 
commitment to tackle corruption, especially high-level corruption. This incident 
demonstrated that the ANC was able to stifle opposition and silence critical and 
effective debate within its own ranks, thereby unden-nining democratic institutions 
such as the Public Accounts Committee. Moreover, the ANC was able to decide 
which organisations would take part in the probe. From the perspective of its 
critics, the episode showed that watchdog institutions such as parliamentary 
committees, which had been dubbed the "engine room" of the new democracy in 
South Africa, could bark but not bite (Mail & Guardian, 14 February 2001). This 
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underscores the importance of political will in controlling corruption, especially 
high-level corruption. It was believed, by one University of Pretoria academic 
that: 
the ANC is not serious about fighting corruption. It preaches good 
governance on the one hand while on the other hand it is reluctant to 
address corruption, especially when its senior people are involved. We 
always read about senior ANC members involved in corruption in the 
private newspapers but we have not yet seen a single big fish brought to 
book. They have established so many organisations to fight corruption but 
they are all ineffective because they are controlled and not given adequate 
resources. You can establish as many anti-corruption organisations [as you 
like] but if they are not resourced, they will not be able to fight corruption. 
Most of these organisations are some kind of public relation exercise. The 
ANC leadership is soft on corruption. Corruption is widespread in 
government (Interview, 19 May 2000). 
The failure to ensure transparent and autonomous anti-corruption procedures thus 
undennined confidence in the honesty of govemment. 
Although corruption has become a feature of the new state since 1994, certain 
departments such as the Police Service, Department of Justice and the regional 
governments, were more affected than others. Usually, ministries like Works, 
Energy, Transport and Defence are most affected because that is where the big 
contracts are (such as the arms contract discussed above). That corruption was 
significant in the Police Service, Department of Justice and regional 
administrations as well "may reflect historically entrenched habits" (Lodge, 1998: 
178). 
With regard to the Police Service, "the Govemment is faced with a serious 
problem amongst the police as a large ntimber of police officers are corrupt and 
they either actively or passively promote corruption" (Republic of South Africa, 
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2001: http: //,. v, %vNv. heathsiu. co. za/). "In 1995,2,000 police officers defrauded their 
medical aid scheme of R60 million" (Good, 1997: 551), and "in 1997,10,000 
policemen (out of a national force of 140,000) were under investigation for 
charges of bribery, theft, fraud and involvement in crime syndicates" (Lodge, 
1999: 6 2). In 0 ctober 2 000, t hree t op p olicemen inD urban w ere i mplicated in 
vehicle hijacking syndicates. Another top police officer charged with the 
responsibility of investigating organised crime was found in possession of a stolen 
car in Durban (Mail & Guardian, 27 October 2000: http: //Nv-, v-vv. mg. co. za). "In 
January 1997 an automatic teller machine containing R22,000 was stolen from 
the fourth floor of police headquarters in Pretoria ... without anyone noticing" 
(Good, 1997: 551). Corruption in the police force thus affects the police service's 
ability to tackle crime. 
Corruption in the Police Service and Justice Department has serious implications 
on the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. Police officers c ollude with 
officials of the Department of Justice resulting in an enormous increase of the 
cases of corruption "through the -vvholesale theft and deliberate loss of police 
dockets inr etum for b ribes from criminals". T his r esults in" several t housands 
cases each year" failing to reach the courts (Good, 1997: 552. Although the 
government says those involved is a tiny fraction of the police force, they 
nevertheless present a big problem for the country. "Dishonesty in the main 
agencies of law enforcement and administration promoted the prevalence of 
corruption elsewhere" (ibid. 552). Selling of dockets by policemen, prosecutors 
and court interpreters is common in South Africa (Interview, 12 May 2000). 
Several officers have been charged with fraud, theft or misconduct in the 
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Department of Justice. "Hundreds of officials in the department of Justice are 
facing charges of misconduct, corruption or fraud and the backlog of cases keeps 
mounting up" (Pretoria News, 10 May 2000). Amongst those charged is the 
Financial Manager of the department following his investigation by the Public 
Protector on charges of nepotism and corruption for employing a relative to a 
position in his office. By the end of 1999 there were some 480 outstanding cases 
for officials of the Justice Department. (ibid., 10 May 2000). A circular dated 8th 
October, 1999 "describes the level of misconduct and crime in the department as 
'disturbing' and attributes it to a lack of proper supervision and control over 
personnel who deal with money". The same circular documented some 'serious 
cases'. A senior clerk received a 10 year sentence for stealing bail money 
amounting to R1.6million. A public prosecutor was convicted on fraud charges 
for making a false claim amounting to R48,760. In another case a public 
prosecutor and two clerks of the justice department were arrested for stealing 
vouchers valued at R892,940 from Elliotdale Magistrate Office. A senior clerk 
was sentenced for five years for stealing R209,000 (ibid., 10 May 2000). In 1998, 
23 officials were reported to have participated in a scheme that defrauded the 
Department of Justice chequesvalued at more than R30million (Lodge, l 999: 
63). 
Moreover, since 1994, corruption seems to have been concentrated in the regional 
administrations. This is the case in part because the integration of the Homelands 
into regional governments appears to have contaminated regional administrations 
with patronage politics. Some of the regional governments which are badly 
affected are Mpurnalanga Province, Eastern Cape Province, Northern Province 
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and the Free State province (Interview, 29 May 2000). However, Mpumalanga 
regional government seems to be the most affected. In Mpumalanga Province, the 
Madhlopa Commission revealed "another web of corruption" in which "the 
province's powerful Highveld District Council chief executive Charles Makola 
irregularly awarded multi-million Rand tenders to politicians and ftiends" (Mail 
Guardiaii, 15 November 2000). In just one irregular tender, the state lost at least 
RI. 5m. The tender was granted to Matrob CC, a shell company which is owned 
by HDC chairman Robert Matseke. Matseke was one of the five African National 
Congress politicians who were blamed for running shell companies aimed at 
securing goverment construction and water infrastructure tenders (ibid., 15 
November 2000: http: //xv-ývw. mg. co. za). Likewise, the province's MECs expended 
some RI. 3 million meant for low cost housing, to refurbish the state houses they 
stay in (Lodge, 1999: 63). Still in Mpumalanga Province, the former Premier was 
implicated in "R120m investment scam". The g overnment trust investment unit 
was subject to the Auditor General's investigation "following indications that 
officials may have creamed at least R4.8rn off ... in irregular commissions" in 
1997 (ibid., I September 2000). 
Moreover, David Ngobeni Commission of Inquiry into allegations of self- 
enrichment by the Deputy Speaker of Mpumalanga, revealed what the former 
Premier of the Province described as "a devastating picture of the legislature, one 
of dishonesty, of collusion to defraud, of theft, of perjury, of maldaministration 
and corruption" (Business Day, 8 July 1998). The fonner deputy speaker of 
Mpumalanga Province plus three other officials of the provincial legislature faced 
charges of theft, for defrauding the state up to RI million by using "front 
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companies and dummy bank accounts". The four admitted, "receiving R967,602 
as legal payment for services rendered to government by companies they 
secretly owned" (Mail &G itardian, 9 October 2 000). Similarly, c orruption has 
also been exposed in other regional governments. However, we will not be able to 
give an overview of corruption in all the regional governments due to space. 
Parastatal organisations have also been a source of corruption. In Mpurnalanga, 
the Heath Unit investigated Mpurnalanga Parks Board (MPB) chief executive 
officer Alan Gray's conduct in illegally handing out "three promissory notes, 
worth $50 million, in return for a one year R340 million loan to the cash strapped 
parastatal" (The Star, 8 September 1998). For the financial year 1995-1996, 
"Telkom and Post Office lost R201 million due to employee fraud" and a "third of 
the SABC's 1996 losses were attributable to corruption". "An audit conducted at 
Denel, the arms exporter in early 1997, revealed R5.6 million unauthorized 
payments to executives in an unauthorized profit sharing scheme" (Lodge, 
1998: 179). Moreover, other central government departments such as the South 
African Revenue Services (SARS) have also been affected by corruption. A joint 
operation of the SARS and the Scorpions (elite officers), confiscated computers, 
documents and other electronic equipment following a search into offices and 
homes of26c ustoms o fficials s uspected oft aking p art inc orruption and fraud 
which goes into billions. The probe is linked to another investigation by SARS 
and the Office for Serious Economic Offences into Value Added Tax fraud in 
which " bribes in excess ofR4.02 m (in cash) a nd I uxury gifts w ere o ffered to 
directors and staff members". The gifts which dated as far back as 1992 were in 
the forrn of travel tickets, television sets, furniture, celIphones and mountain 
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bicycles (Mail & Guardian, 31 January 2001). In September 2000, the 
Investigating Directorate for Serious Economic Offences (IDSEO) "seized about 
40 million Rand (5.7 million dollars, 6.7 million euros) worth of assets, including 
a jet and helicopter belonging to Zimbabwean billionaire Billy Rautenbach" for 
allegedly defrauding the South African Revenue Services some R60 million of 
customs duties by undervaluing Hyundai cars which were imported from 
Botswana to South Africa by 20 to 30 per cent (Botsivana Daily Neivs, 21 
September 2000). These examples demonstrate that corruption is widespread in 
South Aftica. 
Another factor promoting corruption, one linked to the inability of the police to 
tackle c rime and top olice c orruption, h as b een the g rowth ofo rganised c rime, 
often international in nature. The Chainnan of the Central Drug Authority noted 
that South Africa is the biggest producer of mandrax in the world with its 
"international airports, porous. borders and sophisticated banking and 
infrastructure" making it "a target for international drug syndicates". Illegal drugs 
move freely since apartheid came to an end (Mail & Guardian, 8 February 2001). 
A World Economic Forum study warned that "South Africa by 1997 was in the 
grip of organised crime and ranked globally behind only Colombia and Russia" 
(Good, 1997: 551). Moreover, the collusion of police officers with criminal gangs 
provides a favourable environment for criminals to operate freely, and in turn 
provides difficulties in differentiating between corruption and organised crime. 
This in turn makes it even more difficult to combat corruption elsewhere. 
Government is concerned about organised crime as well as corruption in the 
f 
police force. This is the case because corruption and organised crime are 
180 
interwoven. Addressing a news conference, the Minister of Safety and Security, 
Steve Tswete, said that 
hundreds of organised crime syndicates from around the world have moved 
into South Afiica in the past decade, spreading their tentacles across the 
country and even into the prisons... "We have identified 400 [organised 
crime groups] active in our country. Most of them have their origins outside 
our country. " "We are being targeted by big drugs syndicates from Asia and 
Latin America, " he said, adding that he also had evidence of organised car 
theft on a huge scale". However, in 2000 the "strong coordination between 
the police, intelligence, prison and justice ministries had enabled 200 
syndicate leaders and more than 2 300 members to be arrested". Justice 
Minister Penuell M aduna s aid t he s yndicates c overed a 11 a spects ofc rime 
from drugs to prostitution, car theft and smuggling. He listed Chinese triads, 
East European mafla, Nigerian gangs as well as groups from Portugal, 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe as examples of the various origins of the 
criminals operating in South Africa. Correctional Services Minister Ben 
Skosana said he had evidence that the murder last year of Piet Theron, a 
leading judge investigating a series of bombings and shootings in Cape 
Town, had been organised from jail. .... The minister of Safety and Security noted that the police force is undergoing a major shake-up which 
would result in the merger of several "independent and often overlapping 
investigating agencies into just two - one tackling organised crime and the 
other violent crime". He further noted that corrupt police officers are being 
investigated. Although he says these "rogue elements" constitute a small 
number, he does admit that "The rogue elements are quite a problem. They 
are in collusion with criminal syndicates, " and "prosecution files were 
known to disappear from the justice department, often ruining a case" 
(Mail & Guai-dian, 13 February 2001: http: //Nv,, vNv. mg. co. za/). 
Although corruption in South Africa is historically rooted, this chapter has so far 
demonstrated that, in its attempts to transform the South African state, the new 
state h as c reated n ew p ressures f or c orruption t hrough s orne ofi ts p olicies a nd 
because of its institutional weaknesses. However, the government of South Africa 
perceives corruption as an issue of concern. Addressing a seminar in Midgard, 
Namibia, the South African Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, Kader Asmal 
contended that "corruption is potentially one of the greatest forces for the 
destruction of democracy throughout the world, but particularly in Africa where 
parliamentary democracy is still in a fledging and vulnerable state" (1997: 1). 
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This is the case because as we observed in chapter one, corruption attacks the very 
foundations of democracy. As a result, corruption has become an issue of high 
priority for the new democratic state (Van Maancn, 1999). 
The incidence of corruption in South Africa appears to have influenced the 
development of institutional measures to curb corruption. In 1994, it soon became 
evident that the new state did not have the capacity to combat corruption in 
govenunent. As a response to this, a number of positive institutional measures 
were p ut inp lace "within t wo years oft he t ransition" tof ight c orruption (Van 
Maanen, 1999). Today, South Africa has more anti-corruption institutions than 
ever before (Mail & Guardian, 31 May 1997). Moreover, a number of 
conferences have been held to examine ways of tackling the problem of 
corruption. In April 1999, a National Anti-Corruption Conference was held. This 
was a follow up conference to the Public Sector Anti-corruption Conference 
which w as h eld inN ovember, 1998. In 0 ctober 1999, S outh A frica h osted t he 
ninth International Anti-Corruption Conference. "The Public Service Commission 
has also hosted 6 anti-corruption workshops in the provinces. The intention was to 
hold them in all the provinces" (Interview, II May 2000). The section that 
follows examines s ome of the k ey i nstitutional measures t hat h ave b een p ut in 
place to curb corruption. 
Anti-corruption agencies in South Africa 
South Africa has established a number of agencies to combat corruption. These 
include the Public Protector (PP), Investigating Directorate for Serious Economic 
Offences, (IDSEO), the Special Investigating Unit (SIU), the Police Service, the 
Public Service Commission, the Auditor General, the National Intelligence 
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Agency, the National Crime Prevention Strategy, the National Directorate: Public 
Prosecutions and the Independent Complaints Directorate. It is not only the 
complexity of South Aftica's economy and society but also the magnitude of the 
problem that explains why so many agencies have been created. It is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to examine all the anti-corruption agencies in South Africa. 
The chapter will limit itself to the discussion of three agencies, the Public 
Protector (PP), the Investigating Directorate for Serious Economic Offences 
(IDSEO) and the Heath Special Investigating Unit (SIU), because these were the 
leading anti-corruption institutions in the nineties, each with wide ranging powers 
to combat corruption in South Affica. The chapter discusses the development of 
the three agencies, how they function, and how problems impact on their 
effectiveness. 
The Public Protector 
The Public Protector, which was provided for in the 1993 interim Constitution 
of South Africa, was established in October 1995 following the enactment of 
the Public Protector Act in 1994. The establishment of the Public Protector 
was endorsed by the 1996 final Constitution of South Africa as an institution 
that supports constitutional democracy. 
Before 1994, there existed the Office of the Advocate General established in 
1979 following the 'Muldergate' information scandal. The Advocate 
General's office had limited powers. It dealt with financial and administrative 
matters and misappropriation of public funds and it lacked constitutional 
f, 
status. In 199 1, t he 0 ffice oft he A dvocate G eneral w as c onverted i nto t he 
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Office of the Ombudsman. Unlike the Public Protector, the Ombudsman did 
not enjoy constitutional independence. Moreover, the credibility of the 
Ombudsman was questionable because the apartheid state did not represent 
the majority of the people in South Africa. The Ombudsman ceased to exist 
,. vhcn the Public Protector came into effect in 1995 (Interview, 8 May 2000). 
The functions and powers of the Public Protector 
The Public Protector has a wide mandate and enormous investigating powers. 
According to section 182 of the Constitution of South Africa, the Public Protector 
has the power to investigate any conduct in state matters or public administration 
in any sphere of government, that is alleged or suspected to be improper or to 
result in any impropriety or prejudice, to report on that conduct, and to take 
appropriate remedial action. Additional functions and powers of the Public 
Protector are laid down in section 6 of the Public Protector Act of 1994. Section 6 
(4) of the Public Protector Act empowers the Public Protector to investigate 
possible 
(a) maladministration in connection with the affairs of government at any 
level; 
(b) abuse or unjustifiable exercise of power or unfair, capricious, 
discourteous or other improper conduct or undue delay by a person 
perfon-ning a public function; 
(c) improper or dishonest act, or omission or corruption, with respect to 
public money; 
(d) improper or unlawful enrichment, or receipt of any improper 
advantage, or promise of such enrichment or advantage by a person as a 
result of an act or omission in the public administration or in connection 
with the affairs of g overnment at any level or of a person performing a 
pýblic function; or 
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(c) act or omission by a person in the employ of govermnent at any level, 
or a person performing a public function, which results in unlawful or 
improper prejudice to any other person. 
Section 6 (5) of the Public Protector Act extends the powers and functions of the 
Public Protector to any institution in which the State is the majority or controlling 
shareholder of any public entity. This is a classic Ombudsman institution. Its 
mandate is limited to public officials and public institutions. The Public Protector 
may not investigate court decisions. 
According to section 7 of the Public Protector Act, the Public Protector has wide 
powers of investigation, search and seizure. However, to enter any building or 
premises, the Public Protector has to obtain a warrant from a local magistrate or 
judge. Section 7A (1) says "the Public Protector shall be competent to enter, or 
authorise another person to enter, any building or premises and there to make such 
investigation or inquiry as his or her opinion has a bearing on the investigation". 
Section 7A (5) (a) empowers the Public Protector to use reasonable force to 
overcome any forrn of resistance while entering such a premise or building. 
More importantly, section 5(3) of the Public Protector Act provides immunity for 
members of the Public Protector for anything done in good faith. According to 
section 6(8), members of the Public Protector's office shall not be forced to 
answer questions before a court of law or any body regarding any infannation that 
came to his or her knowledge during an investigation. This will ensure that 
members of the Public Protector's office discharge their duties without fear of 
being pr9secuted. This may also help to instil confidence in members of the 
Public Protector. 
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However, the Public Protector does not have any sanction other than reporting to 
the National Assembly. 'Normally, the Public Protector tries to solve problems or 
disputes by dealing informally with departments concerned rather than going to 
the National Assembly' (Interview, 7 May 2000). Its key weapon is mediation and 
negotiation in settling disputes or rectifying an omission. The Public Protector 
lacks independent powers to prosecute. Instead, if during an investigation the facts 
disclose the commission of an offence, it refers cases to the relevant agencies 
charged with the authority to prosecute. However, the Public Protector is 
answerable to Parliament. He br she is not accountable to the President, as in most 
African countries and thus is not dependent on executive patronage. 
Moreover, any person or organisation may lodge a complaint with the Public 
Protector. This is important because it provides for a direct link with the office of 
the Public Protector. Direct accessibility to the office of the Public Protector by 
any person would ensure maximum use of his or her office. This would also 
ensure that complaints are not limited to certain categories of the population of 
South Africa. According to section 7(l) (b) of the Public Protector Act, the Public 
Protector shall deten-nine the procedure to be followed when conducting an 
investigation depending on the nature of the case. 
The problem posed for the credibility of the Public Protector is its inability to 
initiate prosecutions and the relatively light punishments specified for acts of 
corruption. Section II of the Public Protector Act spells out the penalties, which 
can be levied on anyone, found guilty in line with the Public Protector Act. 
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Section 11 (4) says "any person convicted of an offence in terrns of this Act shall 
be liable to a fine not exceeding R40,000 or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding 12 months or to both such fine and such imprisonment". 
Independence of the Public Protector 
The independence of an anti-corruption agency such as the Public Protector is of 
critical importance to its success, credibility and integrity. In South Affica, section 
181 of the 1996 Constitution guarantees the independence of the Public Protector, 
subject only to the constitution and the law. It further stipulates that no person or 
state organ may interfere with the way the Public Protector functions. Moreover, 
other state organs must assist and protect the impartiality, independence, dignity and 
effectiveness of the Public Protector. According to section 193, the President 
appoints the Public Protector on the recommendation of the National Assembly. The 
National Assembly must recommend persons Nvho have been nominated by a 
committee of the Assembly proportionally composed of members of all parties 
represented in the Assembly and approved by at least 60 per cent of the members of 
the A ssembly. U nder s ection 181 of the C onstitution a nd section 8oft he P ublic 
Protector Act, The Public Protector reports and is accountable to the National 
Assembly. 
The other factor that guarantees the independence of the Public Protector in South 
Affica is that the tenure of office for Public Protector is laid down in the 
Constitution. Under section 183, the Public Protector is appointed for a non- 
renewable period of seven years. In addition to tfiýis, the National Assembly 
detemiinps t he t enus a nd c onditions oft he P ublic P rotector. S ection 2 (2) oft he 
Public Protector Act notes "the remuneration and other terms and conditions of 
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employment of the Public Protector shall from time to time be determined by the 
National Assembly upon the advice of the committee". Moreover, the Public 
Protector may be removed from office only on the ground of misconduct, incapacity 
or incompetence; a finding to that effect by a committee of the National Assembly; 
and the adoption by the Assembly of a resolution calling for that removal which 
must obtain the support of at least t-%vo thirds of the members of the Assembly to 
pass. However, the President may suspend the Public Protector once the proceedings 
of the National Assembly committee for his removal have been initiated. Even so, 
the nature of the Public Protector's tenure and terms of appointment ensure that the 
Public Protector performs his or her functions without fear of being removed from 
office. 
Although the independence of the Public Protector is guaranteed by the Constitution, 
certain factors give the executive a degree of influence in the office and affect public 
confidence. Firstly, as one senior official in the Public Protector's office put it: "the 
appointment of the Public Protector by the president creates the perception that the 
executive controls the Public Protector. That is to say, that the Public Protector is not 
immune from executive patronage" (Interview, 8 May 2000). Secondly, the 
appointment of the Deputy Public Protector by the Minister of Justice seems to 
confirrn tl-ýs suspicion. Section 3(2) of the Public Protector Act 1994 says "the 
minister shall, after consultation with the Public Protector, appoint one or more 
persons as Deputy Public Protector". Moreover, according to section 2(2) of the 
Public Protector Act, the Minister of Justice determines the terms and conditions of 
the Deputy Public Protector after consulting the Public Protector. In the view of 
another senior official in the Public Protector's office, "this arrangement is flaNved. It 
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brings the credibility of the office of the Public Protector into suspicion. The Deputy 
Public Protector perfonns the functions of the Public Protector in his or her absence. 
The Deputy Public Protector needs to be appointed in the same way the Public 
Protector is appointed" (Interview, 8 May 2000). In this sense, he noted that 
the D eputy P ublic Protector isI ikely tobes ubject to the influence oft he 
Minister of Justice. All employees of the Public Protector are seconded from 
the Department of Justice. We only advertise and screen, and the Ministry of 
Justice appoints. This is not a comfortable situation because the people you 
are likely to investigate are the ones who assess you. This will change in 
2001 when we will be managing our own funds and making appointments 
(Interview, 17 May 2000). 
IDSEO 
The Office for Serious Economic Offences (OSEO) was established in 1992, 
following the enactment of the Investigation of Serious Economic Offences Act 
No. 117 of 199 1, top royide f or t he i nvestigation ofs crious e conomic o ffences. 
OSEO was replaced by the Investigating Directorate for Serious Economic 
Offences (IDSEO) under the National Prosecuting Authority Act No. 32 of 1998. 
This Act provides for a single national prosecuting authority under the 
Department of Justice. 
The National Prosecuting Authority has nine provincial directors responsible for 
prosecution in country's nine regions. The National Prosecuting Authority Act 
also provides for the establishment of not more than three Investigating 
Directorates, of which there are presently two: IDSEO and the Investigating 
Directorate for Organised Crime (IDOC). IDOC, based in Johannesburg deals 
with syndicates such as organised crime, political violence and gangsterism. 
IDSEO has three branches - in Durban, Cape Town and Pretoria. All fall under 
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one Investigating Director, based in Pretoria. Although there is a fine line between 
corruption and fraud, combating corruption is not the speciality of IDSEO. An 
Investigating Authority for Corruption (IAC) was still in the planning stages in 
2000 although its director had already been appointed. IDSEO for its part, tackles 
serious economic crimes. A serious economic offence is not defined, but it is 
considered to be an offence that is complex and of a serious nature; for example, 
theft and other large or high profile cases. The Commercial Branch of the South 
African Police Service handles small frauds (Interview, 12 May 2000). 
Functions and powers of IDSEO 
Sections 26 to 31 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 define the 
functions and powers of IDSEO. Under section 27, any person who is of the 
opinion that an economic offence is being or is about to be committed may report 
the matter to I DSEO by way of an affidavit. On the basis of this, I DSEO may 
initiate an inquiry if the Investigating Director believes there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect that a serious economic offence is involved. Inquiries are to be 
conducted in camera. 
IDSEO has wide-ranging powers. In tenns of section 28 of the National 
Prosecuting Authority Act of 1998, it can question any person under oath and 
summon 
any person who is believed to be able to furnish any information on the 
subject of the inquiry or to have in his possession or under his control any 
book, document or other object relating to that subject, to appear before 
the Investigating Director at a time and place specified in the summons, to 
be questioned or to produce that book, document or other object (Republic 
of South Africa, 1998: S. 28). 
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Furthennore, under section 29, IDSEO has extensive powers of entry, search and 
seizure. Moreover, IDSEO has the power to use 'reasonable force' against 
resistance to the entry and search of any premises with or without a warrant. 
From 16 October 1998, IDSEO could also prosecute in terms of section 24 of the 
National Prosecuting Authority Act (prior to 1998, its powers to prosecute were 
limited). However, it continues to make some recommendations to the National 
Prosecuting Authority (Interview, 12 May 2000). 
Independence of IDSEO 
For all this power, the National Prosecuting Authority Act does not make IDSEO an 
independent institution. IDSEO has a flaNved structure. It is a govemment 
department under the Ministry of Justice. The President appoints its Director under 
section 13(l) (b) of the Act, in consultation with the Minister of Justice and the 
National Director of Public Prosecutions. Where the Director is unable to perform 
his or her duties or while appointment of the Director is pending, the Minister of 
Justice on the advice of the National Director of Public Prosecutions can appoint an 
acting Director. This gives rise to the perception that the Director acts subject to the 
control and directions of the executive (Interview, 19 May 2000). 
The appointment of the Director of IDSEO by the executive defeats the intention 
behind t he c reation of IDSEO b ecause H)SEO iss ubject tot he v cry p cople itis 
supposed to investigate. Can IDSEO investigate the Minister of Justice or any of his 
colleagues? It seems highly unlikely under the current arrangement. This again casts 
doubt on the government's commitment to combat corruption and on the capacity of 
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IDSEO to investigate high-level corruption. According to section 33 of the Act, the 
final responsibility over the prosecuting authority lies with the Minister of Justice. 
For an anti-con-uption institution to be effective in fighting corruption at all levels in 
govenunent, it needs to enjoy autonomy from the very people it is supposed to 
investigate. At the very least such an agency needs to be able to report to parliament, 
as, in theory parliament is independent from the executive. Moreover, such an 
agency needs to be well resourced. Although the Director of IDSEO must retire on 
reaching the age of 65, under section 17 the President othenvise detennines the 
tenris and conditions of the Director. 
The Heath Special Investigating Unit (SIU) 
We now turn to another anti-corruption agency in South Africa, the Heath Special 
Investigating Unit (SIU). The Heath Special Investigating Unit has been described as 
the most successful anti-corruption agency in South Affica (Interview, 22 May 
2000). However, we shall see later in the chapter, the Special Investigating Unit is 
also frustrated by government's reluctance to issue proclamations in order for the 
unit to carry out its mandate. 
The Special Investigating Unit, commonly known as the Heath Unit, was 
established in 1996 following the 1995 Heath Commission of Inquiry into 
corruption in the Eastern Cape region, which successfully recovered state assets 
through civil proceedings. The Heath Commission was appointed by former 
Eastern qape Premier Raymond Mhlaba (The Star, 5 October 1998). Its success 
'caught the attention' of fonnerP resident Nelson Mandela (Camerer, 1999). In 
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1996, in consequence, Parliament enacted the Special Investigating Units and 
Special Tribunals Act (No. 74), extending the mandate of the Heath Commission 
to the whole country. The Act provides for the establishment of Special 
Investigating Units to investigate serious malpractices in connection with the 
administration of state institutions, public assets, public money and any conduct 
that 'may seriously harm the interests of the public'. Moreover, the Act provides 
for the creation of Special Tribunals to adjudicate upon civil matters which 
originate from the investigations of the Special Investigating Units (Republic of 
South Africa, 1996). In 1996, fonner President Nelson Mandela appointed Justice 
Willem Heath as head of the Special Investigating Unit. 
Functions and powers of a Special Investigating Unit 
A Special Investigating Unit (SlU) has broad functions. In terms of section 2(2) of 
the Act, the SIU is entrusted "to deal with a whole spectrum of clean 
administration and the protection of the interests of the public with regard to 
public money and property" (The Stai-, 5 October 1998). The unit investigates 
maladministration, fraud, corruption, misappropriation, transfers of state assets 
and money, lack of administrative and financial control, and malpractices 
pertaining to public assets and funds. 
Moreover, a SIU has extensive powers under sections 5 and 6 of the Special 
Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act. These include wide powers of 
entry, search and seizure. The SfU can also attach any money or order the return 
of mone 
Iy 
or property. The Unit "has powers to go a lot further than simply 
investigate and recommend. It has the power to seize, interdict and subpoena" 
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(The Sunday Independent, 31 May 1998). Indeed, some critics feel that the powers 
of the unit are too wide (ibid., 31 May 1998; Camerer, 1999), and "object to what 
they see as an increasing tendency to bypass traditional policing and the courts, 
affecting a process that ought to operate within the legal system" (ibid., 31 May 
1998). 
Unlike most anti-corruption agencies, such as the Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong and the Directorate on Corruption and 
Economic Crime (DCEC) in Botswana which combat corruption from a criminal 
perspective, the SIU combats corruption from a civil perspective and institutes 
civil action in a Special Tribunal. As Camerer notes, the SIU "does not investigate 
crimes, arrest criminals or act through the criminal courts" (1999: 206). In terms 
of section 5(7) of the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act, 
matters which come to the attention of the SIU, and justify the institution of legal 
proceedings are referred to or brought to the attention of the relevant bodies. In 
this sense, the SIU is a distinct organisation of its kind. 
Following an investigation by the SIU, "civil action is instituted before the 
Special Courts" (Camerer, 1999: 206). "The evidence is then presented before the 
Special Tribunal, which makes a ruling on the seizure of assets, bank accounts 
and even overseas funds and also determines just how much of this money has to 
be paid back to the state" (The Sunday Independent, 31 May 1998). "If civil action 
is successful, judgement is obtained from the Special Tribunal and full effect is 
given to the judgement including execution and attachment of assets" (Camerer, 
I 
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1999: 206). A Special Tribunal has jurisdiction on any civil dispute brought 
before it by a Special Investigating Unit. 
Special Tribunals or Courts are a separate organ from the SrU. A Special Tribunal 
is presided over by Judges. These judges are appointed along the same lines as 
those of the High Court; in tenus of section 7of the Special Investigating and 
Special Tribunals Act, a Special Tribunal has a President, who is a judge of the 
Supreme Court. The President appoints the Special Tribunal on the advice of the 
Chief Justice, and can also appoint or remove judges or acting judges, magistrates 
or advocates to serve as additional members of the Tribunal subject to certain 
criteria. 
In terms of section 8(l), a Special Tribunal shall be independent and impartial, 
and perform its functions without any fear or favour. The hearings of Special 
Tribunals are held in public but there is a provision for certain proceedings to be 
held behind closed doors. Besides adjudication of civil disputes, the Tribunal has 
the power to subpoena any person, issue warrants of arrest and to decide if the 
infonnation in question is privileged or not. It can also issue suspension orders 
and i nterdicts. A Ithough, t he S pecial T ribunals are n ot p art oft he S IU and a re 
presided over by judges, they have been described as "kangaroo courts" by some 
critics (Sunday Independent, 31 may 1998). 
Independence of the Special Investigation Unit 
The Act does not make the Special Investigating Unit an independent 
I organisafion. The head of the Unit is appointed by and accountable to the 
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President which creates a perception that the executive controls the Unit. 
Moreover, the SIU functions on the basis of presidential proclamations. Thus, for 
the Unit to investigate, the President has to give it the authority to do so; the Unit 
cannot function if the president does not approve or issue proclamations. 
However, Heath, the fonner head of the SIU argued that 
we are completely independent from govenunent. We are a statutory body, 
independent from government. I am h appy w ith t he a ppointment byt he 
President. After we have received a case or report, we refer a proclamation 
to the Ministry of Justice then to the President to approve. This gives the 
impression that we are being controlled. The problem is that it takes long 
for proclamations to be approved or signed. Otherwise the Special 
Investigating Unit is successful and has never had problems with 
proclamations being signed by the president. Politicians co-operate with us 
(Interview, II May 2000). 
Contrary to this view, anecdotal evidence suggests otherwise. There have been 
indications of "growing friction" between the Unit and government. Former 
President Nelson Mandela's office accused the SIU "of preparing sloppy 
referrals" for investigations which "resulted in litigation or threatened litigation" 
(Business D ay, 13 0 ctober 1998). In 1999, t he Pan A fricanist C ongress (PAC) 
MP, Patricia de Lille, disclosed that 91. investigations initiated by the Heath Unit 
were still awaiting government approval. Some of these investigations were 
pending since 1997 (Mail & Guardian, 26 November 1999). The cases pending in 
1999 included an investigation into the contents of the 1997 Semenya report 
regarding malpractices in the Northern Province Government. The Semenya 
Report, amongst others, 
establishes prima facie evidence of the provincial Department of Public 
Works h aving p aid R 18.6-million for ab uilding w orth o nly R 8-million; 
tlie unauthorised expenditure of R97-million for ag overnment complex; 
the purchase of 19 luxury vehicles for government officials without proper 
196 
authorisation; and a housing scam where officials would occupy 
governinent-owned properties rent-free while receiving housing subsidies. 
... Among those implicated in the scandals are many serving members of 
the Affican National Congress-led provincial government of Premier 
Ngoako Ramathlodi (ibid., 26 November 1999). 
Another case pending in 1999 was a request in September 1998 for the 
government to approve an investigation relating to 
the issuing of a promissory note of R600 million by a Tribal Trust in 
K, %vaZulu-Natal to a company identified as Polok'wane Trust with state 
assets illegally put up as security against which the trust could raise 
money. The proposed investigation has apparently been stalled by the 
failure of the KwaZulu-Natal premier to consent to the investigation and 
recovery of state funds (ibid., 26 November 1999). 
Furthermore, the Mail & Guardian claimed in 2000 that, "the state and the 
taxpayer ... lost at least R390m because government is preventing the Judge 
Willem Heath's Special Investigative Unit from investigating cases of corruption" 
(Mail & Guardian, 24 January 2001). The amount of R390rn was arrived at on the 
basis of 26 cases of potential corruption; the value of a further 33 cases of alleged 
corruption had not been established (ibid., 24 January 2001). These examples 
indicate that the Unit depended on the goodwill of the President to investigate, 
and on Regional Premiers in cases where the matter concerned falls under a 
particular Region. In this sense, Premiers were unlikely to consent to the Unit's 
requests for an investigation if such an investigation was likely to affect their 
positions, and those of their close associates in government. 
The relations between the SIU and government appeared to deteriorate after 
Thabo Mbeki became President. Since the 1999 elections when Thabo Mbeki 
assumed the Presidency, practically no proclamations have been approved 
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"leaving the unit powerless" (ibid., 24 January 200 1). The Ministry of Justice, 
which prepares proclamations before they can be submitted to the President for 
approval, "refused to prepare these proclamations". For the year 1998/99,53 
proclamations were issued whereas in the year 1999/2000, only 15 were issued. 
For the period I April 1999 to 31 March 2000, "the unit has sent 83 motivations 
for investigation to the Justice Department, but not a single one was completed, 
bringing the number of outstanding cases to 127" (ibid., 24 January 2001). This 
was lower than what the unit recovered in the previous year (some RI. 3b). 
Heath's position was undennined fatally after the Constitutional Court ruled that 
"it was inappropriate for a judge to head such a unit" because it blurred the line 
between the executive and the judiciary (ibid., 24 January 200 1). In January 2001, 
President Mbeki excluded the Heath Unit from taking part in an investigation into 
the controversial 1999 R43 billion arms contract. Mbeki "froze the unit out of the 
investigation and the government subsequently announced that it would be 
disbanded" (ibid., 30 January 2001). 
President Mbeki observed that the arms probe would be ably conducted by the 
Public Protector, the Auditor General and IDSEO (WOZA News, 7 February 
2001). The President made this claim despite an admission by the Minister of 
Justice that the Public Protector and the IDSEO "lack[ed] the necessary cohesion 
to produce satisfactory results", and the Public Protector lacked powers "to 
enforce i ts f indings" (Republic ofS outh A frica, 2 001: http: //xv-, výv. polity. org. za). 
For t he P resident, h owever, t he m atter w as o ne of government authority: "it is 
also cleaT that we cannot allow the situation to continue where an organ appointed 
by and accountable to the executive refuses to accept the authority of the 
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executive" and to "run out of control". Further he noted that "this situation, of 
ungovernability will not be allowed to continue" (Mail & Guardian, 20 January 
2001). The President's comments openly reject the idea of SIU independence in 
the conduct of its investigations; it was up to government to decide what 'an organ 
appointed by the executive' could and could not do. The anns investigation 
ultimately exonerated government of any corruption although it noted wrongdoing 
of certain government officials (Republic of South Africa, 2001). Its main 
casualty, however, was the integrity of SIU anti-corruption investigations and, 
ultimately, the Heath Unit itself 
Following the clash over the arms probe, Willem Heath resigned as head of the 
SlU and from the judiciary in June 2001. A number of the Unit's staff also 
resigned. President appointed the Deputy National Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Willie Hofmeyr, as the new head of the Unit which fell under the 
control of the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions (Mail & Guardian, 27 
July 2001). Under Heath, the Unit was regarded as 'the most fearless' (ibid., 23 
December 1998) and 'the most effective' anti-corruption organisation in South 
Africa (ibid., 12 March 200 1). 
Problems faced by anti-corruption agencies in South Africa 
Anti-corruption agencies in South Africa face a number of problems, which 
impact on their effectiveness in combating corruption. According to Camerer 
(1999) a successful and effective anti-corruption agency should have; sufficient 
monetary resources, sufficient experts, special powers, independence, and 
coordination. In addition to these requirements as laid down by Camerer, f 
governmental support is pertinent in the fight against corruption. Without such 
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support it would be difficult to ensure that the above criteria is met for anti- 
corruption agencies to function effectively. It is worth noting that fighting 
corruption takes a lot of resources and commitment. The question that arises is; do 
the various anti-corruption agencies in South Africa meet the above requirements? 
In South Africa, the consensus is that anti-corruption agencies are under- 
resourced in terms of financial and human resources (Heath, 1999, Camerer, 
1999). In 2000, a telephonically administered questionnaire by Markinor in which 
more than 150 experts were interviewed as part of the Institute for Security 
Studies survey on the causes and controls for combating corruption in South 
Africa found that "lack of resources are seen as the main problem with the 
government's fight against corruption, with 73% of experts holding the opinion 
that the government does not have sufficient resources to fight corruption". The 
survey was sponsored by the European Union (Mail &Guardian, 12 March 2001). 
The difficult question to answer is whether anti-corruption institutions are 
deliberately starved of the resources to execute their mandates. 
Insufficient funding seems to be a problem, which affects all the agencies in South 
Africa. Although South Africa today has many anti-corruption agencies than ever 
before, according to the Public Protector Selby Baqwa, most of them are 
"underfunded, and do not work together, duplicating each other's investigations and 
not really making an impact" (Mail & Guardian, 31 May 1997). For instance, in 
1998/99, the Public Protector requested for R22 million but was awarded some R7.5 
million (Sunday Independent, 22 March 1998; ibid., 6 march 1998). For the financial 
year 1997/98, the office of the Public Protector received R5.8 million (Business Day, 
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18 March 1998). In 1998, the Public Protector of South Africa, Advocate Baqwa 
said "I sense the political will is still there to stop corruption. But this has not 
translated into resources" (Mail and Guardian, 6 March 1998). The Public Protector 
had to set aside a planned communications campaign because of shortage of 
financial resources (Business Day, 18 March 1998). Commenting on the budget, an 
official in the Office of the Public Protector said "we are not satisfied with our 
budget but we got an increase in the last two years" (Interview, 8 May 2000). As for 
the Special Investigating Unit, 'it also faces the problem of underfunding' 
(Interview, 11 May 2000). In 1998, its "annual budget was just over R16 
million ... but it wanted R32 million to start an expansion process" (Yhe Star, 5 
October 1998). Similarly, IDSEO was underftinded. A recommendation for the 
creation of an extra 29 posts could not be done because of shortage of ftinds 
(Republic of South Aftica, 1997: 2). This suggests that funding is a big problem for 
these organisations. 
With regard to human resources, "in 1999 the Special Investigating Unit had 95 
members of which 50 of them were doing the actual investigation. The Unit needs 
about 200 investigators for it to do the job better. In 1999, the unit had more than 
220,000 cases. The Unit used a sophisticated computer system which enables it to 
investigate many cases quickly. But others required physical investigation to 
collect evidence. The majority of these cases originated from Gauteng Province 
followed by Kwazulu Natal" (Interview, II May 2000). In 1997, IDSEO then 
OSEO took a decision not to undertake fresh investigations until the backlog 
"involving R 12bn" h ad b een c leared (Business Day, 5M arch 1998), a nd " staff 
become available" (Republic of South Africa, 1997: 6). "Neither OSEO nor the 
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Commercial Crime Unit of the SAPS (South African Police Service) nor the 
Attorney General and Senior Public Prosecutors have sufficient experienced staff 
to deal with commercial cases. OSEO does not have enough staff to investigate all 
cases that it could, let alone conduct prosecutions. The present system, in terms of 
which cases are handed over to the. Attomey-General for decision and 
prosecution, which often results in long delays and duplication of work, will 
therefore have to continue" (ibid. ). Similarly the Public Protector "has a huge 
backlog" and "can only handle half of the 200 complaints it receives each month, 
and s ays itn eeds rn ore money todoi ts j ob p roperly" (Business Day, 5M arch 
1998). In 2000, the Office of the Public Protector had 61 investigators (Interview, 
8 May 2000). Anti-corruption agencies needed to be backed by deeds, resources 
and a clearer mandate to be able to do theirjob better. 
Moreover, in spite of "all ... the positive actions to combat" corruption in South 
Africa, anti-corruption agencies in South Africa "are too fragmented and lack a 
clear focus on who is doing what and how to go about it. The workload in some of 
the units is astronomical and will not be dealt with in the lifetime of the present 
operators" (Du Plooy & Hough, 1999: 27). And in some instances, one case is 
investigated by more than three agencies resulting in duplication and waste of 
resources (The Star, 8 October 1998). 
With regard to the Special Investigation Unit (SIU), it also faced problems of 
significant delay in issuing or approving proclamations (Interview, II May 2000). 
The SIU operated on the basis of proclamations which are prepared by the 
Departm6nt of Justice and sent to the President for approval. Without any 
proclamations, the SIU became powerless. There was therefore a need for the SIU 
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to be able to launch its investigations at its own initiative, without having to seek 
presidential proclamations. Proclamations seemed to defeat the purpose of 
establishing the STU. What concerned the fon-ner head of the SIU was that 
"official proclamations are required from the president, often acting on provincial 
premiers' recommendation, before each investigation can proceed" (Business 
Day, 8 October 1998). This, it was believed compromised the independence of the 
Unit (ibid., 7 October 1998). The proclamation process results in unnecessary 
delays. At times it takes up to six months before a proclamation can be issued 
(ibid., 2 March 1998; The Sunday Independent, 31 May 1998). The appointment 
of its head by the President also gave rise to the perception that the SIU was 
subject to executive control and influence, a feeling confirmed by the intervention 
of the President in the investigation of the controversial R43 billion anns 
procurement deal. On the other hand, the Public Protector lacked independent 
powers to enforce its findings. IDSEO for its part lacked both independence from 
government and the cohesion needed to produce satisfactory results. In the light of 
these problems anti-corruption agencies in South Affica have produced 
disappointing results in terins of investigating high-level corruption. The problems 
faced by these agencies suggest that the purpose of anti-corruption agencies in 
South Africa might possibly have more to do with reassuring investors and aid 
donors in an age of globalisation than about actually attacking high-level 
corruption, an activity that would, after all, undermine the newly emerging 
political elites in South Africa. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has offered a detailed exploration of the politics of controlling 
corruption ino ur c ase st udy ofS outh A frica. Firstly, t he c hapter examined t he 
way that the problem of corruption in South Affica is politically and structurally 
rooted. It locates the roots of corruption in South Africa in the structure and 
polices of the apartheid state. However, attempts by the new state to redress the 
practices of the past have created new pressures for corruption through some of its 
policies and because of some institutional weaknesses. That is to say, the new 
policies which have been in place since 1994 have shifted the location of 
corruption. As a result, corruption scandals have become part of the new politics 
of democracy. Corruption in South Africa appears to be widespread and 
diversified, and involves large sums of money. The form of corruption that is 
exhibited in South Africa is both qualitatively and quantitatively different from 
that found in Botswana and Namibia, an issue to which we will return to in 
chapter seven. 
Secondly, the chapter has offered a discussion on the institutional mechanisms 
that have been put in place to combat corruption in response to the growing 
problem. The chapter examined the reasons for establishing anti-corruption 
agencies as well as the nature of institutional mechanisms that have been 
introduced. It has also discussed the problems that attend anti-corruption agencies 
in South Africa, which are lack of resources, independence from executive control 
and statutory autonomy. Where statutory independence exists, as is the case with 
the Public Protector in South Africa, independent powers to enforce their findings 
I are lacking. There is paucity of support for anti-corruption organisations because 
204 
anti-corruption activities clearly threaten not only the positions of politicians but 
also the stability of the political system itself. In the next chapter we discuss the 
nature of corruption in independent Namibia and the efforts to combat corruption 
in Namibia, in particular, through the Office of the Ombudsman. 
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Chapter six: Corruption and its control in Namibia 
This chapter discusses the nature of corruption and efforts to combat it in 
independent Namibia. In particular, it examines the role of the Office of the 
Ombudsman and recent efforts to establish a specialised anti-corruption agency in 
Namibia. Since its independence in 1990 Namibia has functioned as a dominant 
party system with some observable levels of pluralism. Since the independence 
elections in 1989, three multiparty elections have been held. All (1989,1994, and 
1999) were won by the ruling South West Affica Peoples Organization (SWAPO). 
The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index ranks Namibia as the 
least corrupt country in Africa after Botswana. However, cases of corruption in 
recent years have created a need for an effective anti-corruption strategy. Before 
examining the institutional mechanisms set up to fight corruption, the chapter 
explores the political economy of corruption in Namibia. 
Corruption and the state in Namibia 
Corruption is not yet a major political problem in Namibia. This is the case 
despite its history of colonial occupation, apartheid and social division. At 
independence, Namibia "inherited a formidable legacy of internal conflicts and 
contradictions, arising out of the colonial and apartheid history of subordination, 
disempowerment, land dispossession and discrimination" (Sidaway et al, 1993: 
27). Thus, like many African countries, Namibia "inherited" a highly centralized 
administration complicated by the establishment of Homelands administrations 
within Namibia by South Africa (Forrest, 1998: 9). 
1 
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Like South Affica, Namibia was one of the few 'settler oligarchies' that existed in 
Africa (Bratton Van de Walle, 1997; Bauer, 2001). As noted with the case of 
South Africa in chapter five, 'settler oligarchies' differ from most African states 
in the sense that they do not possess the key institutions of Africa's 
neopatrimonial states (Bratton Van de Walle, 1997; Bauer, 2001). In settler 
oligarchies, "the dominant racial group used the instruments of the law to deny 
political rights to ethnic majorities" (ibid. 81). The same apartheid laws that were 
enforced in South Africa also obtained in colonial Namibia (Cliffe et al, 1999). It 
is this colonial legacy which in part gives Namibia a "distinctive character" (ibid. 
57). Compared to South Africa, Namibia has a tiny settler population. 
Namibia was mandated to South Africa by the League of Nations at Versailles in 
1919 and it then existed essentially as a South African colony for seventy years 
until independence in 1990. South Africa administered the mandate in the 
interests of a small settler population and negleCted the indigenous population, 
most of which was confined to the margins of the country outside the Police Zone. 
There was criticism of this policy because it ignored the duties to the local 
population specified in the mandate. In 1945 and 1946, the South African 
government under Jan Christian Smuts applied to. the United Nations (UN) to 
incorporate South West Africa into South Africa but this was refused (Innes, 
1981; Enquist, 1990). Nevertheless, South Africa continued to control the territory 
and disputed the rights of the UN to have any say in the matter, the issue twice 
(1966 and 1971) becoming the subject of litigation in the International Court of 
Justice in The Hague. In 1966, Namibia was declared the responsibility of the UN, 
which South Africa decided to ignore and violate. This was the case until 1988 
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when South Africa agreed to Namibia's independence (Sidaway et al, 1993; Cliffe 
et al, 1999). 
In 1948, the Nationalist party which came to power in South Africa under D. F. 
Malan effectively incorporated Namibia into South Africa in a number of ways. 
First, settlers in Namibia elected MPs to the South African parliament. Enquist 
observed that "ten white members from South West Africa were seated in the 
Union House of Assembly and Senate and South West Africa was declared to be 
no longer subject to the provisions of the League of Nations' mandate" (1990: 
65). The settler oligarchy was, to a large extent, an appendage to another settler 
oligarchy, that of the colonial power - which practised segregation (and later 
apartheid in the 1960s) in its own territory. Namibia thus has elements of 
comparison with South Africa. 
Second, in 1963 after the Odendaal Commission, South Africa set up a series of 
Homelands in the territory and applied the principles of apartheid to its 
administration. As Forrest notes 
the apartheid system in both Namibia and South Africa involved the 
creation of ethnically segregated homelands -a regional policy which was 
meant to entrench the relative isolation of the black African majority (and 
so called 'coloureds') from the privileged white minority. The goal of the 
system was to assure the political impotence of the non-white majority 
while maintaining a steady supply of poorly paid wage labourers for these 
countries' mining, industrial and commercial agriculture sectors (1998: 3). 
These Homelands administrations were not only used as a source of patronage but 
they were also built on patronage and were therefore susceptible to corruption. 
Thus, the Homeland sYstem allowed the use of patronage to local chiefs and 
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collaborators in much the way in which it did in South Africa but on a more 
meagre scale. Cliffe et al argued that "separate administrations were established 
for the different ethnic groups (including whites) and, political leaders were 
groomed and enabled to set up local patronage networks" (1999: 58). Thus, the 
Homelands administrations which "functioned as corrupt, puppet mini- 
governments" were directly controlled by South Africa (Forrest, 1998: 9). Those 
who collaborated with South Africa were generously rewarded. For instance, 
blacks who were willing to collaborate and served as ministers in Homelands 
adiministrations were "provided with a significant personal largesse, courtesy of 
the central government - typically, a modem house, a car and a fann or grazing 
rights" (ibid. 37). Tapscott observed that the "collaborative elite" which was made 
of civil servants, politicians and professionals "earned salaries which were 
sometimes on par with those of their white counterparts" (1995: 157). However, 
these Homelands ministers were not provided with funds for development projects 
in their Homelands. Instead, "all the ten non-white ethnic administrations were all 
characterized by a similarly corrupt, make-believe govemment" (Forrest, 1998: 
37). Tapscott argued that the creation of "second-tier" administrations in the 
1960s provided 
opportunities for high salaries and benefits for those wishing to 
collaborate. [And] the considerable autonomy exercised by the ethnic 
governments and a general lack of accountability also presented 
opportunities for some individuals to enrich themselves through 
corruption. Evidence from the Van Eeden and Thirion commissions of 
enquiry, for example, provided evidence of widespread misappropriation 
of public funds among second-tier governments. It is evident that 
corruption and inefficiency, while not endorsed, were nevertheless 
tolerated as necessary for retaining the support of the leadership of the 
second-tier authorities (1995: 157). 
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Moreover, these ethnic administrations or governments were not necessarily 
representative. A few elections were held and these were skilfully managed by 
South Affica to ensure that positions in ethnic administrations were only occupied 
by chiefs who were recommended by the South African government (Forrest, 
1998: 37). African chiefs in the reserves were also bribed or forced to recruit 
young men in large numbers to provide temporary labour for the mines or fanns 
located in the Police Zone (Forrest, 1994: 89). This patronage has some elements 
in common with post-colonial forms of patronage. 
Another beneficiary of South African patronage which was generously rewarded 
for collaborating with South Africa was the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) 
which was formed in 1977 following a decision by South Africa to hold elections 
and establish a multiparty government in Namibia but without losing control over 
it (Forrest, 1998). These elections were won by the DTA but this was boycotted 
by the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and other parties 
which did not wish to collaborate (Cliffe ct al, 1994). The DTA, which survived 
on official South Aftican patronage, enjoyed the support and backing of the South 
African apartheid state (The Nandbian, 4 November 1998). For instance, in the 
1978 constituent assembly elections, the DTA "spent more than U. S. $5 million 
from sources it refused to disclose, although there were suggestions of West 
German as well as South African finance" (Cliffe, 1994: 38). However, it later 
came out that the DTA was funded by the former South African Ministry of 
Infon-nation (ibid. 38). The DTA also "received official backing ... to buy the 
two leading Windhoek newspapers, The [Vindhoek Advertiser and Die Allgelneille 
Zeitzing" (Green and KiIjunen, 1981: 10). Likewise, in the 1989 independence 
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elections, the South African government covertly financed the DTA's 1989 
electoral campaign and, used part of the NS185.5 million which was put aside to 
underwrite secret "disinformation campaigns". The secret funds were used both to 
enhance the electoral chances of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) and to 
undermine those of SWAPO (The Naiidbian, 4 November 1998). It is against this 
context that Namibia can be explained. 
Like South Affica, democratic Namibia is a new state and the political processes 
which give rise to patronage and clientelism are still in their infancy. However, there 
are signs that clientelism has developed in Namibia since 1990 but this has not 
degenerated into spoils politics. Since independence, there is a desperate need to 
transforin and rationalise the new state to ensure that it reflects all. In trying to 
redress past imbalances, new policies such as affirmative action have given rise to 
political appointments. Affirmative action is a deliberate policy designed to remedy 
past imbalances and improve the conditions of those disadvantaged by the previous 
regime. Thus, since independence, political appointments were made to key 
institutions where power is concentrated. For instance, in December 1989, SWAPO 
appointed permanent secretaries for the new sixteen ministries (Cliffe et al, 1994). 
Politically, there was a need to restructure the civil service because almost none of 
the senior positions in the Namibian Government Service had been held by black 
Narnibians. The changes were "set in motion by the civil service restructuring team" 
which tried to appoint a lot of blacks to senior positions (Cliffie et al, 1994: 216). As 
a result of these appointments, the size of Namibia's public service has almost 
doubled. Namibia's civil service "has increased from 46,600 employees at 
independence to about 80,000 at present, mainly for political reasons. Government 
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has been absorbing large numbers of former I iberation war fighters into the civil 
service, primarily into defence and security forces" (Ae Nandbian, 2 October 2000). 
Recently, SWAPO's Secretary General said "strategic positions in the public sector 
and at state-run parastatals will be given to rank-and-file SWAPO loyalists" (ibid., 4 
December 2000). These appointments were made in part because there is a need for 
the new state to have its allies who would appreciate and encourage its new priorities 
and the public sector is where quick changes can be easily made. 
Although affirmative action is necessary to ensure that the new state reflects all, it 
may give rise to new opportunities of corruption. According to the Modernisation 
school of thought, countries or political systems in transition are characterised by 
rampant corruption and recurrent instances of violence (Huntington, 1968). 
However, this has not been the case in Namibia. Cases of corruption are "fairly 
isolated" (Geingob, 1997: 5). At independence, civil servants employed by the 
colonial government were guaranteed job security (Tapscott, 1993). Although, 
there was a sense of insecurity amongst these in the first months of 1990, they did 
not resign in large numbers a few weeks before independence (Cliffe et al, 1994). 
Moreover, the government of Namibia has treaded carefully "on issues of 
affirmative action, minimum wages and the question of land redistribution" 
(Tapscott, 1993: 33). This is in part because SWAPO controls political power but 
it does not control the economy. 
Nevertheless, affinuative appointments have recently given rise to charges or 
accusations of nepotism, favouritism and discrimination. A United Democratic 
Front (UDF) Member of Parliament (MP) "accused the Ministry of Fisheries and 
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Marine Resources of nepotism and discrimination in the allocation of fishing 
quotas" during the debate of the Marine Resources Bill (The Namibian, 4 October 
2000). The LJDF MP said "everybody knows that so far only a selected few who 
are hand-picked on the basis of a strong party affiliation" benefited from quotas 
(ibid., 4 October 2000). The appointment of Namibian Ambassadors which is the 
sole prerogative of the President has also been criticised from certain quarters 
amongst others by the Public Service Union of Namibia and opposition parties. 
The Public Service Union said that "the fact that out of 18 missions abroad only 
two (Botswana and Brussels) were headed by Namibians from different ethnic 
groups was disturbing" (ibid., 4 December 1998). Similarly, "the DCN MP spoke 
of tribalism and sexism in the appointment of top diplomats. He pointed out that 
of the 20 Namibian mission chiefs only two were women and 18 were 
Oshiwambo speakers" (ibid., II March 1999). Oshiwambo is a language spoken 
by the Ovambo, the biggest ethnic group in Namibia. For the sake of national 
reconciliation, the Namibian Public Service needs to reflect the ethnic 
composition or diversity of Namibia. 
Yet although the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index gave 
Namibia a relatively favourable rating, corruption is perceived as a problem. In a 
survey conducted by the National Democratic Institute of Namibia in 1998, in 
which 269 respondents participated, corruption was ranked "as the fifth most 
important issue facing the Namibian nation" (Ae Nanzibian, 8 October 1998). 
Other issues identified by the survey, as areas of major concern were land 
redistribution, education, unemployment and health care. 45% of the respondents 
I felt that corruption was prevalent in government departments, with 20% 
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suggesting that corruption was common in the police service and courts of law. 
Moreover, "more than 30 per cent of the respondents said members of the Police 
are most likely to take a bribe (cash, gifts or favours) followed by civil servants 
(25 p er c ent), and G overnment M inistries (over 10 p er c ent)" (ibid., 80 ctober 
1998). Furthermore, "almost 50 per cent of the respondents indicated that 
Namibia's economic growth is being severely affected by corruption, while 
unemployment is regarded as the second most affected at 10 per cent". The 
respondents were taking part in 10 regional corruption consultative workshops, 
organised country%vide. The workshops were part of an anti-corruption drive 
initiated by the Office of the Prime Minister and, meant to cultivate ethical 
practices in government and private sector (ibid., 8 October 1998). Yet, despite 
these activities, there is a public perception which believes that corruption is 
prevalent in Namibia and, it is widely believed that many government ministers 
are involved in corruption (Interviews, 22,24,26,28 February 2000). In fact, 
corruption has not reached a stage where public officials extort bribes, "whereby a 
traffic officer can stop you and say, you did not indicate; you give me NSIO or I 
give you a ticket" (Interview, 24 February 2000). One senior civil servant in the 
Ministry of Water Affairs suggested that "the only way to solve the problem is by 
changing the party in power. This can be done through elections but the Namibian 
people do not express their dissatisfaction during elections" (Interview, 26 
February 2000). 
The nature of corruption in Namibia 
For all that has been said thus far, Namibia has its own share of corruption. Below 
f 
we discuss some of the cases of corruption which have been exposed in Namibia. 
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In 1992, several Presidential Commissions of Inquiry were established to investigate 
corruption, abuse and misuse of government property and misappropriation of 
government funds (Republic of Namibia, 1993). These include the Frank 
Commission of Inquiry into the Abuse and Misappropriation of State Property, the 
O'Linn Commission of Inquiry into the Fishing Rights and the Levy Commission 
of Inquiry into Education in the Caprivi. Their findings have been kept away from 
public view (National Society for Human Rights of Namibia, 1995: 9). The Frank 
Commission revealed few cases of large scale fraud but widespread instances of 
petty corruption in various ministries such as misuse of travelling allowances. In all 
the cases, those found guilty were discharged, tried or investigated further (Forrest, 
1994: 93). Nevertheless, attempts to publish the findings of these commissions have 
been dealt with accordingly. Two editors were charged on 22 June 1992 and later 
prosecuted for publishing secret documents of government against a presidential 
proclamation, which outlawed the publication of the findings of two such 
commissions (National Society for Human Rights of Namibia, 1995: 9) 
In addition to these commissions of inquiry, a number of cases have been either 
brought before the courts or reported in the private newspapers. One such case 
involved the Katutura Single Quarters upgrading project by the National Housing 
Enterprise (NHE) - the Ministry of Regional and Local Govemment and Housing 
- from 1993 to 1996 which has come to be regarded as Namibia's "largest 
corruption trial" since independence (The Namibian, 5 May 1999). In this case, a 
Chief Executive Officer of the NHE received a three-year jail sentence for bribery 
but acquitted on charges of fraud (ibid., 5 May 1999). Moreover, a former 
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Director of the Ministry of Housing, a Managing Consultant, Nouiseb and his 
former employee, a building contractor Bampton and his fon-ner employee were 
convicted on fraud charges for causing the NIHE "to pay out NS12,123 million on 
the project from February 1993 to March 1996" through misrepresentation (ibid., 
3 May 1999). This was done "while they knew that all the work that was paid for 
had not been done, all the material paid for had not been used in the project and, 
the quantity surveyor's certificates on which the Housing Ministry's payments to 
contractors were based were not correct" (ibid., 3 May 1999). Delivering the 
judgement, the court noted that the whole project "was riddled with 'complete 
negligence' by all the participants" including the fonuer Minister of Housing, 
Amathlia and her permanent secretary. The permanent secretary of the Ministry of 
Housing "had clearly committed pedury when he testified" (ibid., 3 May 1999). 
Moreover, "an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman uncovered the alleged 
irregular use of benefits by some NHE managers" (ibid., 13 July 1998). 
Another case involved "a wedding gift" for the Minister of Fisheries and Marine 
Resources, Abraham Iyambo. In 1999, Iyambo received "a wedding gift" of 
NS140,000 from fishing companies to underwrite his wedding (ibid., 2 July 
1999). This landed him in an embarrassing position. The minister's wedding gift 
which was supposed to be "anonymous" (ibid., 3 June 1999), was "from 
businesses w hich d epend onh is j udgement for their I ivelihood" (ibid., 22 Ju ne 
1999). "Donations were solicited from at least 67 fishing companies to financially 
underwrite" the wedding Iyarnbo (ibid., 2 June 1999). One of the functions of the 
Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources "include allocating fishing quotas and 
f 
even fishing rights worth tens of millions of dollars to fishing companies" (ibid., 2 
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June 1999). Iyarnbo's wedding donations came "at a time when existing fishing 
quotas which have run for seven years" were "due to come up for review" (ibid., 2 
June 1999). This was a clear case of conflict of interest and corruption. However, 
Iyarnbo failed to accept this and, maintained that he did nothing wrong. Instead, he 
described his critics as "racists who cannot afford to accept that a young black man 
can have what they call a glittering wedding" and used "their power of the media to 
misinforin. the public under the so-called moral ethics and euro-centric outlook" 
(ibid., 22 June 1999). Further, he said that "they are jealous of a young black man 
who despite colonial suppression and being forced into exile at a "tender age" 
studied hard to achieve academic excellence" (ibid., 22 June 1999). lyambo did not 
resign despite the calls and criticism from various quarters for him to do so. 
At t he h eight oft he w edding s candal, s ome o bservers d oubted if "Govemment 
will take any action even if impropriety is proven" because "in the past 
wrongdoers have either been promoted or shifted sideways without being 
punished". In some cases "the culprits were publicly defended by their superiors" 
(ibid., II June 1999). Apparently, the President Sam Nujoma defended the 
Iyambo saying "he has done nothing wrong" (Inter-view, 03 March 2000). 
Defending Iyambo, President Nujoma said "I am of the opinion that the fishing 
companies made donations to the wedding of Dr Iyambo on their own free will. 
Therefore, I want to make it categorically clear that Dr Iyambo remains innocent" 
(The Nandbian, 30 June 1999). Moreover, President Nujorna said "Iyarnbo had 
not created a conflict of interest by accepting the funds despite the fact that the 
Fisheries Minister decides which companies should receive fishing quotas and 
f, 
rights" (ibid., 2 July 1999). Both the President and Iyambo saw nothing wrong in 
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accepting the wedding "gifl" from fishing companies which depend on the 
Minister's decision for their businesses. 
However, an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman found that the 
minister's decision to receive the wedding gift from the fishing companies 
contravened section 42 of the Namibian Constitution. The Ombudsman stated that 
"by having accepted such donations, whether he knew about them or not, 
[Minister Iyambo] created a situation contemplated in -article 42(l) of the 
Namibian Constitution to the extent that he exposed himself to a situation which 
carried with it the risk of a conflict developing between his interests as minister 
and his private interests" (ibid., 21 September 1999). Section 42 of the Namibian 
Constitution clearly stipulates that 
during their tenure of office as members of the Cabinet, Ministers may not 
take up any other paid employment, engage in activities inconsistent with 
their positions as ministers, or expose themselves to any situation which 
carries with it the risk of a conflict developing between their interests as 
Ministers and their private interests. No members of the Cabinet shall use 
their p ositions.... directly ori ndirectly toe nrich t hemselves (Republic of 
Namibia, 1990: 28). 
In another case of misconduct which led to the sacking of the former Minister of 
Agriculture, Anton Von Wictersheim, President Nujorna overruled the Public 
Service Commission (PSC) which had found a senior official in the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Otto Hubschle guilty of misconduct. Von Wietersheirn was sacked 
"after pushing for disciplinary action against Hubschle in 1993" (77ie Namibian, 27 
I 
October 1998). Hubschle had "ignored appropriate regulations by not obtaining a 
permit to produce and sell a lung sickness vaccine which was sold through the 
private sector for distribution by the United Nations Children's Education Fund 
(UNICEF) in Angola without approval from the treasury and his superiors" (ibid., 
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II June 1999). He had ignored the instructions from the Director of Veterinary 
Services to test the vaccine. Hubschle also "used state facilities and resources to 
produce hyperimmune parvo serum for dogs and then provided it to a private 
practitioner" (ibid., II June 1999). The PSC had recommended that Hubschle 
either be transferred or assigned another duty in the Ministry. Instead, Nujoma 
found "the recommended penalty too heavy" (ibid., II June 1999). Otto Hubschle 
was a close friend of President Nujoma (ibid., II June 1999). 
Moreover, in June 1995, a Minister, Deputy Minister and a senior civil servant 
were embroiled in a borehole scandal. The National Assembly session which was 
about to discuss the borehole scandal report was adjourned swifily (National 
Society for Human Rights, 1995: 10). Similarly, two Ministers were alleged to be 
involved in a drought relief scam. Cabinet dismissed the findings of an ad hoc 
Cabinet Committee into the drought relief scam. The two ministers were 
"exonerated" by Cabinet although they had embezzled around US$56,000 of 
drought relief funds (ibid. 13). In 1994, an investigation by the Ombudsman found 
a senior ranking official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs guilty of irregularities 
involving the acquisition of Mercedes limousines worth US$3.8 million for 
Namibian missions abroad. The Ombudsman found out that the official who was 
responsible for the acquisition of Mercedes limousines "had received a kickback 
of some USS4,400" (ibid. 12). 
The Auditor General's reports also reveal several cases of fraud, unauthorized 
expenditure and financial mismanagement. For instance, the Auditor General's 
I 
report for the year ending 31 March 1998 noted fraud totalling NS486,785.21 in the 
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Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, which was being investigated. The 
same Ministry also "failed to keep proper accounting records". The report was also 
critical of unauthorized expenditure, noting that "exceeding approved budget limits 
represents disregard of the National Assembly's powers to control and authorize the 
use of tax payer's money for approved activities and up to specified limits" 
(Republic of Namibia, 1999: 3). Similarly, the Auditor General's report published on 
July 1994 criticised "the Nujorna govenu-nent for widespread financial 
mismanagement and accusing three ministries of criminal fraud" (Banks, 1999: 
682). Likewise, the Auditor General referred another case to the Commercial Crime 
Investigating Unit of the Namibian Police in wl-&h the City Council "was defrauded 
of N$512,650 by a security employee" (Ae Nandbian, 26 September 2000). 
Similarly, for the financial year ended March 1999, overspending by seven 
ministries resulted in an unauthorised expenditure of almost N$160 million. In the 
office of the President, the Auditor General "found that N$253,593 was paid to a 
firm without obtaining the necessary Tender Board for approval" (ibid., 28 
September 2001). 
Fraud a ppears tobct he most p revalent form ofc orruption e xhibited inN arnibia. 
Around 90 people were arrested in connection with a medical fraud in which more 
than US$270,000 was stolen. About half of those arrested were employees of the 
Department of Medical Aid in the Ministry of Finance. The leader behind the 
medical aid fraud received a five-yearjail sentence (ibid., 4 August 1998). In what 
was believed to be "a tip of the iceberg", a fraud cheque scam amounting to 
"N$332,613 in false salary and leave gratuity claims" was uncovered in the 
Ministry of Environment and Tourism (ibid., 21 December 2000). In another case, 
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a court clerk received a one-year jail tenn "for accepting a N$40 bribe in return for 
destroying a court control document" (ibid., 18 May 1998). In yet another case 
"concerning the provision of laundry services to the Ministry of Health and Social 
Services", a Laundry Superintendent in the Ministry of Health together with the 
Managing Director of Lida Cleaning Services faced charges of "fraud totalling over 
N$2.4 million". Lida Cleaning Services "was contracted to wash sheets and blankets 
for the Ministry of Health and Services and the alleged fraud was committed by 
allegedly inflating the number of sheets and blankets paid for by the Ministry" (ibid., 
3 February 1999). The Laundry Superintendent pleaded guilty to all charges of fraud 
and bribery and ftirther "admitted that he received 'various amounts of money' from 
Lida Cleaning Services as consideration for forging laundry lists, issuing 
vouchers and invoices which indicated the nurnber of sheets and blankets washed to 
the Ministry" (ibid., 3 February 1999). Similarly, a principal accountant in the 
Ministry of Works and Transport was "charged with fraud amounting to N$3.2 
million" (ibid., 26 April 1999). A former police detective claims he was pushed to 
resign from the Namibian Police Service after he had uncovered corrupt practices by 
senior p olice o fficers. T he former d etective c laimed t hat an umber ofc ases h ave 
been "covered up" among others "the diamond case7' in which police detectives were 
ordered by a senior police officer to return N$500,000 to a diamond dealer, "the sale 
of Government car parts worth more than N$450,000 by a police mechanic at 
Tsumeb, the misappropriation of Police Tea Club money to the tune of N$400,000 
by a Regional Commander who used some of the money to buy cattle and, the 
selling of driving licences involving a Commissioner" (ibid., 15 May 2000). 
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Insurance companies, banks and parastatals were also affected by fraud. It was 
estimated that "Namibia's insurance industry loses about N$5.7 million a year 
through fraudulent claims by unscrupulous clients who collaborate with dishonest 
insurance agents" (ibid., 24 July 2000). For instance, in 1999 the insurance industry 
uncovered 23 cases of dubious fraud claims which amounted to NS150,000 
combined. By 24 July 2000,17 cases of fraud that amounted to N$990,000 had been 
uncovered. It was reported that "in a separate case a Windhoek couple were charged 
with insurance fraud after they claimed over MI million from three insurance 
companies basing their claim on an anned robbery allegedly faked by the couple" 
(ibid., 24 July 2000). A resident of Windhoek defrauded Old Mutual Insurance 
Company some NS30,000 by "faking the deaths of three of his children to collect 
funeral insurance pay-outs" (ibid., 5 September 2000). Similarly, four people 
appeared in court on 13 March 2001 for defrauding the First National Bank, N$3.3 
million between 1994 and 1999 to finance "their gambling habits" (ibid., 14 March 
2001). A former bank clerk was charged with fraud for stealing "N$275,000 from 
the Roman Catholic Church bank account" (ibid., 2 June 1999). In 1998 "an attempt 
was made to defraud the City of Windhoek of N$9 million. Three Bank Windhoek 
cheques belonging to the City of Windhoek, issued separately for N$2.59 million, 
N$3.61 million and NS2.78 million were deposited into a Millennium Individual 
Trust's account.... in South Affica using falsified signatures" (ibid., 26 September 
2000). Moreover, an official of Namibia Post's banking and investment division was 
suspended following allegations of "forged signatures" in which the sum of 
N$50,843,12 was stolen from customer's accounts (ibid., 30 January 2001). In 
another case "a former TransNamib manager was ... sentenced to pay a fine of 
NS5,000 after he pleaded guilty to 35 charges of defrauding the parastatal of almost 
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N$I million" (ibid., 2001: http: //Nv,, v%v. namibian. com. na). A former claims Manager 
of the Social Security (ýornrnission was sentenced to 15 years in prison for 
defrauding the Commission over N$0.6 million over a period of seven years (ibid., 
22 April 1998). The former Chief Executive Officer of the Indigenous People's 
Business Council of Namibia, an organisation '%vhich aims to advance indigenous 
business people" was sacked for defrauding the Council more than NS15,000 (ibid., 
16 November, 1998). 
These cases of corruption created a need for the establishment of an effective anti- 
corruption strategy to combat corruption in Namibia. In the last four years, the 
government of Namibia published good "intentions to root out graft" (Business Day, 
27 June 2000). That is to say, in addition to commissions of inquiries which were 
established to investigate corruption, there have been efforts to establish a 
comprehensive anti-corruption agency to combat corruption in Namibia. In 
Namibia, the country's Prime Minister leads the anti-corruption crusade. The 
section that follows discusses the political process that preceded the introduction 
of anti-corruption reform in Namibia. 
The process towards institutional reform in Namibia 
The process leading to anti-corruption reforrn has been undenvay for the past four 
years. It commenced with the staging of an anti-corruption conference. Anti- 
corruption conferences are part of a global agenda which was aimed at cultivating 
an international climate of intolerance to corruption. In June 1997, a conference 
on the Promotion of Ethics and Combating Corruption was held in Namibia. The 
anti-corruption conference was staged by the government of Namibia in 
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partnership with Transparency International (Szeftel, 1998). It brought together 
experts from within and beyond Namibia. In addition to making corruption an 
issue of public debate in Namibia, it also highlighted the effects of corruption on 
development. Furthermore, the conference looked at the existing anti-corruption 
legislation in Namibia, identified its weaknesses and ways of improving on it. It 
also examined anti-corruption legislation which had been introduced in Botswana, 
Uganda and elsewhere. 
As a way of reinforcing the anti-corruption momentum, regional anti-corruption 
workshops were held countrywide from August 5-15 1998 (The Nandbian, 14 
August 1998). The purpose of these workshops was to try and cultivate "ethical 
behaviour and practices" both in government and in the private sector (ibid., 19 
August 1998). Some of the topics which were discussed at the regional workshops 
included permits and fishing quotas, freedom of information, watchdog agencies, 
whistle-blowing, awarding of tenders, double standards and the status of 
corruption in criminal law (ibid., 19 August 1998). The basic message at all these 
workshops was that corruption has devastating effects on development, a message 
which is being emphasised by donor governments and agencies. 
As a follow up to regional anti-corruption workshops, another National 
Consultative Conference on Combating Corruption and the Promotion of Ethics 
was staged in Windhoek from 7-9 October 1998. The anti-corruption conference 
once again brought together experts in the area of corruption. The aim of the 
conference was to devise a national integrity strategy for Namibia (Republic of 
Namibia, 1998). As one University of Namibia academic noted "the conference 
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concluded that Namibia should emulate Botswana and Uganda by establishing an 
independent or special anti-corruption commission to co-ordinate or deal with 
corruption" (Interview, 28 February 2000). Following this workshop, an official 
of the Legal Assistance observed that "the government of Namibia received 
funding from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to draft an 
anti-corruption legislation" (Interview, 10 March 2000). Cabinet approved some 
of the recommendations that were adopted by the Technical Committee of the 
1998 anti-corruption conference (The Nandbian, 29 May 2001). It also accepted 
the idea of establishing an independent anti-corruption agency (ibid., 23 June 
2000). However, in 1999 cabinet "reached an impasse on whether the agency 
should be incorporated into the Prosecutor General's office or operate on its own" 
(ibid., 23 June 2000). It appears anti-corruption initiatives were "stalled" by the 
deadlock in Cabinet (ibid., 29 May 2001). In March 2000, Cabinet agreed to 
establish an independent anti-corruption institution following months of 
46 prevarication" (ibid., 23 June 2000). Following this decision, the Namibian 
government declared that an anti-corruption legislation would be tabled in 
Parliament in 2000, and an anti-corruption unit will start functioning in 2001. This 
did take place (ibid., 29 May 2001). In April 2001, President Nujoma when giving 
the State of the Nation speech in Parliament said that "there is no question of a 
new bill to come" (ibid., 29 May 2001). A month later, at an international anti- 
corruption conference in The Hague, Namibia's ambassador to the Netherlands 
and Belgium told the Namibian Newspaper that "the anti-corruption bill was 
being drafted" (ibid., 29 May 2001). In June 2001, the Prime Minister also noted 
that the anti-con-uption bill will be tabled in parliament in September 2001 (ibid., 
f, 
29 June 2001). 
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The government's delay in introducing the anti-corruption bill and the confusion 
that followed thereafter, in certain quarters reflected lack of government 
commitment to combat corruption. The Namibian Government's recent "well- 
publicised" aims to combat corruption have been repeatedly criticised. as worthless 
because there has been an unwillingness on the part of government to take action on 
reported cases like those which were exposed by the Frank Commission (ibid., 23 
June 2000; Business Day, 27 June 2000). According to a SWAPO MP, Ruppel, 
"Namibia was on the right track" of tackling corruption but "a lack of political will 
as well as scarce resources to implement anti-corruption programmes were slowing 
down progress" (Ae Nandbian, 2001: http: //xvxv%v. namibian. com. na). 
After almost four years since the 1998 National Consultative Conference on 
Combating Corruption and the Promotion of Ethics, the anti-con-uption bill was 
tabled in Parliament on the 25th of September 2001 (ibid., 26 September 2001). 
Although Members of Parliament (MPs) welcomed the introduction of the bill, a 
number of NWs including those of the ruling party raised several objections during 
the political debate of the anti-corruption bill. Some were critical of the sweeping 
powers of the envisaged anti-corruption commission (Republic of Nandbia 
Governinent News, 13 November 2001). For their part, opposition MPs especially 
those of the Congress of Democrats (CoD) felt that the bill was inadequate and 
flaNved in the sense that it lacked a comprehensive definition of corruption. They also 
wanted the anti-corruption commission to be granted independent powers to 
prosecute (77ie Nandbian, 15 November 2001; Republic of Namibia, 2001). They 
I 
were also critical of the appointment of Special Investigators by the Director of the 
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anti-corruption commission with the concurrence of the Prime Minister (ibid., 18 
October 2001). Opposition MPs also objected to a clause of the bill which exempted 
the President (ibid., 18 October 2001; ibid., 19 October 2001). They were also 
critical of the provision that gave the President the powers to appoint the director of 
the anti-corruption commission and made such a director answerable to the Prime 
Minister (ibid., 10 October 2001; ibid., 11 October 2001; Republic of Narnibia 
Govenunent News, 10 October 2001). Other MPs wanted the director of the 
commission to be appointed by the judiciary. They felt that the involvement of the 
executive in appointing the head of the commission would put the credibility of the 
anti-corruption commission into question (ibid., 18 October 2001). Some opposition 
MPs wanted the anti-corruption bill to be referred to a Standing Committee on 
Govenunent Affairs for all the loopholes in the bill to be addressed (ibid., 11 
October 2001). The Prime Minister objected to the request of referring the bill in 
light of the "long delay in introducing the draft law" (ibid., 19 October 2001). 
Following these objections, the clause that exempted the President was removed 
from the bill (ibid., 19 October 2001). Moreover, the clause that gave the President 
the power to appoint the commission's director was changed slightly to allow 
Parliament to appoint the director following a nomination by the President (ibid., 15 
November 2001). 
The anti-corruption bill was finally passed by parliament on the 13"' of November 
2001, despite some reservations about it. Most SWAPO MPs and members of the 
leading opposition, the DTA-UDF coalition supported the bill. However, two 
Cabinet Ministers, the Attomey-General and the Minister of the Environment 
I 
abstained from voting. NWs for the opposition, the CoD voted against it (ibid., 15 
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November 2001). The envisaged anti-corruption commission in Namibia will have 
wide-ranging powers. These include the power to investigate, obtain infon-nation, to 
enter and search. The power to search will be exercised with the authority of a 
magistrate orjudge. It will also have the right to inspect suspect's financial accounts. 
It may also require any person who is the subject of an investigation to fumish the 
anti-corruption commission with a statement of his or her assets and how such assets 
were acquired (ibid., 26 September 2001). 
The anti-corruption bill also carries severe penalties. Anyone found guilty of 
corruption can be sent to prison for a maximum of 25 years or a fine of N$500, 
000 or both. It also protects whistleblowers. Furthen-nore, any person who gives 
wrong information to the anti-corruption commission could be sent to prison for a 
period of not more than five years or face a fine of not More than N$100,000 or 
both (ibid., 26 September 2001). However, like most anti-corruption commissions 
in Africa, it lacks independent powers to prosecute. The decision to prosecute 
rests with the Prosecutor General (ibid., 26 September 2001). The Director and 
Deputy Director of the anti-corruption commission will be appointed by 
Parliament following a nomination by the President. The anti-corruption 
commission will submit its report to the Prime Minister. The bill also provides for 
a mandatory code of conduct and declaration of assets by MPs (ibid., 15 
November 2001). 
However, the National Council rejected the anti-corruption bill by a two-thirds 
majority and, noted that "the tasks of the anti-corruption agency it was supposed to 
set up could be carried out by the Ombudsman's office" (ibid., 13 February 2002). 
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The National Assembly can either accept or reject the recommendations of the 
National Council. At the time of writing it has yet to react. If it accepts the 
recommendation of the National Council, "the Bill will be scrapped" (ibid., 13 
February 2002). The main aim of the Bill is "to establish the Anti-Corruption 
Conunission and provide for its functions; to provide for the prevention and 
punishment of corruption; and to make provision for matters connected therewith" 
(Republic of Namibia, 2001). The Bill provides for an anti-corruption strategy that 
involves investigation, corruption prevention and public education. The envisaged 
anti-corruption commission is modelled on the Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong. 
Since independence, the Office of the Ombudsman has been the main institution 
that investigates corruption in Namibia. The section that follows discusses the 
Office of the Ombudsman. It examines the reasons for its establishment and the 
nature of its performance. 
The Ombudsman 
The Ombudsman in Namibia was established in accordance with section 89 of the 
Constitution of Namibia. The Ombudsman in Namibia is constitutionally emplaced 
and directly linked to Parliament. Since independence, the Ombudsman has been the 
key institution that investigates corruption in Namibia. The Ombudsman is mainly 
an investigatory organisation that recommends remedial action where appropriate. 
However, there is the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1985 which criminalizes 
corruption. According to section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1985 
Any person who 
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a) in the case of the agent, corruptly accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or 
attempts to obtain from any person, either for himself or for any other 
person, any gift or consideration as an inducement or reward for doing or 
omitting to do or for having done or omitted to do any act in relation to his 
principal's affairs or business, or for showing or refraining from showing 
favour or disfavour to any person in relation to his principal's affairs or 
business; or 
b) corruptly gives or agrees to give of offers any gift or consideration to any 
agent as an inducement or reward for doing or forbearing to do or for having 
done or forbone to do any act in relation to his principal's affair's or 
business; or 
c) knowingly gives to any agent or, in the case of an agent, knowingly uses 
with intent to decide his principal, any receipt, account or other document in 
respect of which the principal is interested and which contains any statement 
which is false or erroneous or defective in any material particular, and which 
to his knowledge is intended to mislead his principal, 
shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to the penalties which 
may by law be imposed for the crime of bribery. 
The Prevention of Corruption Act of 1985 appears to be inadequate both in 
comprehensiveness and reach in combating corruption amid the changing and 
complex forms of corruption. However, there is no evidence to suggest that this Act 
is insufficient. In the view of one senior official in the Office of the Ombudsman 
"the Prevention of Corruption Act is not in use or has largely fallen into disuse" 
(Interview, 22 February 2000). As an oversight institution, the Ombudsman needs to 
be effective and impartial in discharging its duties. However, as we demonstrate later 
in the chapter, the Ombudsman is a weak and ineffective institution. 
Functions and powers of the Ombudsman 
The functions and powers of the Ombudsman are defined and prescribed by the 
Ombudsman Act of 1990. The Ombudsman Act gives the Ombudsman wide- 
ranging functions and powers. Its jurisdiction is not only limited to government and 
local govenunent institutions. It also extends to individuals, enterprises and private 
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institutions. The Ombudsman in Namibia has four core functions. Although it is not 
exclusively an anti-corruption organisation, one of its key functions is to investigate 
corruption. According to the Ombudsman Act, the Ombudsman is empowered to 
investigate acts of maladministration, issues of human rights abuse, acts of 
corruption and issues of the envirom-nent or misuse of natural resources. Section 3 
(1) of the Ombudsman Act empowers the Ombudsman to investigate 
(a) alleged or apparent or threatened instances or matters of violations or 
infringements of fundamental rights and freedoms, abuse of power, unfair, 
harsh, insensitive or discourteous treatment of an inhabitant of Namibia by 
an official in the employ of any organ of Government (whether national or 
local), manifest injustice, or corruption or conduct by such official which 
would properly be regarded as unlawful, oppressive or unfair in a 
democratic society; 
(b) the functioning of the Public Service Commission, administrative organs 
of the state, the defence force, the police force and the prison service in so far 
as such complaints relate to the failure to achieve a balanced structuring of 
such services or equal access by all to the recruitment of such services or fair 
administration in relation to such services; 
(c) the over-utilization of living natural resources, the irrational 
exploitation of non-renewable resources, the degradation and destruction 
of ecosystems and failure to protect the beauty and character of Namibia; 
(d) practices and actions by persons, enterprises and other private institutions 
where such complaints allege that violations of fundamental rights and 
freedoms have taken place; 
(e) all instances or matters of alleged or suspected corruption and the 
misappropriation of public moneys or other public property by officials. 
These functions can only be exercised on the basis of a comPlaint either from an 
individual or institution. The Office of the Ombudsman cannot institute an 
investigation on its own initiative. A lawftilly detained person shall lay a complaint 
by way of writing in a scaled envelope and the person in charge of the place where 
such a person is being detained shall hand such an envelope to the Ombudsman. 
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Before the Ombudsman makes any enquiry into any matter which falls within its 
remit, a complainant is advised or asked to exhaust the available channels of 
communication before taking the matter to the Ombudsman's office. However, this 
does not stop the complainant from contacting the Ombudsman's office initially. 
Direct access with the office of the Ombudsman is of paramount importance to 
ensure maximum use of the Ombudsman's office. However, in terms of section 3(6) 
of the Ombudsman Act, the functions of the Ombudsman "shall not apply in respect 
of any decision taken in or in connection with any civil or criminal case by a court of 
law". The intention behind this provision is to preserve the independence of the 
judiciary. 
The powers of the Ombudsman are defined by section 4 of the Ombudsman Act and 
article 92 of the Constitution of Namibia. The Ombudsman has wide powers of 
investigation, entry, search and seizure. He or she can administer an oath and has the 
right to decide who is to be present or not at any proceedings of any investigation. 
The Ombudsman may also decide the extent and nature of any investigation of any 
matter in question. He or she may also force or request any person to produce any 
material that in the opinion of the Ombudsman is necessary for any matter in 
question. And any person questioned is required to co-operate with the Ombudsman. 
More importantly, section II of the Ombudsman Act limits liability for officials 
of the Ombudsman's office. It states that "the Ombudsman, his or her deputy or 
any member of the staff of the Ombudsman shall not be liable in respect of 
anything d one ing ood f aith u nder a ny p rovision oft his A ct". T his w ill ensure 
I 
members of the Ombudsman discharge their functions without fear of being 
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prosecuted. Furthermore, section 7(2) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Ombudsman 
the right to ask for the assistance or expertise of any person, if he or she feels that 
such expertise is necessary to conduct any investigation. 
However, the Ombudsman does not have independent powers to prosecute. Rather, 
the Ombudsman recommends remedial action or refers the matter to the relevant 
body or authority following investigation. According to section 5(l) of the 
Ombudsman Act, the Ombudsman can take appropriate action to remedy the 
situation; by causing the two parties to negotiate and compromise, referring the 
matter to the Prosecutor General or Auditor general, bringing proceedings in a Court 
to ten-ninatet he offending action, and make the superior of the offending person 
aware of the complaint and the findings of the Ombudsman. 
Section 10 of the Ombudsman Act stipulates the punitive measures that can be 
levied following an investigation by the Ombudsman. It states that the person "shall 
be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding R2,000 or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months or to both such fine and such 
imprisonment". Punitive measures are necessary for the Ombudsman to be taken 
seriously. This does not suggest that severe penalties alone can constitute a deterrent. 
But the above penalties are relatively light. 
Although the Ombudsman in Namibia has such wide-ranging powers, the fact that 
the Ombudsman cannot initiate an investigation on its own largely limits the use of 
these powers. These powers can be effectively utilised if the Office of the 
I Ombudsman pro-actively uses them. This can be the case if the Office of the 
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Ombudsman is empowered to initiate an investigation at its own initiative. The 
section that follows examines the independence of the Ombudsman. 
The independence of the Ombudsman 
The independence of the Ombudsman is of major importance to its success. 
Commenting on the independence of the office, the Ombudsman in her annual report 
of 1997 wrote that 
the independence of the Ombudsman in the exercise and perfon-nance of his 
or her duties and functions is guaranteed by the Namibian Constitution. 
Independence is, however, a relative ten-n and as long as one is mindful that 
the office cannot operate in a vacuum, it becomes essential to forge links 
with government and civil society organisations (Republic of Namibia, 1997: 
7). 
Furthermore, she observed that 
the impression created of the Office is that it is a witch-hunt institution and 
we would like to take this opportunity to dispel any such impression. The 
Office of the Ombudsman is an indispensable organ in the search for good 
governance and the promotion and protection of the rights of people. It is not 
an advocate on behalf of anybody but rather an advocate for good 
administration. It does not replace the courts but rather act complimentary to 
the courts in its pursuit ofjustice (ibid. 8) 
This demonstrates that an independent Ombudsman is necessary for people to have 
confidence in it and to enhance its credibility. In Namibia, section 89 of the 
Constitution guarantees the independence of the Ombudsman, subject only to the 
law and the Constitution. It stipulates that no member of Cabinet or the legislature or 
any other person shall interfere with the operations of the Ombudsman and, all state 
organs are required to assist the Ombudsman to ensure the independence, dignity 
and effectiveness of the Ombudsman. Under section 6 of the Ombudsman Act, the 
Ombudsman reports to the Speaker of the National Assembly. The Speaker shall in 
turn cause the report of the Ombudsman to be laid before the National Assembly. 
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Although the Constitution guarantees the independence of the Ombudsman, certain 
factors give the executive a degree of influence in the office and that affect public 
confidence. First, is the appointment of the Ombudsman. According to section 90 of 
the Constitution, the President appoints the Ombudsman on the recommendation of 
the Judicial Service Commission. Although section 89 of the Constitution guarantees 
the independence of the Ombudsman, the appointment of the Ombudsman by the 
president gives rise to the perception that the Ombudsman in not immune from 
executive interference. For instance, as one opposition politician noted "at one 
stage, following the death of the Ombudsman, the President appointed the Deputy 
Ombudsman as the Ombudsman without following the constitutional procedures. 
However, following public outcry that the president had violated the spirit and 
letter of the constitution of Namibia, the appointment was reversed" (Interview, 
10 March 2000). 
For an anti-corruption agency to be effective in combating corruption at all levels in 
government, it needs to enjoy autonomy from the very people it is supposed to 
investigate. At the very least the Ombudsman needs to be appointed by Parliament. 
Furthermore, the appointment process of the Ombudsman needs to be made 
transparent. In the view of one senior opposition MP "one of the ways to make it 
transparent would be to have more than one candidate short-listed followed by an 
interview by a panel of experts before Parliament makes the final decision" 
(Interview, 10 March 2000). Moreover, the Ombudsman's office "is for budgetary 
and other institutional arrangements linked to the Ministry of Justice" (Republic of 
Namibia, 1997: 7). There is a need to de-link its budget from the Ministry of 
I Justice and link it to Parliament. 
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Another factor which puts the independence of the Ombudsman into suspicion is the 
terms and conditions. Although the Ombudsman must retire on reaching the age of 
65, under section 2 of the Ombudsman Act, the President othenvise determines the 
terms and conditions of the Ombudsman. Furthermore, according to article 94 of 
the Constitution of Namibia, the President may remove the Ombudsman from 
office acting on the recommendation by the Judicial Service Commission. The 
President may also suspend the Ombudsman pending an outcome of the 
investigation by the Judicial Service Commission. This arrangement once again 
gives rise to the perception that the Ombudsman is not immune from executive 
influence. For the Ombudsman to enjoy security of tenure, his or her removal 
from office also needs to be linked directly to Parliament. This could also go a 
long way towards enhancing the credibility and instilling confidence in the 
Ombudsman's office. 
Problems faced by the Ombudsman 
The Office of the Ombudsman in Namibia faces a number of problems which 
impact on its effectiveness. One such problem is funding. In the view of one 
senior official in the Ombudsman's office "funding is the number one problem 
faced by the Ombudsman's office in Namibia. Funding is a big problem in 
Namibia. It has been and continues to be a serious problem faced by the 
Ombudsman in Namibia" (Interview, 28 February 2000). Generally, the Office of 
the Ombudsman in Namibia faces uncertainty regarding the availability of funds 
(Republic of Namibia, 1999). With regard to its finances, it is accountable to the 
Ministry of Justice, which is its parent ministry. Available evidence suggests that 
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the Ministry of Justice is also under-resourced. For example, for the financial year 
1999/2000, the Ministry of Justice was allocated some N$101 million. Speaking 
during the budget debate, the Minister of Justice said that 
courts are overstretched with cases; training is required to improve the 
administration of justice; more magistrates are needed together with 
support staff and logistics; the establishment of Small Claims courts as 
well as the streamlining of administration at Community Courts have been 
on hold for over seven years, all due to financial constraints (The 
Nandbian, 14 May 1999). 
For the same period, the Office of the Ombudsman was allocated N$2,822,000 
(Tjiriange, 1999). For the financial year 1998/1999, it was allocated N$2,371,000 
(Tjiriange, 1998) whereas for the financial year 1996/1997, the Office of the 
Ombudsman had a budget of N$1,977,000 (Tjiriange, 1996). Although its budget 
has increased gradually over the years, it remains inadequate. 
The s econd m ajor p roblem f aced byt he 0 ffice of t he 0 mbudsman in Namibia 
relates to staffing. The Office of the Ombudsman is understaffed. It lacks the 
capacity to fully implement its mandate. Although there is a provision to bring on 
board expertise from outside its office, ideally it would be proper to have capacity 
within its own office. The Office of the Ombudsman has a staff compliment of 12 
excluding the Ombudswoman of which four are investigators (handle complaints). 
It is very thin on the ground. This is captured in the strategic plan of the Office of 
the Ombudsman in Namibia for 1999-2003, which notes that 
as it is now, the establishment comprises a total of 12 posts, of which only 
four are designated for complaint handling. It is thus no wonder that the 
Office has not been able to efficiently and effectively deal with complex and 
systemic investigations, while mechanisms for the establishment of a 
regional presence could also not be considered, even on a limited scale 
(Republic of Namibia, 1999: 2). 
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According to a senior official in the Ombudsman's office, the office "has no 
immediate plans to establish regional offices in the immediate future because of 
lack ofc apacity. R ather, m obile c linics orr egular v isits too ther r egions a re in 
use" (Interview, 28 February 2000). The O. Mbudsman is largely concentrated in 
Windhoek. There is no doubt that the size of the country presents a problem to an 
already over-stretched Office of the Ombudsman in Namibia. Moreover, the 
Office of the Ombudsman has a flawed organisational structure with some limited 
promotional opportunities. Further, it faces a problem of lack of co-operation 
from institutions complained against. It also operates amid diminished political 
support (Republic of Namibia, 1999). In the view of an official of the National 
Society for Human Rights, the Office of the Ombudsman is perceived as being 
fearful of politicians even though it is protected by the Constitution (Interview, 29 
February 2000). 
Another main constraint faced by the Office of the Ombudsman is that the 
Ombudsman in Namibia only acts on the basis of a receiving a complaint from an 
individual or institution. The Office of the Ombudsman in Namibia does not act or 
investigate at its own initiative. According to one senior official in the 
Ombudsman's office, "this is a serious constraint for us" (Interview, 22 February 
2000). The Ombudsman needs not to act on the basis of a complaint alone. The 
Ombudsman also needs to institute investigations or inquiries at its own initiative. 
For it to be dble to do this, it has to be well resourced both in tenns of finance and 
expertise. Linked to this, the Ombudsman only makes recommendations 
following its investigations. This makes the Ombudsman a weak and ineffective 
institution in Namibia. Although section 92 of the Constitution of Namibia 
empowers the Ombudsman to cause any person contemptuous of any of its 
238 
subpoena to be prosecuted before a competent court, this is not adequate. The 
Office of the Ombudsman needs to be strengthened so that it can have 
independent powers to arrest and prosecute if it is to make any impact. Otherwise 
it risks reducing itself to a disciplinary committee. In addition to this, it needs an 
awareness unit within its ranks that will help to make the public aware of its role 
and mandate. Currently, the Office of the Ombudsman has some limited public 
outreach programmes in place. 
The other deficiency of the Ombudsman Act is that it does not provide for an 
adequate mechanism for protecting whistle blowers. Section 8 of the Act states 
that 
the Ombudsman and every other person employed in carrying out the 
provisions of this Act shall preserve and aid in preserving secrecy in 
respect of instances or matters that may come to his or her knowledge in 
the exercise of his or her powers or the performance of his or her duties 
and functions in connection with those provisions, shall not communicate 
any such instance or matter to any person whomsoever or permit a person 
to have access to any documents in his or her possession or custody, 
except in so far as any such communication is required to or may be made 
in terms of this Act or any other law (Republic of Namibia, 1990: S. 28). 
This is not adequate. Whistle blowers need to be protected otherwise the office 
would be denied the support it needs from such people. In light of these problems, 
the ombudsman has produced disappointing results in investigating corruption. 
Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman does not affect factors that promote 
corruption in Namibia. This may suggest that anti-corruption agencies in Namibia 
have more to do with reassuring foreign investors than to tackle corruption. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter examined the politics of controlling corruption in Namibia. It 
demonstrated that although corruption is not a major political issue in Namibia, 
several scandals and cases of corruption which have been exposed since 
independence have created a need for institutional reforra. 
It a Iso d iscussed t he n ature of and e Sorts toc ornbat c orruption ini ndependent 
Namibia. In particular, it examined the role of the Ombudsman and recent efforts 
to establish a specialised anti-corruption commission. Since independence, the 
Ombudsman has remained the main institution that investigates corruption in 
Namibia. However, several problems make the Office of the Ombudsman a weak 
and ineffective institution. It is extremely underresourced in terms of personnel 
and funding. Moreover, the Ombudsman is largely an investigatory organisation. 
It lacks independent powers to prosecute and it is not empowered to initiate 
investigations at its own initiative. As a result, its impact is not felt in Namibia. As 
Rose-Acken-nan (1999: 172) noted, Ombudsmen "seldom uncover large-scale 
systemic corruption". This suggests 'that the Ombudsman in Namibia is a 
necessary institution but not sufficient to effectively tackle the problem of 
corruption especially high-level corruption. In the next chapter we bring together 
the individual case studies of Botswana, South Africa and Namibia with the aim 
of obtaining a comparative analysis of anti-corruption institutions in the three 
countries. 
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Chapter seven: A comparative analysis of anti-corruption initiatives in 
Botswana, South Africa and Namibia 
Having assessed the nature of political corruption and of anti-corruption efforts in 
each of our case studies in turn, this chapter brings them together in order to 
compare the anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, South Africa and Namibia. 
Comparison is made in terms of their nature, powers, level of autonomy, 
resources and effectiveness in tackling corruption. Before evaluating these anti- 
corruption agencies, however, it is necessary to examine how the state and 
patterns of corruption differ in the three countries. 
The nature of the state and patterns of corruption in the three countries 
We can identify different kinds of state in the three countries. In Botswana, the 
state takes the post-colonial form but with developmental elements. In contrast, in 
South Africa, there is a combination of surviving elements of settler oligarchy and 
an emerging post-colonial state. In Namibia on the other hand, although it 
functioned as a small settler oligarchy dependent on the South African state, 
affluent remnants of the apartheid state remain and co-exist with post-colonial 
features. In all three countries, corruption is moderate but patterns of corruption 
are fairly similar as we demonstrate in the analysis that follows and as shown by 
Figure 7.1 below. 
In Botswana, corruption follows prebendal and clientelist patterns. Patterns of 
clientelist patronage politics characteristic of post-colonial states can be identified 
although this is less prominent in Botswana than in much of post-colonial Africa. 
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This includes corruption which typically involves appropriation or looting of 
public goods to reward clients or increase personal wealth. This can be 
exemplified in the case of the National Development Bank (NDB) where some 
senior politicians, including the former President Masire, borrowed large sums of 
money from the bank but failed to service their loans, resulting in the NDB 
incurring huge losses and retrenching some of its employees. 
But alongside this is clientelism and corruption associated with class (as distinct 
from personal or factional) formation which promotes private capital 
accumulation and involves the use of state resources to further the growth of 
propertied strata. This kind of corruption fosters accumulation, not just 
consumption as in the first case. The cattle class is an obvious example. Tsie has 
argued that, to the extent that the cattle based bourgeoisie has developed in 
Botswana, it has depended on the state. However, in contrast with much of post- 
colonial Africa, the state did not develop into the one and only vehicle for amassing 
wealth (Tsie, 1996). Thus, "economic pragmatism" dominates over factionalist 
looting (UNDP, 1997.: 49). In Botswana, the use of patronage to foster proper-tied 
classes has not confined rewards to particular factions or regions. Even opposition 
elites have shared in it. Hence, the process has not created as much political 
controversy - and has not been as destabilising - as in other post-colonial states 
(e. g. Zambia, Kenya and Zimbabwe) - at least at elite level. Butt here is some 
cynicism about honesty of the political system. Moreover, patronage was used to a 
lesser extent to reward political followers. The ruling party in Botswana "has been 
compelled to utilise public polices to maintain political support" (Danevad, 1995: 
393). The state used part of its wealth to advance welfare programmes for the 
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poorer sections of the populations (Molutsi, 1989: 126). For instance, the 
government launched a number of rural development programmes which 
strengthened "the popularity of the BDP amongst the peasantry" (Tsie, 1996: 
605). 
Similarly, in South Africa corruption followed clientelist patterns under the 
apartheid state. Afrikaner nationalism used the apartheid state much as African 
nationalist parties elsewhere on the African continent, in that they too sought to 
use access to public resources to change the circumstances of their supporters. 
Apartheid allowed them to limit and monopolise the capacity to access and 
appropriate public goods - much as factions seek to do in spoils politics described 
in chapter two. Although the apartheid state was a white state, run and dominated 
by Afrikaner nationalists, it nevertheless needed to reward allies and supporters 
through state patronage and payoffs. Such patronage was used to reward not only 
Afrikaners or White but also Indian, Coloured and Black conservative allies. In 
some ways the apartheid state built-in corruption in its Homeland policies, 
allowing the Homeland elites to line their pockets to a far greater extent than was 
permitted in the white state (Friedman, 1995). 
Such state patronage was used to dispense rewards and favours for a variety of 
reasons and in a variety of ways. The most noticeable and more important was the 
nature of unchecked executive power and the rise of the security state under P. W. 
Botha with the adoption of the Total Strategy (TS) in the 19 80s as the official 
policy of the apartheid state. This was also in many ways a source of criminal 
I 
behaviour and corruption because the Total Strategy created an environment in 
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which corruption, authoritarianism and lack of transparency flourished. Efforts to 
suppress those who opposed the apartheid state both within and the Southern 
Africa region, led to an increase in corruption within South Africa (Ellis, 1996). 
The apartheid state used money to reward those who supported it and kill those 
who opposed it (Van Maanen, 1999) Through the Department of Information, the 
apartheid state covertly distributed government funds as a way of soliciting 
influence and support both within and outside South Africa (Ellis, 1996). In this 
sense, the structure of the apartheid state and the way it functioned 
institutionalised some forms of corruption. Politics was based on the post-colonial 
pattern of patronage. In this way, South Africa is essentially similar to most 
African states, which used politics and the state to change the position of their 
supporters. U nder t he a partheid s tate, c orruption w as p art ofaw ider a nd m ore 
serious system of discrimination which had low legitimacy from the start. 
Equally, since 1994, as in most post-colonial states, corruption in democratic 
South Africa follows prebendal and clientelist patterns - although the process is 
still in its infancy. Since 1994, public resources were used to redress inequality 
through tendering or procurement policies that give preference to small 
businessmen (Good, 1997). This is an area of corruption common to all states. 
What gives it a different force in South Africa is a need to empower those 
previously disadvantaged and redress the deep historical socio-economic 
imbalances inherited by the new state in 1994. This in a way may not be termed as 
corruption but as a way of narrowing the gap between the privileged and less 
privileged. The only major noticeable problem is the way in which the strategy is 
I being pursued by the new state. This is in part because there is pressure on the 
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new state to deliver noticeable results within a short period. Thus inequalities can 
not be left to market forces because the market changes inequalities too slowly. 
Van Der Berg (1998) observed that racial inequalities are still a major problem, 
however, what he fails to acknowledge is that these inequalities developed over 
many decades and therefore they can not be addressed within a short period. 
As in Botswana, the new state in South Africa is using public resources to 
promote elite capital accumulation by favouring black owned-enterprises. 
However, as in Botswana and Namibia, there is less emphasis on rewards to rank- 
and-file followers. This has resulted in payoffs for some party members. As we 
discussed in chapter five, a small black economic elite benefited from the policies 
of the new state and the development of capitalism since 1994. Not only did their 
incomes increase but also' made significant gains in the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange. 
Alongside black elite capital accumulation, as in Namibia, democratic South 
Africa seeks to redress inequality through some types of affirmative action in the 
public service which are not based on merit values because the new state wants 
allies in government who would support its policies. These policies in turn led to 
clientelism and corruption. However, corruption has not been as destabilising as is 
the other post-colonial states, but there is growing cynicism about public honesty 
which threatens democracy. 
Corruption inN arnibia on t he o ther h and, isa replication oft he S outh A frican 
apartheid model - although on a meagre scale - because South Africa applied the 
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principles of apartheid to its administration. For instance, South Africa established 
a series of Homelands administrations within Namibia which were not only used 
as a source of patronage but they were also built on patronage and -in turn 
susceptible to corruption. The Homelands administrations were not only a source 
of patronage and corruption, but they were also directly controlled by South 
Africa (Forrest, 1998). Those who collaborated with South Africa were 
generously rewarded. Tapscott observed that the "collaborative elite" which was 
made of civil servants, politicians and professionals "earned salaries which were 
sometimes on par with those of their white counterparts" (1995: 157). Thus, the 
Homeland system allowed the use of patronage to local chiefs and collaborators in 
much the way in which it did in South Africa but on a more meagre scale. 
As in South Africa, clientelism in democratic Namibia is still in its infancy. Public 
resources were used to redress past imbalances through affirmative appointments 
and the promotion of black empowerment. As we noted in chapter six, affirmative 
action has given rise to political appointments. Since independence, political 
appointments were made to key institutions where power is concentrated. As a 
result of political appointments, the size of Namibia's public service has almost 
doubled (The Namibian, 2 October 2000). Recently, SWAPO's Secretary General 
expressed the need to appoint SWAPO cadres to key posts in government and 
parastatal, organisations (The Nandbian, 4 December 2000). Politically these 
appointments are necessary because there is need for the new state to have allies 
who would appreciate and encourage its new polices, and the public sector is 
where quick changes can be easily made. 
I 
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Alongside affirmative appointments, as in Botswana and South Africa, public 
resources are used to promote elite capital accumulation in Namibia with less 
emphasis on rewards to rank-and-file followers. One opposition politician 
remarked: "imagine having a business in an area you. are responsible for as a 
minister" (Interview, 10 March 2000). In the view of another senior opposition 
politician, there is lack of clarity for the whole aspect of black empowennent 
which centres around people with good connections with politicians (Interview, 
03 March 2000). An official of the Namibian Society for Human Rights noted that 
in Namibia, corruption manifests itself at the highest level e. g. unfair 
granting of tenders, favouritism based on tribal or political party 
affiliation, with the ruling party establishing companies and granting them 
tenders. Stocks and Stocks is building blocks to be rented by government. 
This company is run by the president through his brother-in-law and 
SWAPO. Another SWAPO company, Namprint wins tenders to print 
ballot boxes in which SWAPO is one of the contestants. Moreover, 
unqualified people, friends and relatives are employed in the Public 
Service through the system of patronage (Interview, 29 February 2000). 
Although corruption is not a major issue in Namibia because it is embedded in a 
wider system of discrimination which lacked legit imacy from the start, there is a 
growing cynicism about corruption and honesty of politicians. There is a public 
perception which believes that corruption is prevalent in Namibia and, it is widely 
believed that many government ministers are involved in corruption. For one 
respondent, the problem of corruption can be dealt with by bringing in a new 
party into power (Interview, 26 February 2000). Despite this cynicism, clientelism 
and the importance of the state as a source of resources have not degenerated into 
spoils politics. Figure 7.1 below summarizes the foregoing discussion on the 
nature of corruption in the three countries. 
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Fig 7.1 The nature of corruption in Botswana, South Africa and Namibia 
Botswana South Africa Namibia 
Forni ofstate Post-colonial state (1) Settler oligarchy (1) Colony; small 
with elements of (2) Non-racial democracy: settler oligarchy 
developmental state surviving elements of dependent on South 
settler oligarchy; African state 
emerging post-colonial (2) Post-colonial state 
state 
Payoffs and Corruption follows (1) Corruption follows (1) Replication of SA 
Corruption prebendal and clientelist pattern. apartheid model 
clientelist patterns. Patronage used to promote (small scale) 
Patronage used to white (Afrikaner) capital (2) Corruption follows 
promote local capital accumulation and make prebendal and 
accumulation and, to payoffs to black clients clientelist pattern; Use 
lesser extent, reward and allies public resources to 
political supporters (2) Corruption follows redress past 
prebendal and clientelist imbalances; 
pattern. Public resources Promotion of black 
used to redress inequality. capital accumulation; 
Promotion of black capital some rewards for 
accumulation; some political supporters. 
payoffs to party members. 
Political role of Corruption spreads (1) Afrikaner (1) Promotion of 
comiption rewards throughout empowerment; rewarding foreign capital; 
elite and promotes political clients & allies. rewarding political 
propertied strata. Less (2) Black empowerment. clients &allies. 
emphasis on rewards Promotion of elite capital (2) Black 
to rank-and-file accumulation. Less empowerment. 
followers emphasis on rewards to Promotion of elite 
rank-and-file followers capital accumulation. 
Less emphasis on 
rewards to rank-and- 
file followers. 
Level of Moderate but growing Moderate but growing Moderate but number 
comiption number of scandals number of scandals and of prominent scandals 
increasing incidence 
System Corruption a problem (1) Corruption part of (1) Corruption not a 
consequences of but does not become wider and more serious major issue because 
co"-Ilption subject of ethnic system of discrimination; embedded in wider 
factional conflict as in low legitimacy from start. system of 
much of post-colonial (2) Democracy threatened discrimination lacking 
Africa. Some by growing cynicism legitimacy from start 
cynicism about about public honesty (2) Democracy but 
honesty of political growing cynicism 
system about corruption and 
honesty of politicians 
Govennnent Adoption of the ICAC (1) Proliferation of agencies Partial adoption of 
responses to model in form of (2) Proliferation of ICAC model; role of 
comiption DCEC agencies but also some Ombudsman 
reduction of their ability 
to probe political elite 
behaviour; Structures and 
powers reflect influence 
of ICAC. 
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The response to the problem of corruption in the three countries was to create 
anti-corruption agencies. The section that follows seeks to compare anti- 
corruption agencies in the three in tenns of their functions. 
Functions of agencies in the three country cases 
As shown in Figure 7.1 above and in Figure 7.2 below, anti-corruption agencies in 
Botswana, South Africa and Namibia are modelled directly or indirectly and, in 
different ways, on the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 
Hong Kong. Following the success of the ICAC in combating corruption in Hong 
Kong, the ICAC has been seen, cited and employed as a model which other 
countries should follow. This is the case although the ICAC was designed for a 
colonial system with huge material resources. In this sense, the model is 
inappropriate to the African setting and assumes conditions which cannot be 
replicated in the subcontinent. Botswana, South Africa and Namibia are 
democratic regimes which are obliged to employ the rule of law in response to 
democratic demands from their citizens. 
In Botswana, the ICAC model was adopted in the form of the Directorate on 
Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC). In South Africa, there is a proliferation 
of agencies but with some reduction of their ability to probe political elite 
behaviour. Although, there is no political discussion in setting South African 
agencies, the structures and powers of the agencies reflect the influence of the 
Hong Kong ICAC. Similarly, in Namibia, the broad mandate of the Ombudsman 
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and its powers reflect ICAC influence. There is also a partial adoption of the 
ICAC model in Namibia with the envisaged anti-corruption commission. 
In Botswana, the DCEC as Figure 7.2 below shows was established in 1994 to 
combat corruption and economic crime following the enactment of the DCEC 
Act. Similarly, in South Africa, the Public Protector was created to investigate 
maladministration, abuse of power or improper conduct, corruption, unlawful 
enrichment and improper prejudice. The Investigating Directorate: Serious 
Economic Offences (IDSEO) is empowered to investigate serious economic 
offences and, the Heath Special Investigating Unit (SIU) deals with 
maladministration, corruption, fraud and misappropriation of state assets. On the 
other hand, Ombudsman in Namibia tackles corruption, maladministration, human 
rights abuse and misuse of natural resources. 
As in Hong Kong, the DCEC's anti-corruption strategy involves a three pronged 
strategy of investigation, corruption prevention and public education. In South 
Africa, the Public Protector, IDSEO and the SIU fight corruption mainly through 
investigation. The same applies to the Ombudsman in Namibia. However, the 
envisaged anti-corruption agency in Namibia would combat corruption through 
investigation, prevention and public education as in Hong Kong and Botswana. 
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Fig 7.2 Comparison of anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, South Africa 
and Namibia 
Botswana South Africa Namibia 
Nanze of DCEC Public IDSEO Heath Unit Onibudsinan 
, 4gency Protector (SIU) 
Creation of 1994 1995 1992 1996 1990 
agency 
Designated role Investigate Investigate Investigate Investigate Investigate 
corruption, corruption, serious corruption, corruption, 
prevention and maladn-ýinistrat economic maladministrat maladministrat 
public education ion, improper offences ion, fraud ion, human 
conduct, rights abuse 
unlawful and misuse of 
enrichment natural 
resources 
Level of A government Independent- Government Accountable Guaranteed 
autonoiny department terms & Department to President and reports to 
under President conditions under Ministry Speaker 
determined by of Justice 
Parliament 
Nature of Director Public Director Head Ombudsmana 
executive appointed by Protector appointed by appointed by ppointed by 
control or President and appointed by President after President after President 
interference reports to President & consulting recommendati 
President Deputy Public Justice on by JSC and 
Protector Minister and to get approval 
appointed by National from President 
Minister of Director of to investigate 
Justice Prosecutions 
Type of cases 
Cases Major cases 
Mainly 
matters to do 
investigatedl Mainly lower A variety of involving including with 
detected level cases. large sums of political conditions of money behaviour services 
Degree of Limited - petty 
Limited - Limited - Limited - Limited - little 
effectiveness corruption poorly poorly political 
done; poorly 
resourced resourced interference resourced 
Resources; Resources; 
lacks Resources; investigates on Resources; lacks independent lacks of Resources; 
basis of 
Lindtations on independent powers to independent Presidential complaint effectiveness powers to prosecute; powers to proclamation only; 
lacks 
prosecute lacks prosecute 
independent 
sanctions powers 
to 
rosecute 
In all three countries as shown in Figure 7.2 above, anti-corruption agencies are 
appointed by the executive as is the case with the ICAC in Hong Kong. In 
Botswana, the DCEC is politically appointed by the President and is directly I 
answerable to him. In South Africa, the Public Protector is appointed on a non- 
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renewable seven year term by the President following a National Assembly 
I recommendation of persons "nominated by a committee of the Assembly 
proportionally composed of members of all par-ties represented in the Assembly; 
and approved by the Assembly by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote - of 
at least 60 per cent of the members of the Assembly" (ibid. 105). With regard to 
IDSEO, its director is appointed by the President after consulting the Minister of 
Justice and the National Director of Public Prosecutions since October 1998. Prior 
to that, its director was appointed by the Minister of Justice. The head of the SIU 
is also appointed by the President. 
Similarly, in Namibia, the Ombudsman is appointed by the President "on such 
terms and conditions as the President may determine" (Republic of Namibia, 
1990: 3), following a recommendation by the Judicial Service Commission and 
reports to the Speaker of the National Assembly. In all three countries, these 
appointments by the executive give rise to the perception that these agencies are 
not immune from executive manipulation. For instance, in Botswana as one senior 
DCEC official noted, "the Pennanent Secretary to the President, the Vice 
President and the President can be perceived to be giving instructions to the 
DCEC director, and there is nothing that proves that this does not happen" 
(Interview, 25 October 1999). The control of these agencies is fundamental to the 
political establishment because of the threat these agencies pose to the 
establishment. 
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Powers of anti-corruption agencies in the three countries 
As shown in Figure 7.3 below, anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, South 
Africa and Namibia have been granted wide-ranging powers as is the case with 
the Hong Kong ICAC. The powers of the ICAC are enshrined in three specific 
laws, namely the Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance, the 
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance and the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Ordinance. 
Section 10 of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance gives 
the ICAC powers of arrest. And section IOC confers the ICAC powers to search, 
seize and detain anything that an officer may believe to be or to contain evidence 
of an offence. More importantly, section 10(l) of the Prevention of Bribery 
Ordinance makes it an o ffence for a person to be in possession of unexplained 
property or assets. In Botswana, the DCEC Act conferred the DCEC with wide 
and sweeping powers to investigate corruption and economic crime according to 
section 6 of the DCEC Act. Like the ICAC, the DCEC has the power to arrest, 
search and seize with or without a warrant. It also has the power to obtain 
infonnation and to use reasonable force. It also has the power to access suspect's 
bank a ccounts w ithout t heir k nowledge and i ts d irector ist he o ne who decides 
whether or not to peruse a suspect's accounts. The DCEC can also institute 
extradition proceedings against fugitive suspects. Most of the DCEC's powers are 
exercised with the authority of a magistrate. 
Similarly, in South Africa, the Public Protector has enormous investigating 
powers like those of the DCEC and the ICAC. According to section 7 of the 
Public Protector Act, the Public Protector has wide powers of investigation, 
search and seizure. However, to enter any building or premises, the Public 
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Protector has to obtain a warrant from a local magistrate or judge. Section 7A (5) 
(a) empowers the Public Protector to use reasonable force to overcome any form 
of resistance while entering such a premise or building. 
Fig 7.3 Comparison of agencies in Botswana, South Africa and Namibia in 
terms of how they mirror the Hong Kong ICAC 
Hong Kong Botswana South Africa Nan-dbia 
Naine of ICA C DCEC 
Public 
IDSEO 
Heath Unit 
Onibudsinan 
Agency Protector (SIU) 
Role Investigate Investigate Investigatei Investigate Investigate Investigate 
corruption, corruption, mproper serious maladminis maladministr 
prevention prevention conduct, economic tration, ation, 
and public and public corruption, offences fraud, corruption, 
education education maladminist corruption human rights 
ration, abuse and 
unlawful misuse of 
enrichment natural 
resources 
Powers Wide Wide Wide Wide Wide Wide powers 
powers of powers of powers of powers of powers of of entry, 
entry, entry, entry, entry, entry, search and 
search and search and search and search and search and seizure 
seizure seizure seizure seizure seizure 
Place in G=jýic= Director Public Director Head On-bud3nm 
political appointed appointed Protector appointed appointed appointed by 
system by Chief by appointed by by President 
Executive President by President President President 
Lhnits on No limits Limited by Limited by Limited by Limited by Limited by 
use of under nature of nature of nature of nature of nature of 
powers colonial democracy democracy dmmaLy - democracy democracy - 
administrati - sensitivity - sensitivity sensitivity - sensitivity sensitivity to 
on to political to political to political to political political 
protest at protest at protest at protest at protest at 
unchecked unchecked unchecked unchecked unchecked 
use of use of use of use of use of power 
power power power power 
Success in High - Minimal - Minimal - Minimal - Minimal Minimal - 
tackling unchecked focus on very poorly poorly polifical little done to 
high level use of petty resourced resourced interference implement 
corruption power corruption powers - 
cases very poorly 
resourced 
Likewise, IDSEO also has some wide-ranging powers like the ICAC and the 
DCEC. In tenns of section 28 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act of 1998, 
it can question any person under oath and summon 
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any person who is believed to be able to furnish any infannation on the 
subject of the inquiry or to have in his possession or under his control any 
book, document or other object relating to that subject, to appear before 
the Investigating Director at a time and place specified in the summons, to 
be questioned or to produce that book, document or other object (Republic 
of South Africa, 1998: S. 28). 
Furthen-nore, under section 29, IIDSEO has extensive powers of entry, search and 
seizure. Moreover, IDSEO has the power to use 'reasonable force' against 
resistance to the entry and search of any premises with or without a warrant. The 
SIU on the other hand, also has extensive powers under sections 5 and 6 of the 
Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act. These include wide powers 
of entry, search and seizure. The SITJ can also attach any money or order the 
return of money or property. However, unlike ICAC in Hong Kong and the DCEC 
in Botswana which fight corruption from a criminal perspective, the SIU combats 
corruption from a civil perspective and institutes civil action in a Special Tribunal. 
Similarly, the Ombudsman in Namibia, like the DCEC in Botswana, Hong Kong 
ICAC and, the Public Protector, SIU and IDSEO in South Africa, has broad 
investigating powers under section 4 of the Ombudsman Act and article 92 of the 
Namibian Constitution. The Ombudsman has wide powers of investigation, entry, 
search and seizure. He or she can administer an oath and has the right to decide who 
is to be present or not at any proceedings of any investigation. The Ombudsman may 
also decide the extent and nature of any investigation of any matter in question. He 
or she may also force or request any person to produce any material that in the 
opinion of the Ombudsman is necessary for any matter in question. And any person 
questioned is required to co-operate with the Ombudsman. 
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Although anti-corruption agencies in the three countries have been granted wide 
powers to investigate corruption, however, like the Hong Kong ICAC, they lack 
independent powers to prosecute possible offenders. In Hong Kong, the power to 
prosecute rests with the Secretary for Justice. In Botswana, the decision to prosecute 
is vested with the Attorney-General who retains the right to decline to prosecute. 
Similarly, the Public Protector refers its cases to the Police Service following its 
investigations. IDSEO which falls under the Ministry of Justice has been granted 
powers to prosecute since October 1998 but it continues to make recommendations 
to the National Prosecuting Authority (Interview, 12 May 2000). With regard to the 
SIU, it institutes action before a Special Tribunal following an investigation. 
However, for the SIU to investigate, the President has to give it the authority to do 
so. Similarly, the Ombudsman in Namibia does not have independent powers to 
prosecute. Rather, the Ombudsman recommends remedial action or refers the matter 
to the relevant body or authority following investigation. 
The problem of resources for agencies 
Unlike the ICAC, the anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, South Africa and 
Namibia are underresourced. The ICAC was designed for a colonial system with 
huge material resources. Theobald and Williams noted that the ICAC "is 
extremely well resourced (with 1300 stafo" and "operates in an environment 
where legal and financial institutions are extremely well developed" (1999: 130). 
Camerer observed that the ICAC functions "within a relatively well-regulated 
administrative culture alongside a large, well-resourced police force under a 
political and legal environment which supports anti-corruption activities" (1999: 
204). 
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Compared to the ICAC, anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, South Africa and 
Namibia are under-resourced, because there is usually lack of political support for 
anti-corruption agencies. In part this arises because there is lack of appreciation 
for the fact that an effective anti-corruption agency needs to be properly 
resourced. But political support is usually lacking, also, because anti-corruption 
agencies are victims of pressures for personal accumulation which bedevil African 
politics. Moreover, anti-corruption agencies lack adequate resources because of 
economic underdevelopment. Anti-corruption agencies compete for resources 
with other institutions of the state. Because of underdevelopment, the state is not 
able to provide adequate resources for any of its competing institutions, including 
anti-corruption agencies. Resources in this case refer not only to money but also 
institutional weaknesses and skills. In most developing countries, skills are in 
short supply and the institutions are generally weak. This manifests itself in weak 
support for anti-corruption activities from related institutions such as the judiciary 
and the criminal justice system. Camerer (1999) noted that a successful and 
effective anti-corruption agency should have sufficient monetary resources, 
sufficient experts, special powers, independence and coordination. In addition to 
these requirements as laid down by Camerer, governmental support is pertinent in 
the fight against corruption. Without such support it would be difficult to ensure 
that the above criterion is met for anti-corruption agencies to function effectively. 
Fighting corruption takes a lot of resources and commitment. 
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Compared to the ICAC, the DCEC in Botswana faces some problems. One such 
problem was shortage of trained personnel in the areas of combating white-collar 
crimes. At the moment, the DCEC heavily relies 
on expatriates (mostly retired) who are believed to be lacking the latest 
investigative skills. The feeling is that they have yesterday's skills. There 
are also problems of the leadership which fails to understand the direction 
the DCEC is going. Obstacles within the DCEC (e. g. internal 
communication problems) prevent conversion of skills. Others are 
disillusioned and the brightest people soon resign. Old people not 
knowledgeable with modem concepts are at the top with young and 
talented people at the bottom. This is a general problem in the Botswana 
Public Service (Interview, 14 January 2000). 
Equally, in South Africa, anti-corruption agencies are under-resourced in tenus of 
human a nd financial r esources (Heath, 1999, C amerer, 1999), w hich i mpact on 
their effectiveness in combating corruption. In a survey conducted in 2000 by the 
Institute for Security Studies in which more than 150 experts were interviewed, 
shortage of resources was regarded as the major problem hampering the 
government's efforts to tackle corruption in South Affica. 73% of the experts 
interviewed were of the view that the government did not have adequate resources 
to combat corruption (Mail & Guardian, 12 March 2001). 
For instance, the Public Protector which had a backlog of cases could only deal 
with half of the 200 cases it receives every month, and needed extra funding to do 
its job better (Business Day, 5 March 1998). In 2000, the Office of the Public 
Protector had 61 investigators, including supervisors (Interview, 8 May 2000). 
Similarly, in 1997, IDSEO then OSEO decided not to initiate fresh investigations 
until it had dealt with the backlog of cases in which R12bn was at stake (Business 
Day, 5 March 1998), and had more staff (Republic of South Affica, 1997). OSEO, 
the Commercial Crime Unit of the South African Police Service, the Attorney- 
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General asw ell as S enior P ublic P rosecutors don ot h ave a dequate s killed a nd 
trained staff to handle commercial cases. OSEO does not only lack experienced 
staff to do the actual investigations but to prosecute cases. As a result, it continues 
to refer its cases to the Attorney-General to prosecute. This does not only result in 
lengthy delays but in work being duplicated (ibid. 7). During my visit in 2000, 
IIDSEO had 44 investigators. With regard to the SITJ, according to its founder 
head, it had 95 staff members out of which 50 were involved in actual 
investigations in 1999. The Unit required around 200 investigators to be able to do 
its job properly. It had over 220 000 cases in 1999. The Unit used a complex 
computer system which enabled it to deal with a lot of cases much faster. Most of 
its cases (Interview, 11 May 2000). 
As in Botswana and South Africa, the Ombudsman in Namibia does not have 
adequate staff. It lacks the capability to execute its remit fully. The Office of the 
Ombudsman has a staff establishment of 12 posts save for the Ornbudswoman, of 
which four do the actual investigations (handle complaints). It is very thin on the 
ground. As such, the Office was not able to handle complicated investigations, 
and has also failed to establish a regional office. In part because of this, the Office 
remains mainly concentrated in Windhoek, the capital city. 
The other problem facing anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, South Africa and 
Namibia relates to inadequate funding. For example, in Botswana the DCEC's 
training budget for the year 1999/2000 was reduced by about 66% (Interview, 10 
January 2000). Botswana is a big country and the work of the DCEC entails a lot 
of travelling. There is also shortage of transport and drivers (Interview, 10 January 
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2000). The Director of the DCEC observed that shortage of resources, both human 
and financial, and the need to ensure operational capability, meant that the DCEC 
could not achieve its required training targets (Republic of Botswana, 2000). 
Similarly, in South Afhca shortage of funds is a problem affecting all the three 
agencies. Despite the existence of many anti-corruption agencies in South Affica 
than ever before, according to the Public Protector Selby Baqwa, most of these 
agencies are not adequately funded and fail to work together resulting in duplication 
of investigations (Mail & Guardian, 31 May 1997). For example, in 1998/99, the 
Public Protector asked for R22 million but was granted some R7.5 million (Sunday 
Independent, 22 March 1998; Mail and Guardian, 6 march 1998). For the financial 
year 1997/98, the Office of the Public Protector got R5.8 million (Business Day, 18 
March 1998). In 1998, the Public Protector of South Africa, Advocate Baqwa noted 
that although he could sense the political will to tackle corruption; tlýiis was yet to 
translate into resources (Mail and Chiardian, 6 March 1998). The Office of the 
Public Protector had to put aside a planned communications campaign because of 
lack of financial resources (Business Day, 18 March 1998). Commenting on the 
budget, an official in the Office of the Public Protector observed that "we are not 
satisfied with our budget but we got an increase in the last two years" (Interview, 8 
May 2000). Likewise, IDSEO faces the problem of funding. For instance, because of 
shortage of funds, a proposal to create an additional 29 posts could not be carried out 
(Republic of South Afhca 1997). The Special Investigating Unit is also not 
adequately funded (Interview, II May 2000). For example, in 1998, it required R32 
million to start an expansion process but it received a budget ofjust over R16 million 
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(The Star, 5 October 1998). This indicates that funding is a major problem for these 
agencies. 
In Namibia, under-funding is also a major problem for the Ombudsman. 
According to a senior official in the Office of the Ombudsman, shortage of funds 
is the key problem faced by the Ombudsman in Namibia (Interviews, 28 
February; 3 March 2000). Generally, the Office of the Ombudsman in Namibia 
faces uncertainty regarding the availability of funds (Republic of Namibia, 1999). 
In Namibia, the Office of the Ombudsman is financially accountable to the 
Ministry of Justice. This Ministry also faces the problem of under-funding. For 
instance, it received N$101 million during the 1999/2000 financial year. The 
problem of funding was highlighted by the Minister of Justice during the 
1999/2000 budget. The Minister noted that because of financial problems, the 
creation of Small Claims Courts and the reorganization of Community courts 
were suspended for seven years. Thus because of shortage of courts and judicial 
officers, courts are currently stretched to the limit. Therefore, there is a need to 
train and employ more judicial officers and support staff in order to improve the 
administration of justice (The Nandbian, 14 May 1999). For the same period, the 
Office of the Ombudsman was granted N$2,822,000. In the financial year 
1998/1999, it received N$2,371,000 and NS1,977,000 for the financial year 
1996/1997. Nonetheless, the budget of the Office of the Ombudsman remains 
insufficient. 
In a ddition tos hortage of t rained s taff a nd i nadequate funding, t he D CEC a Iso 
faced delays at the Attorney-General Office because of its failure to bring cases to 
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court immediately. Delays at the Attomey-General Office arise due to shortage of 
staff (Republic of Botswana, 1998). The Director of the DCEC acknowledges this. 
He observed that the establishment of the DCEC has created an extra work load 
for the Attorney-General's Office because cases emanating from the DCEC make 
more than 50% of the work of the Prosecution Division in the Attorney-General's 
Office. Despite the increase in the Prosecution Division's work load, the Division 
did not recruit more staff to deal with the increased work load. As a result, there 
are delays in dealing with cases (Republic of Botswana, 1997). Besides problems 
within the Attomey-General's Office, there are delays within the administration of 
justice. The Director of the DCEC further observed that the formation of the 
DCEC had a significant effect on Magistrates courts because it meant more cases 
are brought before them. As a result, it takes longer for the courts to deal with 
cases before them in time (Republic of Botswana, 1997: 6). 
In Namibia, over and above shortage of staff and funds, the Office of the 
Ombudsman as noted in chapter six has an organizational structure which offers 
some restricted promotional opportunities for its members. This would make it 
difficult for the Office to attract the best brains in the country. Moreover, apart 
from diminished political support, the Office also faces lack of co-operation from 
institutions complained against (Republic of Namibia, 1999). 
The other key problem which hampers the operations of the Office of the 
Ombudsman in Namibia is that it does not initiate its own investigations. It can 
11 
only investigate when it has received a complaint either from an individual or an 
institution. This is regarded as a major limitation for the Office of the 
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Ombudsman in Namibia (Interview, 22 February 2000). The Office of the 
Ombudsman needs to be equipped so that it can initiate its own investigations 
without having to wait for a complaint to be made first. Related to this, the Office 
of the Ombudsman lacks independent powers to arrest and prosecute. Instead, it 
recommends some remedial action following an investigation. A combination of 
these factors makes the Ombudsman in Namibia a weak organization. 
Effectiveness of agencies in the three countries 
Having examined the functions, powers, resources of anti-corruption agencies and 
their place in the political system in the three countries, we seek to examine their 
effectiveness in combating corruption. The Hong Kong ICAC, on which anti- 
corruption agencies in Botswana, South Africa and Namibia have been modelled on, 
has been successful in fighting corruption. Moran situates the success of the ICAC in 
the context of a complex set of interconnected factors of the Hong Kong political 
economy. He attributes its effectiveness to "state capacity, favourable relations with 
the metropolitan power [Britain], the rule of IaNv and the balance of power within the 
political economy" (1999: 112). 
Thus, the successes of anti-corruption agencies need to be understood in the context 
of their resources, the way they have been structured and the political environments 
under which they function. In Aftica, anti-corruption agencies were seen to be 
failing in combating high-level corruption. This is because tackling high-level 
corruption threatened the political establishment. Thus, tackling high-level 
corruption was a question of political will. Giving a key-note address at the 9ý' 
International Anti-corruption Conference, Durban, South Affica on the I Ph October 
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1999, President Festus Mogae emphasised the importance of political will in the 
anti-corruption crusade as follows: 
for if an anti-corruption campaign is to succeed the Goverm-nent of the day 
must be prepared to risk potential embarrassment to itself, and there must 
be an accompanying realisation that whatever mechanisms are put in 
place, they must be so organised and structured that the campaign and the 
campaigners have unfettered operational autonomy, subject only of course 
to the necessity to ensure strict observance of human rights and of course 
natural justice and the laws regarding the obtaining of evidence (Republic 
of Botswana, 2000: 29). 
This underlines the fundamental importance of political will in fighting corruption 
especially in Africa where anti-corruption agencies were or have become victims 
of the political process. 
Compared to the ICAC, anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, South Africa and 
Namibia have produced disappointing results in tenris of investigating and 
prosecuting high-level corruption. In Botswana, the DCEC has dealt with a wide- 
range of cases since its creation in 1994. Some of the cases the DCEC has dealt with 
include tax evasion, illegal importation of the currency, stealing by servant, 
misappropriation of money collected in official capacity, perverting the course of 
justice, bribing and attempting to bribe public officers, forged documentation, 
buying of certificates, licences, passports and permits (both residence and work 
permits), ignoring tendering procedures, false claims and smuggling of goods. 
However, what was striking about the DCEC was that the majority of the cases it has 
dealt with involved petty corruption of officials who received a few hundreds 
Botswana Pula of P100 - P500 or making false claims. The Director of the DCEC 
acknowledged this. He says "a majority of cases involve petty corruption such as 
someone failing to pass a driver's (licence) test and finding a way around it" 
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(Business Day, 8 April 1998). Likewise, the 1999 annual report for the DCEC noted 
that 
a large number of investigations have concerned allegations concerning false 
claims made by public officers for subsistence allowance and travelling 
expenses. A Ithough a mounts i nvolved ine ach c ase a re r elativelY s mall, it 
does appear the problem is widespread, affects a number of Ministries and 
cumulatively involves a considerable amount of Government ftinds 
(Republic of Botswana, 2000: 15). 
For the period 1994 to 1999, the DCEC received some 6,587 cases or complaints 
which resulted in investigations commencing in 1,994 cases as shown in 
Appendix 4. It should be noted that not all the cases received by the DCEC 
amount to corruption and economic crime. Out of the 6,587 complaints received 
in the period 1994 to 1999,4,593 were either referred to other bodies or no action 
was taken. In 1999, t he DCECreceived fewer reports than in 1996,1997, and 
1998. This was attributable to the opening of the Office of the Ombudsman 
(Republic of Botswana, 2000) and, probably to the new referencing system that 
was introduced in January 1999. Prior to this, in the view of one senior DCEC 
official, the DCEC used a flawed referencing system (Interview, 12 October 
1999). 
The DCEC has been heavily criticised for targeting the 'small fish' or petty 
corruption and leaving the 'big fish' (high-level corruption) free. As one senior 
opposition politician put it: 
There is a belief that at a lower-level corruption is being seriously fought. 
The majority of cases registered at court so far involve small sums of 
money. That is, corruption generated by economic factors. But corruption 
at a greater scale by big shots is not really being fought or is being 
ignored. And this is where Batswana expected something at that level, but 
Batswana have not seen that. At the big shot level, the DCEC has not yet 
achieved its objectives. We get big shots corruption in the papers, not in 
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court. T he p apers j ust s imply reveal. Idon ot t hink t hat t he p apers w ill 
always write something without a basis. Minister Jacob Nkate's just 
simply resigned and that does not address the problem. A definition for big 
shots should be different because they are the ones who create the 
conditions for corruption. This is what I call silent corruption, behind the 
doors, make connections with some big guys, give them favours e. g. 
tenders, a loan etc, even though they do not qualify at times. Nkate 
pretended to be an attorney even though he did not pay to practice. So, on 
what basis was he acting? He obtained P 10 000 for being aD irector of 
Zachern Company. The big shot in this case is a sleeping partner. He is not 
active but still benefits (Interview, 24 January 2000). 
Another opposition politician observed that the successes of the DCEC in combating 
corruption were questionable because "it does not focus its attention on all members 
of the community. There are those it regards as untouchable" (Interview, 10 January 
1999). Allegations of corruption especially in tendering involving ministers and their 
close associates were rife in Botswana. There were also claims that the DCEC did 
not treat its suspects on an equal basis. It would appear there was a fear to investigate 
because the DCEC falls under the president's office. Partly because of this, and "the 
cautious approach in prosecution", it was not surprising that no single minister has 
been prosecuted (Interview, 4 February 2000). In the view of one University of 
Botswana academic, the DCEC was seen as a public relations unit (Interview, 20 
January 1999). 
Although the DCEC was perceived as fairly ineffectual in tackling high-level 
corruption, it has handled a few cases that were of interest as discussed in chapter 
four (see pages 122 - 128). As shown in chapter four, probably the most interesting 
and complicated case it has dealt with was the Nicholas Zachem case which led to 
the r esignation ofac abinet m inister a nd r esulted int he c onviction oft he former 
Director of the Department of Roads. 
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Similarly, in South Affica, the successes of anti-corruption agencies should be 
understood in the light of its history and transition, and the nature of the agencies it 
has set up. The Special Investigating Unit (SM observed that if there is one area 
where there is a boom in the South African economy, it is in corruption, 
misappropriation and maladministration. This is an issue of serious worry for the 
business sector. The appalling reality is that a considerable section of the South 
Affican populace seems to consider public resources as "fair game" for corrupt 
practices. This mind-set goes into other areas and when doing business with the 
state, demanding payment from the state for services rendered and, when dealing 
with state assets. Members of the public and the private sector regularly collide with 
public officials in diverting a significant proportion of state resources meant for the 
general populace (Republic of South Africa, 2000: http: //wNvw. heathsiu. co. za). The 
SHJ further observed that South Affica was "faced with a crisis, a national crisis, a 
problem far more serious than what the ordinary man in the street perceives if', and 
"somehow internal controls, supervisors audits, the police and the ordinary courts 
have not been able to hinder the growth of this problem" (Republic of South Africa, 
2000: //mv%v. heathsiu. co. za). 
In 2001, the head of the SIU questioned the seriousness of the political leadership in 
fighting corruption in South Africa warning that if necessary action was not taken, 
South A frica ra ight " go t he s arne w a)e' aso ther Third World c ountries in A frica 
(Mail &G itardian, 4A pril 2 00 1). A ccording to the h ead oft he SJU " corruption 
governs aS outh A frica I ed byp eople w ho a re n ot s erious, a bout fighting i t" a nd 
warned that "if govenunent does not allow investigations or support investigations 
into corruption properly then it allows corruption to increase. Until and unless we 
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become enthusiastic and dedicated in the fight against corruption we will not make 
progress in this country" (Mail & Guardian, 4 April 2001). It appears the emerging 
perception was that "important public institutions such as the Public Protector and 
the Special Investigating Unit" were being "undennined by the readiness of African 
National Congress (ANQ leaders to defend its own members" (Business Day, 18 
April 2001). 
However, the establishment of the Public Protector, the Investigating Directorate: 
Serious economic Offences (IDSEO) and the SIU amongst others, were indicative 
of a declared intent to combat corruption. The Public Protector has investigated 
numerous cases since its creation in 1995. The Public Protector carried over 544 
cases from the former Ombudsman when he took over office in October 1995. In 
the period, October 1995 and March 1996 and, April 1996 and June 1996, the 
Public Protector received on average 133 and 200 cases per month (Republic of 
South Africa, 1997). Appendix 6 shows how the cases for this period were 
finalised. 
For the period October 1995 to June 1996, the nature of complaints involved 
pensions, conditions in prisons, corruption in approving building plans, tender 
irregularities and improper preference, police victimisation, passport refusals. Since 
October 1995, the Public Protector had by January 1999, in spite of the financial 
constraints, finalised 4,868 cases. "In 526 cases it was found that the complaint was 
not founded. The office has also provided advice or assistance in 3,262 cases. These 
exclude the telephonic assistance that is provided to thousands of complaints 
annually. The achievements of this office have been recognised internationally" such 
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that South Africa hosted the 2000 International Conference for the International 
Ombudsman Institute (Republic of South Africa, 2001: http: //mvw. polity. org. za). 
Some of the cases of great public interest investigated by the Public Protector, 
include investigations of the Play Sarafina H and its Donor (1996), irregularities 
concerning the 1996 Matric Examinations, irregularities pertaining to the issuing of 
Degrees and courses at the University of Zululand (1997), the conduct of officials of 
the Ministry and Department of Health Statements regarding the prices of medicines 
in South Africa (1997), the Affairs of the independent Broadcasting Authority 
(1998), the awarding of a contract by the Mpurnalanga Housing Board to Motheo 
Construction (pty) Ltd (1999), nepotism in government (1999), a public statement by 
Mpumalanga Premier, who declared that "it was acceptable for politicians to lie" 
(1999), and it has also investigated alleged irregularities into the Affairs and 
Financial statements of the Strategic Fuel Fund Association (SFF) Association 
(1999). 
In the period July 1996 to December 1996, the Public Protector received on 
average 219 cases (Republic of South Africa, 1996). Appendix 7 shows how cases 
received during this period were finalised. And for the period January 1997 to 
December 1997, the Public Protector received and finalised cases as shown in 
Appendix 8. In spite of its staffing constraints, the above cases demonstrate that 
the Public Protector receives more cases than it can handle. 
IDSEO on the one hand, has investigated many cases that involve large sums of 
money since it was established. Some of the cases it has investigated include; a 
pyramid scheme in which members of the public lost around R19m, a R95rn 
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investment fraud, 6,000 tons gold bearing soil theft, fraud involving the diversion 
of the United Nations World Food programme from Angola to South Africa, the 
NBS bank fraud amounting to R135m, "fraud, reckless and insider trading in 
Crusader life Assurance Corporation Limited", two cases of prime bank 
instrument frauds, "in which forged bank instruments were used to attempt to 
obtain credit or funds". Numerous investigations by IDSEO have led to successful 
prosecutions. Appendix 9 shows some of the cases that have been handled by 
IDSEO, together with the amount of money involved. However, as we noted 
earlier, IIDESO was hampered by lack of adequate resources. 
On the other hand, the SIU was regarded as the most successful anti-corruption 
agency in South Africa despite its resource constraints. In 2000, more than 150 
experts were inter-viewed as part of the Institute for Security Studies survey on the 
causes of and controls needed to combat corruption in South Affica rated the SIU 
as the most effective a nti-corruption agency in the country. It received an 85% 
approval rating compared with those of the Auditor General (74%), the Public 
Protector (62%), the Special Investigating Directorate on Corruption within the 
National Directorate of Public Prosecutions (47%) and the Public Service 
Commission (34%) (Mail & Guardian, 12 March 2001). 
Since the Heath Unit started its operations in 1996, it "has recovered about 
R314m for the state" and the unit "is currently investigating 221,580 cases 
involving about 100 organs of state and extending over all nine provinces. About 
R3bn was at stake" (ibid., 29 November 2000: http: //-vv,, vw. mg. co. za). In 1999, it 
recovered state assets / money up to RI. 3 billion (Interview, II May 2000). In 
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1998, the Special Unit "recovered 80 farms valued at R20 million, 372 state- 
owned vehicles worth R33 million and R23 million defrauded from the office of 
Eastem Cape Premier" (The Star, 24 August 1998), and "recovered R848 
million". "Between 1995 and 1996 the fon-ner Heath Commission saved or 
recovered RIO billion" (Republic of South Africa, 
2001: http: //%vNvw. heathsiu. co. za). In 2000, it prevented "R168m in potential 
corruption" (Mail & Guardian, 24 January 2001: http: //NvNvw. mg. co. za). 
The SrU was not only regarded as the most successful anti-corruption agency in 
South Africa, but it was the top and most able. Dismissing reports that the SIU 
was to be dissolved, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development noted 
that 
when government took office in 1994, it soon became apparent that 
government d id n ot h ave t he c apacity toa ct u pon a llegations ofs crious 
corruption, maladministration or misappropriate of State funds swiftly and 
decisively. Whilst institutions such as Commissions of inquiry, the Public 
Protector and the Office for Serious economic Offences could be utilised 
to some extent to curb these kind of problems, they lack the necessary 
cohesion to produce satisfactory results. Commissions of inquiry generally 
do not have the teeth to enforce their recommendations whilst the 
Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences is principally 
involved in the investigation of criminal offences and forms part of the 
National Prosecuting Authority. The Public Protector on the other hand 
does not have adjudicative powers so as to enforce its findings (Republic 
of South Africa, 2001: http: //%v,, vxv. polity. org. za). 
Nevertheless, the SIU was dependent on Presidential proclamations for it to 
investigate. In 2001, the SIU clashed with government following a Constitutional 
Court ruling which declared that it was improper for a judge to head such a unit as 
this blurred the line between the executive and the judiciary. The government was 
given one year to rectify the situation. 
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According to the founder head of the Special Investigating Unit, Judge Heath, 
since the Penuell Maduma took over as the Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development "little or nothing was referred to the Unit" (Republic of South 
Africa, 2001: http: //Nv,, v-%v. polity. org. za). Responding to this, Minister Maduna 
declared that: 
government was under no obligation to refer each and every case to the 
Unit for investigations. There are other agencies in place such as the 
Public Protector, the Scorpions, Asset Forfeiture Unit, the Auditor General 
and the Police who can also investigate similar cases. The question 
whether to refer a new case to the Unit or not is the president's discretion 
(Republic of South Africa, 2001: http: //vý, mv. polity. org. za). 
Without the Presidential proclamations, the SlU becomes powerless. This was the 
case when President Thabo Mbeki refused to allow the SIU to take part in the 
controversial R43 billion arms contract as we demonstrated in chapter five. 
In Namibia, the Ombudsman was generally regarded as ineffectual in combating 
corruption as it lacked the necessary coherence. As one senior official in the Office 
of the Prime Minister put it: "the Ombudsman lacks initiative, it does not prosecute 
but makes some recommendations. It is thin on the ground. It lacks resources such as 
experts and adequate funding. It is only based in Windhoek. Its presence is not felt, 
and its role is not yet appreciated" (Interview, 24 February 2000). In 2000, the Office 
of the Ombudsman had only three investigators. It was believed that the 
Ombudsman in Namibia faced two key problems, lack of capacity and political will. 
One University of Namibia academic noted that "the ombudsman lacks the 
investigative capacity and the capacity to follow up cases. These problems are quite 
considerable. At the moment the Ombudsman is a victim of executive influence. It 
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has fallen into silence and is largely ineffective" (Interview, 28 Febmary 2000). In 
the view of an official of the Namibian society for Human Rights, the Ombudsman 
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in Namibia "lacks credibility. It is a far cry. Although the Act of the Ombudsman is 
good, lack of funding, lack of institutional independence and under-staffing 
undermine the independence of the Ombudsm&' (Interview, 29 February 2000). 
Although allegations of corruption especially in high places were rife in Namibia, a 
closer look at the reports of the Ombudsman suggested that the majority of the cases 
it handled were matters to do with conditions of service for civil servants. Some of 
the issues it investigated include; unfair dismissals, remuneration, problems with the 
supervisor, pension fund, inappropriate actions, unfair labour practice, parole, 
citizenship and passports. For instance, in 1997 and 1998, of the cases dealt with by 
the Ombudsman, unfair dismissal and remuneration constituted 23% and 20%, and 
21% and 13% respectively (Republic of Namibia 1997; 1998). 
Response to international governance concerns 
The ineffectiveness of anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, South Aftica and 
Namibia, especially in tackling high-level corruption may suggest that the purpose of 
establishing these agencies might possibly have more to do with reassuring investors 
and aid donors in an age of globalisation than with actually combating high-level 
corruption. There is some evidence which supports this observation in all the three 
country cases. In Botswana, the Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public 
Administration, Lt. General Mompati Merafhe at that time pointed out that by 
introducing the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) Bill, the 
government wanted to make it clear to the voters and investors that business in 
Bots%, Vana was done in a just and sincere manner, and that the voters do not put up 
with abuses of the law by those who possess wealth and are in positions of influence 
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(Republic of Botswana, 1994). This shows that the government was concerned with 
investor confidence in the country. The concern with investor confidence was also 
reiterated by Botswana's President Festus Mogae in 1999 when addressing the ninth 
International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC) in Durban, South Africa. 
President Mogae observed that by introducing an anti-corruption agency, Botswana 
was sending a clear message to the international investors that business activities and 
decisions in Botswana were not detennined by offering bribes or inducements. 
Moreover, Botswana needed to assure its citizens that the govermnent encouraged 
their wish to have a goveniment, public and private institutions which are reliable 
and dependable (Mogae, 1999). 
Similarly, South Africa hosted the ninth International Anti-Corruption Conference 
(IACC) in 1999; the first such conference to be held in Affica. The conference 
showed that there was growing unease over the problem of corruption in Africa not 
only amongst governments but civic organisations as well. This conference was one 
significant instance of how international developments and pressures impact on the 
development of anti-con-uption agencies in Affica and elsewhere. The development 
of these agencies shows that corruption was not only taken seriously but there was 
also a need to control it because corruption was perceived as a threat. Speaking in 
1997 at a seminar in Midgard, Namibia, the foriner South Affican Minister of Water 
Affairs and Forestry, Kader Asmal warned that corruption was one of the major 
threats to democracy globally, especially in Affica where the development of 
democracy remains weak. Likewise, there is also concern about the problem of 
corruotion in Namibia. Two anti-corruption seminars - led by the Prime Minister - 
were held in 1997 and 1998. The aim of these conferences was to formulate a 
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national integrity plan for the country. Following these seminars, an anti-corruption 
bill was tabled in Parliament in 2001 by the Prime Minister. The Bill which has been 
stalled by the political process is yet to be translated into law. 
While Botswana, Namibia and South Africa were considered as the least corrupt 
countries in Africa by Transparency International, through these initiatives these 
countries want to show foreign investors, donors as well as voters that they were 
concerned about the problem of corruption. Thus, although the three countries 
were not subjected to the same levels of direct donor pressures as much of Africa, 
these countries wanted to protect their fragile democratic gains and strengthen 
their reputation for honesty. It was in this context that the control of corruption 
was important for these countries hence the creation of anti-corruption agencies. 
Conclusion 
This chapter brought our case studies together in order to achieve a comparative 
analysis on anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, South Affica and Namibia. First, 
the chapter examined the nature of the state and patterns of corruption in the three 
countries. Second, it compared anti-corruption agencies in the three countries in 
tenns of their functions, powers, resources and their effectiveness in tackling 
corruption. In all three countries, anti-corruption agencies have an extensive mandate 
and powers. However, in all three countries anti-corruption agencies have produced 
disappointing results in investigating and prosecuting high-level corruption. 
The successes of anti-corruption agencies need to be understood in the context of 
their resources, the way they have been structured and the political environments 
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under which they function. In all the three countries, anti-corruption agencies have 
suffered from lack of resources resulting from lack of political support and the 
general problem of underdevelopment. There is also lack of political will to 
prosecute high-level corruption. Even if there was such a will, these agencies, by 
their nature, are unable to affect the underlying political pressures which promote 
corruption and that, therefore, their successes can only be limited to individual cases. 
Moreover, the model on which these agencies are based is inappropriate to the 
Affican setting and assumes conditions that cannot be replicated in the subcontinent. 
Therefore, the purpose of anti-corruption agencies in Africa might possibly have 
more to do with reassuring investors and aid donors in an age of globalisation than 
about actually attacking high-level corruption, an activity that would, after all, 
undermine the fragile political elites of these countries. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
This chapter gives a summary of the main arguments presented in the thesis. The 
thesis placed anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, South Africa and Namibia 
within the politics of the African state. It explored socio-political forces and 
economic problems that drive corruption in Africa and give rise to anti-corruption 
agencies. It sought to explain why corruption was seen as destructive to African 
development in terms of the politics of the state in Africa and to illustrate the 
factors that made anti-corruption agencies important and why they needed to be 
effective. The thesis has also examined the broader context of reform policies in 
Africa and more generally. Moreover, the thesis discussed the politics of 
corruption, Ahe nature of corruption and anti-corruption agencies in our case 
studies of Botswana, South Africa and Namibia. Lastly, the thesis brought the 
individual case studies together in order to attain a comparative analysis on anti- 
corruption agencies in the three countries. To the best of my knowledge, this 
study is the first of its kind. Previous studies focused on single country studies. 
For the past ten to fifteen years, Africa has been besieged by refonn efforts (neo- 
liberal) aimed at reversing corruption and economic crisis which bedevil African 
economies. These are mainly perceived as a governance problem amongst others 
by international financial institutions such as the World Bank. Przeworski noted 
that the goal of the recent reforms "is to organize the economy that rationally 
allocates resources and which the state is financially solvent" (1991: 136). 
AlthoUgh Bratton and Van de Walle appreciate that refonus which Africa 
embarked on in the 1990s "were shaped by the crippling effects of a structural 
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economic crisis and precipitated by democratic initiates in Eastern Europe, China 
and South Africa", they authoritatively contest that "African governments 
introduced governance refonns primarily in response to indigenous political 
demands" (1992: 27). The other factor that led to reforrns is the disintegration of 
the fon-ner Communist block. The collapse of the Soviet Union gave rise to a new 
international political order which favoured not only the growth and promotion of 
democracy in Africa and elsewhere, but has also gave donor agencies and 
governments an opportunity to tackle the problem of corruption. 
With the e nd oft he C old W ar, c orruption c ame tobep erceived asani ssue of 
great concern because it was associated with economic crisis facing most African 
countries. Prior to this, authoritarian and corrupt regimes received aid from both 
Western countries and the Soviet Union because Western countries were mainly 
concerned with the spread of communism. The flexibility in aid has dried up 
partly because authoritarian regimes have lost their strategic importance. William 
Reno noted that "superpower rivals lost much of their interest in weak states with 
the end of the Cold War" (1997: 166). Economic aid has been tied to political 
refonns. The end of the Cold War has played a key role in shaping the nature of 
the state that emerged in the 1990s. Even fon-ner liberation movements such as 
SWAPO and the ANC which benefited from Soviet aid in their fight against the 
apartheid state, have abandoned their rhetoric socialist programmes since 
assuming p ower inN amibia ( 1990) a nd S outh Africa ( 1994). N evertheless, as 
shown in chapter three, reforms are fraught with contradictions. 
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The post-colonial state in Africa assumed a central role in the economy mainly 
because the private sector was underdeveloped. As a result, the state was seen as 
an engine of development and the only means to acquire wealth hence it became 
the battlefield for resources (Mokoli, 1992). Although corruption was often 
perceived as a product of individual greed, lack of morals etc, the nature of the 
state was of paramount importance in understanding the dynamics of corruption in 
Africa. The nature of the post-colonial state made access to the state crucial 
because the state was the single most important entity which controlled vast 
amounts of resources than any other entity. As a result the state was seen as the 
source of education, health, employment and wealth in much of Africa. C arino 
(1985) observed that govenunent manages the distribution of a huge number of 
services such as employment, health and education along with licences and 
contracts. Johnston underscores the same point, noting that "government is an 
important source of goods, services, money decisions, and authority in society - 
benefits that are vigorously pursued by many groups and individuals" and, in most 
case's "demand for government's rewards frequently exceeds the supply" (1982: 
3). This was acute in most of the developing world where resources were scarce. 
The majority of the populace in most of the developing world is heavily 
dependent on the state for their survival. As a result, the state was besieged with 
demands which it could not meet. However, by the 1980s 
the economic situation in most countries that followed the state-oriented 
paradigm was deteriorating. State-directed development had led to the 
creation of bloated bureaucracies, inefficient management, loss of 
productivity, corruption, deterioration of services, the rise of new elites 
feeding off the public purse, and widespread public discontent. The notion 
that a strong state is the key to development had been discredited (Case, 
2001: http: //Nv-%vxv. case. org. za/htm/civilsaf. htm). 
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The World Bank attributed policy failure on patronage networks during the Cold 
War (Reno, 1997). Partly because of past state failures, neo-liberal refonns called 
for a minimal state which was both efficient and effective. For the neo-liberals, 
corruption existed because there was no democracy, and that the state interfered 
with the functioning of the market. Therefore they were putting pressure on Third 
World governments to institute political and economic reforms. These reforms 
perceive the market as the engine of economic development because the state was 
associated with corruption and past economic failures. Neo-liberal reforms were 
calling for right sizing, down-sizing, privatisation and deregulation amongst 
others. They contested that "radical privatization and deep cuts in state 
employment ... subject state agents to the discipline of the market" (ibid. 170). 
Moreover, "private enterprise will undermine inefficient patron-client cliques as 
resources shift from state control to the private economy" (ibid. 170). 
Nevertheless, as we noted in chapter three, these reforms are not a panacea for 
corruption. Instead economic reforms may lead to the privatisation of corruption 
whereas political refonns may democratise corruption. 
Recent history in Africa indicated that there was a move towards the development 
I of anti-corruption agencies and ombudsmen mainly because of domestic and 
international democratic pressures.. Domestic pressures included the press, 
interests groups and pressures from opposition parties. On the international front 
these included the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, 
Transparency International and donor agencies in general which were concerned 
with the problem of corruption. Botswana, South Africa and Namibia were not 
exceptions in creating anti-corruption institutions. The global trend was to 
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establish specialised agencies with special powers to curb corruption. In 
Botswana, the DCEC was established in 1994, and in Namibia, an Ombudsman 
was created in 1990 and plans were under way to create a specialised agency. In 
South Africa, IDSEO was set up in 1992, and the Public Protector and the Heath 
SIU were established in 1994 and 1996 respectively. The ultimate reason for 
establishing these institutions was to promote transparency and accountability. 
These agencies lack independent powers to prosecute. They investigate and refer 
cases to the prosecuting institution and/or recommend remedial action where 
appropriate. In Botswana, the DCEC investigates, prevents and educates the 
public on the dangers of corruption to the economy and the society at large, and in 
Namibia, the Ombudsman investigates corruption, administrative malpractices, 
abuse of human rights and misuse of natural resources. 
In South Africa, the Public Protector must 
investigate matters and protect the public against matters such as 
maladministration in connection with the affairs of government, improper 
conduct by a person perfon-ning a public function, improper acts with 
respect to public money, improper or unlawful enrichment of a person 
performing a public function and an act or omission by a person 
perfon-ning a public function resulting in improper prejudice to another 
person (Republic of South Africa, 1994: PREAMBLE). 
IDESO, on the one hand, was established to provide for a quick and proper 
investigation ofs crious economic o ffences. T he H cath S M, ont he o ther h and, 
was set up "for the purpose of investigating serious malpractices or 
maladministration in connection with the administration of state institutions, State 
assets and public money as well as any conduct which may seriously harm the 
interests of the public" (Republic of South Africa, 
2001: http: //xvxv,, v. heathsiu. co. za/act. htm). Anti-corruption agencies in the three 
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countries differ in terms of the strategies they use to combat corruption. In 
Botswana, the DCEC uses three pronged strategy of investigation, prevention and 
public education, a strategy it borrowed from Hong Kong. In South Africa, the 
three agencies, the Public Protector, IDSEO and the SIU, fight corruption mainly 
through investigation. The same applies to the Ombudsman in Namibia. 
The creation of these institutions suggested that there was a declared intent to 
fight corruption in the three countries. However, despite efforts to fight corruption 
by Botswana, South Africa and Namibia in their public administrations, the 
results have so far been largely disappointing in tenns of investigating and 
prosecuting high-level corruption. The problem facing these agencies goes beyond 
resources and the appropriateness of the model. The problem is that these 
agencies are unable to change the underlying political pressures which drive 
corruption. If they attempt to do so, their government hinder progress. The 
obvious example is the SIU which experienced difficulties when it wished to 
investigate the controversial R43 billion arms contract. 
For all that, the development of these agencies is a hopeful sign that the struggle 
to contain corruption - and to prevent its destructive effects - is being taken 
seriously. Whatever the motives for their creation, they are indicative of a felt 
need to confront the problem and to be seen to be doing so. Perhaps, in time, they 
will be given the support and resources they need to develop sharper teeth. 
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(i) Botswana 
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Assistant Director, DCEC 
Assistant Director, DCEC 
Assistant Director, DCEC 
Assistant Director, DCEC 
Principal Investigator, DCEC 
Principal Investigator, DCEC 
Principal Investigator, DCEC 
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Investigator, DCEC 
Investigator, DCEC 
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Leader, Botswana Congress Party (BCP) 
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Deputy Attorney-General 
The Ombudsman 
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Official of Ditshwanelo (Botswana Centre for Human Rights) 
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Interviews were conducted during February and March 2000 in Windhoek with, 
among others, 
Deputy Director, Office of the Ombudsman 
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Deputy Director, Office of the Prime Minister 
Director, Ministry of Water Affairs 
Public Relations Officer, Ministry of Home Affairs 
Professor, University of Namibia 
Lecturer, University of Namibia 
Director, National Society for Human Rights 
Auditor General 
Assistant Auditor General 
USAID Official, Windhoek 
DFID official, Windhoek 
European Union Official, Windhoek 
Leader, Democratic Tumhalle Alliance (DTA) 
Govemment Attomey 
Under Secretary, Office of the Prime Minister 
Editor, The Namibian Newspaper, Windhoek 
MP, Congress of Democrats (CoD) 
Legal Services Officer, Legal Assistance Centre 
Editor, Die Republikein Newspaper, Windhoek 
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(iii) South Africa 
Interviews were conducted in May 2000 in Pretoria with, among others, 
The Director, Investigating Directorate for Serious Economic Offences (IDSEO) 
Senior Advocate, IDSEO 
Senior Advocate, IDSEO 
Head, Special Investigating Unit (SIU) 
Executive Assistant, SIU 
Public Relations Officer, Office of the Public Protector 
Chief Advocate, Office of the Public Protector 
Registry Officer, Office of the Public Protector 
Journalist, South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) 
DFID official, Pretoria 
Joumalist, Pretoria News, Pretoria 
African National Congress (ANC) politician 
Senior Advocate, Department of Justice 
Senior Advocate, Department of Justice 
Democratic Alliance (DA) politician 
Professor, University of Pretoria 
Lecturer, University of Pretoria 
Deputy Director, Department of Pubic Works 
USAID official, Pretoria 
Director, Public Service Commission 
Member, Public Service Commission 
Communication Officer, Department of Land Affairs 
Legal Services Officer, Department of Land Affairs 
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Appendix 1: Markovits and Silverstein's due process 
The realm of scandals in liberal democracies 
The logic of power The logic of due process 
By its very nature: By its very nature: 
-Privatizing -Public-oriented 
-Secretive -Open 
-Exclusive -Inclusive 
Reproduced from: Markovits and Silverstein (1988: 7) 
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for senior officers of anti-corruption agencies 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to solicit information on the effectiveness of 
anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. Please note that 
all inforination will be treated in confidence. The inforination will be used in 
aggregate terms and not for individual cases. You are therefore assured complete 
confidentiality. 
a) Personal data 
1) Gender a) M [: ] b) Fn 
2) Age group a) 21 - 30 F-I b) 30 - 40 [] c) 40 - 50 E] d) 50 - 60 0 e) 60 
n 
3) Educational Background a) no schooling [: ] b) PrimaryE] c) Secondary 
[: ] d) CollegeE] e) UniversityE] f) Others 
4) Citizenship a) Citizen F-I b) Non-citizen R 
5) What office do you hold with the organisation? -------------------------------------- 
6) What are the functions and responsibilities of your office / job? 
7) Is- your role in the organisation investigatory or managerial? 
8) What is your previous employment? 
------------------------------------------------ 
b) Organizational details 
9) What is the name of your organisation? ----------------------- 
I 
10) When was it established? 
I 1)_ By which statute? ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
12) What is your organisation charged to do? 
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13) How many individuals (establishment) are working for this organisation? 
14) How many of these are; a) supervisors n b) investigators [: ] c) back-up staff 
16) Are there any vacant posts in your organisation? a) YesE] b)NoE] 
17) Why are they vacant? -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
18) How do you compensate for the vacant posts? 
19) Where is your organisation situated within government? a) Office of the 
President b) Ministry of Justice [: ] c) Ministry of Home AffairsEld) National 
Assembly D e) Police F1 
20) How does your organisation work with this? 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
21) Who appoints its chief officer(s)? a) President 0 b) Minister of JusticeEj 
c) ParliamentFý 
22) To whom do you report to? a) President [: ] b) Minister of JusticeE] 
c) Parliament M 
23) What is the budget of your organisation? a) less than I OmE] b) 10 - 20m 
c) 20 - 30m [] d) 30 - 40mE] e) 40-50m [: ] f) 50 - 60m [] g) 60m+ [: ] 
24) What proportion of the budget is allocated for different functions? 
a) equipmentE] b) Management R c) investigationE] d) back-up administration 
FJ 
25) Is this enough? a) yesE: ] b) NoF-l 
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26) If no, how much more do you really need? ----------------- 
27) Do you feel your organisation is adequately funded? a) Yes [: ] b) No [] c) 
Do not know F-1 
c) Functions of the organisation 
28) Why was your organisation established? --------------------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
29) What does it entail? ---------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------------------------- I 
30) What are the expected outcomes? ----------------------------- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3 1) How does the statute define corruption? ------------------ 
32) Do you think this is a useful definition? a) Yes E] b) No [] c) Do not Know 
33) Is it an adequate definition? a) Yes n b) No [: ] c) Do not knowE] 
34) What kind of expertise do people in your organisation need? 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
35) Do you have adequate expertise? a) Yes F1 b) NoE] c) Do not know [: ] 
36) If no, what steps have you taken to provide the required training? --------------- 
37) Do you have the necessary and adequate equipment? a) Yes [] b) NoE] c) 
Do not knowF-I 
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38) What is the exact nature of your powers (specific) given to conduct your 
work? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
39) What is the source of them? ------------------------------------------------------------ 
40) Have there been amendments to your statute to reduce or increase your 
powers? a) yesE]b) NoF-j 
41) If yes, why were they changed? ------------------------------------------------------- 
42) Do you think these changes have made it easier for you to conduct your work? 
a) yes n b) No F] 
43) Are these powers necessary? a) Yes [] b) No F-1 
44) Why? 
45) Is the way you exercise your powers subject to extemal review? a) YesE: ] b) 
No R 
46) What limits are put on the way yo u exercise your powers? ----------------------- 
47) Do you think your organisation enjoys public support? a) Yes [: ] b) No [J 
48) If yes, what makes you say that? 
49) If no, what do you think can make the public conscious and confident in your 
work? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
50) Do you feel your organisation has the support of politicians? a) Yes [: ] b) No 
F-I 
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5 1) Which politicians? a) Government [] b) MPs F-I c) both government and MPs 
F-I 
52) If yes, what makes you say that? 
53) If no, what do you think can make the politicians conscious and confident in 
your work? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
54) In what ways do politicians support your organisation? 
55) With which departments do you cooperate closely? 
56) Are there any where relations are difficult? a) yesE] b) No F1 
57) Why do you think that is? 
58) What strategy do you use to combat corruption 
59) Is it adequate? a) Yes F] b) No F-1 
60) What is the range of penalties offenders may get? 
61) Are the penalties adequate? a) Yes [] b) No F1 
62) Do they act as a deterrent? a) Yes 0 b) No F1 
63) To whom are you immediately accountable? a) President F1 b) Minister of 
Justice F1 c) Minister of Home Affairs [: ] d) Parliament E] e) Judge [j f) Police 
F-1 
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64) Is your organisation transparent? a) Yes 0 b) No n 
65) What kind of monitoring of your activities goes on? ------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
66) Given the fact that your work is mostly confidential, to what extent are you 
open to the public about your investigations? -------------------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
67) Do you publish the results of your investigations? a) Yes [: ] b) NoE] 
68) In what fon-n? How widely available? 
69) Does Parliament scrutinise what you do? a) Yes [: ] b) No D 
70) Are you subject to the Auditor General? a) YesE] b) No [: ] 
71) In what way is your organisation independent? -------------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
72) Does it have statutory independence? a) Yes [: ] b) No F1 
73) Are you able to protect informants from victimisation? a) Yes [: ] b) No 
74) To what extent can you protect them? 
75) Have there been attempts to intimidate one of your officials? a) Yes [] b) No 
F-I 
76) If yes, what action did you take? 
77) How do you relate to the press? ---------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- I 
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78) Who defines the specific tasks of your organisation? ------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
79) How often do they do it? -------------- 
-------------------------------------------------- 
80) Have you had success in limiting corruption? a) Yes F1 b) No [] 
81) If yes, what'makes you say that? 
82) If no, why do you think you are not successful? 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
83) Have you successfully managed to implement the act(s) which established 
your organisation? a) Yes n b) No [: ] 
84) If yes, what factors account for your success? --------------------------------------- 
85) What is the yardstick for effectiveness? ------------------- 
86) What percentage of the cases You investigate result in prosecutions? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
87) What percentage lead to conviction(s)? 
88) Are there cases you investigate outside your remit? a) Yes [: ] b) No [: ] 
89) If yes, what is the nature of such cases? 
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90) What has your organisation contributed? 
91) Why? 
d) Problems 
92) Is your organisation treated with respect by the government, civil servants and 
members of the Public? a) Yes [: ] b) No 0 
93) Which parts of government? ------------------------------------------------------------ 
94) What problems do you encounter? 
95) How can your problems be solved? 
------------------------------------------------ 
96) What has your organisation failed to do? 
97) What additional resources would help you to do your job more effectively? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
98) Are you happy with the quality of staff? a) Yes [ý] b) No 0 
99) Who detenuines your conditions of service? 
100) Are you adequately paid? a) Yes F] b) No n 
101) How does the state control your organisation? 
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102) What lessons have you learnt from other countries? 
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Appendix 3: Questionnaire for line investigators of anti-corruption agencies 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to solicit information on the effectiveness of 
anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. Please note that 
all information will be treated in confidence. The information will be used in 
aggregate terms and not for individual cases. You are therefore assured complete 
confidentiality. 
a) Personal data 
1) Gender a) ME] b) FF-I 
2) Age group a) 21 - 30E] b) 30 - 40E] c) 40 - 50 [: ] d) 50 - 60E] e) 60 +E: 1 
3) Educational Background a) no schooling M b) PrimaryE: ] 
c) Secondary[: ] d) CollegeF] e) UniversityE] f) Others [j 
4) Citizenship a) Citizen [] b) Non-citizen F-I 
5) What office do you hold with the organisation? 
6) What are the functions and responsibilities of your office /job? ------------------- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
7) What is your previous employment? 
b) Organizational details 
8) What is the name of your organisation? 
9) What is your organisation charged to do? ---------------------------- 
10) Are there any vacant posts in your organisation? a) Yes [] b) No [: ] 
11) Why are they vacant? 
-------------------------------- 
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12) How do you compensate for the vacant posts? ---------- 
13) To whom do you report to? a) PresidentE] b) Minister of JusticcE: ] 
c) Parliament F1 
14) What is the budget of your organisation? a) less than I OmE] b) 10 - 20mE] 
c) 20 - 30m F] d) 30 - 40mE] e) 40-5OmE] f) 50 - 60mE] g) 60m+E] 
15) What proportion of the budget is allocated for different functions? 
a) equipment [: ] b) ManagementE] c) investigationE] d) back-up administration 
EI 
16) Is this enough? a) yesE] b) NoFý 
17) If no, how much more do you really need? 
18) Do you feel your organisation is adequately funded? a) Yes [: ] b) No 
c) Do not know F-I 
c) Functions of the organisation 
19) Why was your organisation established? 
20) How does the statute define corruption? 
21) Do you think this is a useful definition? a) YesE] b) No R c) Do not Know 
F] 
22) Is it an adequate definition? a) Yes [: ] b) No [: ] c) Do not knowE: ] 
23) What kind of expertise do people in your organisation need? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
24) Do you have adequate expertise? a) YesE] b) No R c) Do not knowEj 
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25) Do you receive the necessary training? a) YesE] b) NoF-I c) Do not knowEj 
26) If no, what steps have been taken to provide the required training? -------------- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
27) Do you have the necessary and adequate equipment? a) YesE] b) NoEj c) 
Do not knowF] 
28) What is the exact nature of your powers (specific) given to conduct your 
work? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
29) What is the source of them? 
30) Have there been amendments to your statute to reduce or increase your 
powers? a) yesE] b) NoF-I 
3 1) If yes, why were they changed? 
32) Do you think these changes have made it easier for you to conduct your work? 
- a) yes [: ] b) No F-I 
33) Is the way you exercise your powers subject to extemal review? a) Yes F] b) 
No 
34) What limits are put on the way you exercise your powers? 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
35) Do you feel your organisation enjoys public support? a) Yes [] b) No [] 
36) If yes, what makes you say that? ------------------------------------------------ 
37) If no, what do you think can make the public conscious and confident in your 
work? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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38) Do you think your organisation has the support of politicians? a) Yes [: ] b) No 
F1 
39) Which politicians? a) GovernmentEl b) MPsEj c) both government and MPs 
F-1 
40) If yes, what makes you say that? ----------------------------- 
41) If no, what do you think can make the politicians conscious and confident in 
your work? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
42) In what ways do politicians support your organisation? 
43) With which departments do you co-operate closely? -------------------------------- 
44) Are there any where relations are difficult? a) yes [] b) No F 
45) And why do you think that is? 
46) What strategy do you use to combat corruption? ------------------ 
47) Is it adequate? a) Yes [: ] b) No n 
48) What is the range of penalties offenders may get? 
49) Are the penalties adequate? a) Yes [] b) No F] 
50) Do they act as a deterrent? a) Yes [: ] b) No r] 
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5 1) To whom are you immediately accountable? a) President [] b) Minister of 
Justice F1 c) Minister of Home Affairs [] d) Parliament E: ] e) Judge Police 
n 
52) Is your organisation transparent? a) Yes [: ] b) No F-1 
53) What kind of monitoring of your activities goes on? ------------------------------- 
----------------- 
54) Given the fact that your work is mostly confidential, to what extent are you 
open to the public about your investigations? -------------------------------------------- 
55) Do you publish the results of your investigations? a) Yes [] b) No 0 
56) In what form? How widely available? 
--------------------------------------------------- 
57) Does Parliament scrutinise what you do? a) Yes n b) No n 
5 8) Are you subject to the Auditor General? a) Yes n b) No [: ] 
59) In what way is your organisation independent? 
60) Does it have statutory independence? a) Yes [: ] b) No 
61) Are you able to protect informants from victimisation? a) Yes [: ] b) No [: ] 
62) To what extent can you protect them? 
63) Have there been attempts to intimidate you? a) Yes E] b) No El 
64) If yes, what action did you take? -------------------------------------- 
66) How do you relate to the press? 
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67) Who defines the specific tasks of your organisation? 
68) How often do they do it? 
69) Have you had success in limiting corruption? a) YesE] b) No [: ] 
70) If yes, what makes you say that? -------------------- 
71) If no, why do you think you are not successful? ------------------ 
72) What is the yardstick for effectiveness? 
73) What percentage of the cases you investigate result in prosecutions? 
74) What percentage lead to conviction(s)? ---------------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------------- 7 ------------------------------------------------------ 
75) Are there cases you investigate outside your remit? a) Yes 0 b) No [] 
d) Problems 
76) Is your organisation treated with respect by the government, civil servants and 
members of the Public? a) YesE] b) No D 
77) Which parts of government? 
78) What problems do you encounter? ------------- 
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79) How can your problems be solved? 
80) What has your organisation failed to do? -------------- 
81) What additional resources would help you to do your job more effectively? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------- 
82) Who determines your conditions of service? 
83) Are you adequately paid? a) Yes r] b) No F1 
84) How does the state control your organisation? 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
85) What lessons have you learnt from other countries? -------------------------------- 
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Appendix 4: Questionnaire for senior civil servants, politicians, leaders in 
NGOs, newspaper editors and senior reporters 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to solicit infon-nation on the effectiveness of 
anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. All information 
will be treated in confidence. The information will be used in aggregate terms and 
not for individual cases. You are therefore, assured complete confidentiality. 
a) Personal data 
1) Gender a)MO b)FFJ 
2) Age group a) 21 - 30F-I b) 30 - 40 [D c) 40 - 50E] d) 50 - 60E] c) 60 +E] 
3) Educational Background a) no schoolingE: ] b) PrimaryE: ] c) SecondaryEj 
d) College [: ] e) University [: ] f) OthersF_1 
4) Citizenship a) Citizen n b) Non-citizen R 
b) Functions and organisational details 
5) Why was it established? 
6) What is it charged to do? 
7) Do you think it is doing a valuable job? a) Yes [: ] b) No 
8) Do you think it has it been successful in limiting comption? a) Yes 0 b) NoEj 
9) If yes, what makes you say that? 
10) If no, why has it not been successful in limiting corruption? 
11) Do you notice it? a) YesE: ] b) No F] 
12)'How? 
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13) Do you have any knowledge of any of its investigations? a) YesE] b) NoEj 
15) Do you think it investigates trivial matters? a) YesE] b) No [: ] 
16) Do you feel it interferes with your work / life? a) YesE: ] b) NoFj 
17) If yes, in what ways? 
18) Do you have trust and confidence in this organisation? a) Yes [: ] b) NoEj 
19) Why? 
20) Do you think it enjoys public support? a) Yes F1 b) No [: ] 
- 21) If yes, what makes you say that? 
22) If no, what do you think can make the public conscious and confident in its 
work? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
23) Do you think it enjoys the support of politicians? a) Yes [: ] b) No [J 
24) If yes, what makes you say that? 
25) If no, what do you think can make politicians conscious and confident in its 
work? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
25) Do you think it is independent from government? a) Yes 0 b) No rl 
26) If yes, in what way is it independent? 
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27) If no, what do you think can be done to guarantee its independence? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
28) Do you think it has adequate expertise? a) Yes [ý] b) No n 
29) Do you think it is adequately funded? a) YesE: ] b) NoF-I 
30) What additional resources do you think it needs to do its job better? ------------ 
3 1) Do you think it should it be abandoned? a) YesE: ] b) No n 
32) If yes, why should it be abandoned? 
------------------------------------------------- 
33) Do you think it is an effective organisation? a) Yes [: ] b) NoE] 
c) Problems 
34) What problems does it encounter? 
35) In what ways can these problems be solved? 
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Appendix 5: Cases received by the DCEC in Botswana, September 1994 - 
1999 
1994 
Report (Sep- 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
statistics Dee) 
Number of 
complaints 254 896 1378 1511 1525 1023 6587 
received 
Number made 
in which 237 734 1003 1132 1052 741 4899 
complaints 
identified (93.31%) (81.92%) (72.79%) (68.98%) (68.98%) (72.4%) (74.4%) 
themselves 
Number made 17 162 375 379 473 282 1688 
anonymously (6.69%) (18.08%) (27.21%) (25.08%) (31.02%) (22.6%) (25.6%) 
Number of 
investigations 170 411 417 316 318 362 1994 
commenced 
Number of 
cases either 
referred to 
other bodies 84 485 961 1195 1207 661 4593 
or in which 
no action was 
taken 
Source: Republic of Botswana, 1999 annual report of the DCEC 
Appendix 6: Cases received and finalised by the Public Protector in South 
Africa, October 1995 - June 1996 
Period New cases received Cases finalised 
Oct 1995 121 48 
Nov 1995 155 42 
Dec 1995 71 46 
Jan 1996 135 68 
Feb 1996 146 61 
March 1996 169 54 
April 1996 198 37 
May 1996 202 100 
June 1996 201 47 
Total 1398 503 
NB: 544 cases were carried over from September 1995 and, 1 439 cases carried 
over to I July 1996. Source: Republic of South Africa First half-yearly report 
1996 
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Appendix 7: Cases received and finalised by the Public Protector in South 
Africa, July 1996 - December 1996 
Period New cases received Cases finalised 
July 1996 123 47 
August 1996 292 34 
September 1996 176 43 
October 1996 340 74 
November 1996 251 125 
December 1996 129 73 
Total 1311 396 
NB: 1521 cases were carried forward from June 1996, and 2436 were carried to 
January 1997. Source: Republic of South Africa, second half-yearly report 1996 
Appendix 8: Cases received and finalised by the Public Protector in South 
Africa, January 1997 - December 1997 
Period New cases received Cases flnalised 
January 1997 239 7 
February 1997 228 9 
March 1997 237 7 
April 1997 290 30 
May 1997 367 98 
June 1997 261 117 
July 1997 241 186 
August 1997 312 147 
September 1997 313 173 
October 1997 399 114 
November 1997 290 197 
December 1997 166 99 
Total 3343 1184 
NB: 1 248 cases were carried forward from 1996, and 3406 were carried forward 
to January 1997. Source: Republic of South Africa, Report No 14 for 1 Jan to Dec 
1997 
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Appendix 9: Investigations completed by IDSEO in South Africa, 1993 - 1997 
Case Time taken Amount involved 
1993 Period Alorths 
1. IPCL 7/7/92 - 4/2/93 7.0 Indeterminable 
2. Palm - 30/10/93 ? Indeterminable 
3. Hatec 1/9/92 - 20/4/93 8.0 R60 m 
4. BTM 1/4/92 - 7/12/93 20.0 R17 m 
5. IMR 30/10/92 - 24/12/93 14.0 R28 m 
6. KPL Etsa 26/1/93 - 27/10/93 9.0 R200m 
7. Joubert 21//1/93 - 10/12/93 11.0 R50 m 
8. Fundstrust 1/4/92 - 29/l/93 10.0 R29 m 
9. Cape Municipal 
Fund 
29/l/93 - 1/7/93 5.0 
Average 10.5 
1994 
1. ASA Fasteners 7/9/92 - 23/3/94 6.0 R56m 
2. Two way 12/11/92 - 25/3/94 16.0 R100m 
3. Group 88 4/12/92 - 3/8/94 21.0 R423m 
4. Moutse 18/12/92 - 2919194 21.0 R40m 
5. Pam/Zaz 1/4/93 - 9/5/94 13.0 R23m 
6. Qualis 
Headquarters 
30/11/92 - 19/9/94 22.0 R6m 
7. Deeds office 17/5/93 - 16/5/94 12.0 RO. lm 
8. Slade 21/5/93 - 9/9/94 16.0 R6.5m 
9. Bitrich 16/11/93 24/8/94 9.0 Rllm 
10. Table Mountain 
Trust 
113194 17/10/94 9.5 R10m 
11. IEC 29/9/94 24/11/94 2.0 R2.8m 
12 CET 24/4/92 25/5/94 25.0 R490m 
13 Sure Group 7/12/92 25/5/94 18.5 R5m 
14. President Insurance 18/11/92 - 25/2/94 16.0 R20m 
Average 14.8 
1995 
I Tollgate 2/2/93 - 12/6/95 16.0 R350m 
2. Escoffely 212195 - 29/9/5 8.0 RI8.6m 
3. Crest 2/11/92 - 2/2/95 27.0 R6m 
4. XR Sales 3/11/93 - 31/1/95 15.0 RO. 5m 
Average 16.5 
1996 
1. Le Roux 18/10/93 - 6/96 32.0 R25m 
2. Hamex 4/3/93 - 24/5/96 38.5 R9m 
3. Alpha Bank 10/12/93 - 30/7/96 31.5 Indeterminable 
4. Rail Commuter 
Corporation 
19/9/94 - 21/10/96 25.0 R25m 
5. Booysens/NedBa 
nk 
17/11/94 - 24/1/96 14.0 RI 800m 
6. Ru olph 9/l/95 - 2/7/96 18.0 R5m 
7. Foundation for 
Peace& Justice 
10/2/95 - 17/1/96 11.0 R3m 
8. National Tourism 
Forum 
10/3/95 - 30/8/96 17.5 R4m 
9. Reyneke 16/4/93 - 9/l/96 21.0 R12.5m 
10 Emeralds 21/4/92 - 19/12/96 56.0 R350m 
Average 26.5 
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Appendix 9: Investigations completed by IDSEO (continued) 
1997 (to date) 
1. Fancourt 2/2/95 5/3/97 25.0 R100m 
2. Zhauns Textile 15/6/94 - 21/4/97 34.0 R6.3m 
3. Molyneux 6/11/95 - 5/6/97 19.0 R7m 
4. TPANPA 
Contracts 
14/9/94 - 20/8/97 35.0 R3m 
5. Sivils Bamard 29/3/95 - 9/10/97 30.0 R9.8m 
6. Puma Sales 23/8/95 - 15/10/97 25.5 R12.6m 
7. Granagia Trust 30/3/95 - 16/10/97 30.5 RO. 75m 
8. Owen Wiggins 16/1/95 - 4/11/97 33.5 R12m 
MF 20/5/92 - 10/12/97 66.5 Indetern-ýnable 
Average 33.2 
NB: The names used above are convenient names. Source: Republic of South 
Africa, IDSEO Annual report: I July 1996 to 30 June 1997 
